He taught us little: but our soul
Had felt him like the thunder's roll

Matthew Arnold

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dīgharattaṁ hitāy' assa ṭhānaso upakappatu (Pv I 4[4]).

Preface

We are now a mere two years away from the centenary of the foundation of the Pali Text Society and the majority of texts that make up the Pali Canon have long since been available in a reasonably reliable English translation. In addition the labours of a band of international scholars have provided us with thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of books on Buddhism to the extent that to draw up an exhaustive bibliography on Pali Buddhism alone would be an all but impossible task.

One might think, therefore, that by now an extensive bank of knowledge were available and that little more remained to be said other than as regards those issues of seemingly incompatible doctrine stubbornly resisting solution. Yet when we seek for a book going beyond a general introduction to the religion we tend often to seek in vain and as Rune E. A. Johansson has observed:

> Invalid generalisations seem to be one of the cardinal sins of scholarly works. Views about Buddhism have very frequently been based on a very limited range of material, most often a few quotations from the Pali Canon. There are, as a matter of fact, a small number of quotations that appear again and again, while hundreds of others always pass unnoticed[1]

This is perhaps understandable given the quite daunting fact that the Nikāyas – the earliest stratum of the Pali Canon – alone amount to more than five thousand pages in translation. It is only a fortunate few who, unencumbered by the other pressures of academic life, can find the time to read – and re-read, for once is not enough – through these texts in their entirety; but when they do they are likely to find that not only are the majority of such generalisations not substantiated by the texts but also that they are often contradicted by the wealth of suttas lying between those usually cited.

For the sad fact is that much of the basic terminology and symbolism of the Nikāyas is still in need of detailed investigation. Indeed the fact that a good many terms were used with a distinctly technical sense has often escaped most scholars including, it may be noted, translators of the Pali Canon; and whilst it might be going too far to say that these texts are written in a code – for there is no evidence that they were written in a deliberately deceptive fashion – it is nonetheless necessary that their

code be broken if we, some two thousand five hundred years later, are to understand what they are able to tell us. Until now Buddhism has tended, consciously or otherwise, to suffer demythologisation at the hands of those ignorant of its mythology including, it may be added, some scholars in the East aping the bad habits of the West, so much so that the time has surely come when the texts should be seen in their own terms. If the Buddhism of ancient India is to be understood it will have to be remythologised in the sense that there will have to be restored to its technical and metaphorical language all the nuances and associations its terms once had for those who heard them. It is the task of the present work to take a short but positive step in that direction. In so doing one must be very careful to avoid passing any judgements of one's own. One will have to accept that for the Buddhist of the day – as indeed it remains the case with many in the East to this day – the claim that the Buddha had freed the hearts of eighty-four thousand beings from the āsavas in but one instant was greeted with no less credulity than the claim that he had done this for one person: the large number did not give rise to suspicions of exaggeration but rather to awe at the great majesty of the Buddha. At the same time, however, it will be necessary that any value judgements or prejudices of the Buddhists themselves are preserved and I have, at times, endeavoured to give renewed expression to the antipathy, indeed the sheer disgust they seem to have felt for the puthujjana and the brahmin of their day. In addition I have adhered to the presupposition commonly found in many Indian schools from the Vedic period onwards that to speak about the cosmos (ādhidaivic) and to speak about the human mind (ādhyātmic) are two different ways of speaking about the same thing. For each level of consciousness there is a cosmic counterpart – or for each level of the cosmos there is a corresponding state of consciousness. Neither is in any sense prior. To say that one reaches the Brahmaloka or enters jhāna is to say the same thing but with a different model. Neither is reducible to the other: rather both are equally figurative ways of referring to some elusive neutral phenomenon lying somewhere between the two. Thus we find that the Buddhist has no difficulty if nibbāna is on occasion spoken of as though it were a place and at other times as though it were a state of mind. It is only the western mind that has found difficulty with this manner of expression and, as a consequence, has generally assumed that talk of nibbāna as a place is a figurative way of talking about nibbāna which is really a state of mind. In emphasising those passages in which nibbāna is spoken of as a place I hope I may have restored a little balance to this matter.[2]

I have throughout adhered to the principle of Johansson in that it has been 'the intention of the present writer . . . not to review what others have written but to make a fresh and independent attempt to under-

stand'.[3] In the main I have restricted my remarks to the Nikāyas by which I mean the Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṁyutta and Aṅguttara Nikāyas, the Udāna, Itivuttaka, Dhammapada and Sutta Nipāta since these texts may, for reasons of style, be said to form a literary unit. Moreover, they present a doctrine which, whilst clearly in transition, nonetheless remains sufficiently unified to distinguish it from ideas expressed in such texts as those of the Abhidhamma and the Visuddhimagga and the commentaries in general (although I do not hesitate to cite the support of the commentaries where this is felt to be useful). Most importantly, these texts all exhibit the same purpose – to record instances believed to have occurred during the Buddha's own lifetime. I do not mean by this that there is no doubt as to the historicity of the Pali Nikāyas nor do I wish to imply that these texts provide either the earliest, or the most authentic, account of the historical Buddha; and when I claim that such were the case 'in the Buddha's own lifetime' I mean no more than in that mythological lifetime handed down to us in the Pali Nikāyas. The translations of the various passages discussed are largely my own. This has been necessary to ensure consistency, especially given the technical nature of many of the terms. Some such terms I have, however, left untranslated, supplying a glossary and hoping that their ramifications will become clear as the discussion unfolds. On a few occasions, where there seemed no material advantage in trying to perfect an already good translation – or where an existing translation had a poetic quality – I have felt content to utilise such existing translations, silently emending them where appropriate.

Given the inter-relatedness of many of the concepts it has often been extremely difficult, indeed sometimes arbitrary, to decide where to begin, the task being made all the more arduous through the absence of any other works dealing with these topics to which I might have referred the reader. Only the reader will know to what extent I have been successful, although I suspect that I have fallen far short of the ideal of clarity I had hoped for. To compensate for this, and as a general guide to the whole work, I give here a brief summary of each chapter, highlighting some of the more important topics touched upon.

In the first chapter I seek to show that the spiritual division of the Buddhist world was represented in the Nikāyas not by that of monk and layman but by that of ariyasāvaka* and puthujjana. It was the ariyasāvaka* alone who was in possession of right view* in the sense that he had seen the impermanence of the phenomenal world, the existence of a sanctuary lying beyond that realm of impermanence and also the path* leading to that sanctuary. Only the ariyasāvaka* is on the path* to nibbāna, the path* to the cessation of rebirth. The puthujjana, on the other hand, lacking this vision of the ariyasāvaka* remains ignorant of

the existence of that path*. He does not see things as they really are* and instead remains attached to ensnaring sensual delights, treading at best the path of merit that leads to continued rebirth within saṁsāra. This spiritual division transcends the purely social one of monk and layman since many laymen and devas were ariyasāvakas* and many monks puthujjanas. In order to emphasise this distinction and, moreover, to isolate technical terms applicable only to the ariyasāvaka* I have made use of the asterisk (*): any term bearing an asterisk is to be understood as either denoting a particular variety of ariyasāvaka* – such as the arahant* – or an epithet or attribute exclusive to the ariyasāvaka* – for instance that he alone treads the ariyan* eightfold path*.

In the second chapter I argue that the evidence of the Nikāyas suggests that the ariyan* eightfold path* began, as the Buddha always said it did, with right view*. However, since the path* would seem to incorporate all aspects of Buddhist practice this entails that there can be no practice by means of which such right view* might be acquired. Indeed upon examination of those instances recording the acquisition of right view* by a given individual we always find that it was acquired at the end of a specially tailored oral initiation by the Buddha in which he first descended to the level of the individual concerned and, by means of a progressive talk, gradually guided him into a state of consciousness in which he could see for himself the impermanence of the phenomenal world, the sanctuary beyond and the path* thereto. At this moment he became an ariyasāvaka*, a hearer of the roar of the Timeless Beyond. It was this insight* granted by the Buddha that formed the right view* of the path*. It was accompanied by six benefits guaranteeing successful progress along the path* of which the most important were: (a) that the person concerned had been thereby established upon the ariyan* eightfold path* that prevented the generation of any fresh kamma; and (b) that the arising of right view* had brought to destruction the majority of all kamma previously generated. Without this twin freedom from kamma new and old the goal of freedom from rebirth would clearly be unthinkable.

In the third chapter I suggest that, again on the basis of actual cases recorded, acquisition of the goal of the path* was as much the outcome of an oral teaching as had been that path's entrance. Moreover such path* consummation generally followed path* entrance with remarkable rapidity – often in a matter of minutes and hardly ever in more than seven days. At this point the goal was deemed won but the form that goal took depended upon the nature of the kammic remnant left unaffected by the arising of right view*. If it was of a nature to be expiated in that same lifetime one became an arahant*; if not then one of the many other varieties of ariyasāvaka* depending upon the outstanding saṁsāric time

required for the expiation of that remnant. That is to say, the various types of ariyasāvaka*, mistaken by some as stages on the path* to liberation, are really independent goals of that path* distinguished on the grounds of this kammic substrate alone. In the course of the discussion I examine the term sotāpanna* and suggest that it may have been originally a term denoting the converted in general. Finally, the fact that it seems crucial that one came to hear Dhamma from the Buddha raises the issue of whether this is to be seen as an exercise of grace on the part of the Buddha and also whether his ariyasāvakas* possessed the ability to cause right view* to arise to others.

In the last chapter I turn my attention to the relationship between Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇic tradition in general and argue that the Buddhists were critical of the brahmin on the grounds that he no longer lived up to the social and religious ideal that had been associated with his predecessors. These ideals were now to be found in the ariyasāvaka* alone who was now said to be the true brahmin*. If the Buddhists were reformists or innovators this was only in the sense that they advocated a return to what they saw as the former conservatism of Vedic India.

This is in every sense a pioneer work and its shortcomings are more than apparent to me. If I should appear to contradict myself from time to time this may be a genuine mistake. On the other hand, the texts are themselves frequently fraught with contradictions, or with what appear to be contradictions, for the more one becomes familiar with the code of the Nikāyas the more these apparent contradictions are resolved. Since the texts also preserve doctrines that are in transition, however, certain terms and concepts are themselves in a process of change. This is apparent in the case of the sotāpanna* which may first have meant the converted in general, then one of the goals of the path* and finally for some a stage on the way to a sole goal expressed in terms of arahantship*. Since it is the latter of these three uses that is commonly employed in modern secondary sources I have in the beginning abided by it so as to avoid unnecessary confusion. Moreover, it will no doubt be noted that I speak at times of there being puthujjana monks during the Buddha's own lifetime whilst at others I voice my suspicion that during his lifetime individuals became monks only as a result of becoming sāvakas*. The real situation may be that, although those going forth under the Buddha only did so as a result of becoming sāvakas*, there was a tendency for these monks, with or without the Buddha's permission, to ordain others who were still at the level of the puthujjana. To decide this matter is clearly impossible given the contradictory nature of the passages concerned, half suggesting one were the case, half the other. Other issues are equally difficult to resolve given the silence of the texts and the lack of any clear statement on many of the perplexing issues connected with the

ariyasāvaka* may be seen from the extent to which such issues form the basis of the various points of controversy in the Kathāvatthu. If agreement upon such matters were not possible so soon after the Buddha's Parinibbāna, it is unlikely that they can be resolved today. My next reading of the Nikāyas will probably cause me to rethink some of the claims made in the present work but if, in the meantime, enough has been said to stir others into realisation of the need for a re-examination of the Buddhism portrayed in the Nikāyas, my efforts will have been rewarded.

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Notes to Preface

1 Rune E. A. Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvana* (London 1969), p. 9.
2 For further details on this and Figure 4 on p. 165 see my 'Mind/Cosmos Maps in the Pali Nikāyas', in *Buddhist and Western Psychology*, ed. Nathan Katz, Prajna Press, Boulder, 1983, pp. 69–93.
3 Op. cit., p. 10.

Chapter One

The Spiritual Division of the Buddhist World

The ariyasāvaka* and the puthujjana

That the Buddhist world is socially divided into monk and layman is obvious – perhaps too obvious since this has seemingly misled most into assuming that this is also its spiritual[1] division. In his discussion of the relationship of animism and Buddhism in the context of the Theravāda in Burma, Professor Ling appears to favour the view of the anthropologist Mendelson who argues that 'it is misleading and incorrect to think in terms of a rigid dichotomy between what is popular and what is monastic' and that rather 'one should think in terms of a continuum, from animistic ideas on the one hand, to abstract analyses of the Dhamma on the other'.[2] Mendelson grants that though 'there does appear to be an inexplicable gap between the worship of a host of varied spirits on the one hand, and the practice of an austere, godless, self-renouncing philosophy or way of life on the other', when village and monastic life are studied separately, it is nonetheless 'possible to discern that there are connecting links between these two, so that, in fact, Buddhism is in living contact with the popular religion; the two are seen "in their right perspectives as two poles of a continuum which is Burmese religion"'.[3]

Such a view, it will be noticed, assumes that whether one speaks either in terms of lay and monastic Buddhism or in terms of animism and a self-renouncing philosophy, it is, in either case, the same physical division of the Buddhist world that is involved. Yet it does not follow from the fact that the layman is socially distinct from the monk that he need be spiritually distinct. For it is surely not in the mere shaving of the head and beard and in the donning of the yellow robe that a transformation of one's being, or of one's weltanschauung, should result, as though one's animistic beliefs should drop away with the falling of each lock of hair (M i 281f):

> I, monks, do not say that the recluseship of one who wears an outer cloak depends merely on his wearing of an outer cloak . . . If, monks, the

> covetousness of one who is covetous and who wears an outer cloak could be got rid of merely by wearing an outer cloak, if the malevolence of mind . . . the wrath . . . the grudging . . . the hypocrisy . . . the spite . . . the jealousy . . . the stinginess . . . the treachery . . . the craftiness . . . the evil desires . . . the wrong view of one who is of wrong view could be got rid of, then his friends and acquaintances, kith and kin, would make him wear an outer cloak from the very day that he was born, would encourage him to wear an outer cloak, saying, 'Come, you auspicious-faced, become a wearer of an outer cloak, for on your being a wearer of an outer cloak the covetousness of one who is covetous . . . the wrong view of one who is of wrong view will be got rid of merely by the wearing of an outer cloak'.
>
> But because I, monks, see here some wearers of an outer cloak who are covetous, malevolent in mind, wrathful, grudging, hypocritical, spiteful, jealous, stingy, treacherous, crafty, of evil desires, of wrong view, therefore I do not say that the recluseship of one who wears an outer cloak depends merely on his wearing of an outer cloak.

Indeed the eight-year-old monk is unlikely to be any more spiritually advanced than his eight-year-old lay cousin – and quite possibly less spiritually advanced than an adult lay-follower. Similarly, the non-meditating adult monk, of which there are many in Ceylon, may well be spiritually inferior to his meditating lay supporter, and several laymen in Ceylon meditate. This sentiment finds expression in the Nikāyas where, for instance, Gopikā, by her own admission a mere (lay) woman (D ii 272) but nonetheless a sāvaka* (D ii 273) possessed of the sotāpattiyaṅgas* (D ii 271) – and thus here probably a sotāpanna* – rebukes, upon her rebirth in the Tāvatiṁsa realm, three former monks reborn in that same realm as mere gandhabbas saying, 'Where were your ears, good sirs, that you did not hear Dhamma from the Lord?' (Kuto mukhā nāma tumhe mārisā tassa Bhagavato dhammaṁ assutvā – D ii 272). One might equally cite the case of the householder Citta who was declared by the Buddha to be chief amongst his sāvaka* lay-followers who talked on Dhamma (A i 26) and who was called upon to clarify a point of doctrine upon which theras, even, could not agree, such theras subsequently praising Citta on the extent of his paññā* (S iv 281–283); later in the same Saṁyutta, Citta can also be found teaching first devas and then his relatives upon the subject of the impermanence of things (S iv 302–304). It is, moreover, worthy of note that in some of the intervening suttas groups of theras are to be found being instructed by the most junior amongst them on this or that point of doctrine of which they themselves are unsure (e.g. S iv 283–288).

Such passages confirm that neither one's standing within the monastic community nor indeed the fact that one was a monk at all necessarily entailed spiritual superiority and it is simply fallacious to assume, as most

writers on Buddhism appear to have done, that the social division of monk and layman is also the spiritual division of the Buddhist world. It is, of course, true that such a social distinction finds mention in the Nikāyas but it is continuously asserted in these texts that there is another, purely spiritual, division of the Buddhist community in terms of the puthujjana and the sāvaka* that totally transcends this social division and it is with a detailed examination of these two categories that the remainder of this chapter will be concerned.

The puthujjana is said to be assutavant. Translators have differed in their interpretation of these two, really quite simple, terms and we find assutavā puthujjano rendered variously as 'uneducated manyfolk' (KS v 316; GS i 8), 'unlearned average man' (GS iii 46; GS iv 39f), 'unlearned common average folk' (GS iv 108), 'untaught manyfolk' (KS iii 38; KS iv 195), 'ignorant worldling' (KS iv 98) and 'uninstructed average person' (MLS i 3), whilst puthujjana alone is rendered as 'ordinary man' (GS ii 170), '(average) many man' (GS iv 247), 'average man' (KS i 186), 'average worldling' (KS i 167) and so on. Most of these renderings are quite misleading and none conveys the essential connotation that these terms possessed during the Nikāya period. Assutavant means, literally, 'one who is not in possession of suta (Vedic śruta)', the oral transmission of the sacred lore or revelation (cp śruti). The puthujjana is thus one who has not heard the teaching or the tradition (MLS i 3 n 8; cp Dhs trans 258 n 2), that is to say, the Dhamma; it is in this crucial knowledge that he is deficient. This is confirmed by the stock description of the assutavant puthujjana as: ariyānaṁ adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinīto sappurisānaṁ adassāvī sappurisadhammassa akovido sappurisadhamme avinīto (M i 1, 7; S iii 16, 42, 46; S iv 287, etc.). The first of these epithets describes the puthujjana as ariyānaṁ adassāvī, without the ability to discern who is an ariyan*, the ariyan* being defined as a Buddha, a Paccekabuddha or a sāvaka* of a Buddha (MA i 21). This inability is paralleled in the second half of the passage by his being also sappurisānaṁ adassāvī, without the ability to discern who is a sappurisa*, the sappurisa* being defined as a Paccekabuddha or a sāvaka* of the Tathāgata (MA i 21; cp Asl 349). The Cūḷapuṇṇamasutta (M iii 20ff) goes further by asserting that it is impossible for one who is not a sappurisa* to tell of another whether he is a sappurisa* or a non-sappurisa, whereas the sappurisa* can discern either quality in another. According to C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Buddhaghosa 'points out at some length that the inability to perceive, lit., see, holy persons is no mere visual shortcoming, but a lack of insight or of intelligent inference. The truly noble, as such, seen with the bodily, or with the 'divine' eye, are not really seen. Their appearance (vaṇṇo) is apprehended, but not the area of

their noble nature, even as dogs and jackals, etc., see them and know them not. Even the personal attendant of a Thera may not discern the hero in his master, so hard is it without insight and understanding to discern the standpoint attained by the saints, or the conditions of true nobility' (Dhs trans 258 n 4). The reason for this inability seems twofold: firstly, the sappurisa* is, in a sense, not accessible to the puthujjana since when entering upon the plane of the sappurisa* the plane of the puthujjana is transcended (sappurisabhūmiṁ okkanto vītivatto puthujjanabhūmiṁ – S iii 225); secondly, the puthujjana may not even be aware that there are such beings as sāvakas* since he is ariyadhammassa akovido, unconversant with the Dhamma of the ariyans*, and ariyadhamme avinīto, not guided* or instructed in that same Dhamma – hence the statement that the puthujjana is the man not skilled in the path* (puriso amaggakusalo ti kho Tissa puthujjanass' etaṁ adhivacanaṁ – S iii 108).

Thus leaving the term puthujjana untranslated for the present we find that the puthujjana is one who has not heard the Dhamma, one who is unable to discern who are ariyans*, one who is not guided* in the Dhamma of the ariyans*, one who is unable to discern who are sappurisas*, one who is unconversant with the Dhamma of the sappurisas*, and one who is not guided* in the Dhamma of the sappurisas*.

It is with such a puthujjana that the sāvaka*, or ariyasāvaka*, is contrasted (e.g. A iv 68, 157, etc.) and who is said, conversely, to be: sutavā ariyasāvako ariyānaṁ dassāvī ariyadhammassa kovido ariyadhamme suvinīto sappurisānaṁ dassāvī sappurisadhammassa kovido sappurisadhamme suvinīto (M i 8, 300, 310, 434; S iii 17, 44, 47, 102, etc.). The term sāvaka* is derived, like suta above, from the root śru and means, literally, 'One who hears'. Hare's rendering of ariyasāvaka* as 'Ariyan listener' (GS iv 39f) is thus preferable to its more usual rendering as 'ariyan disciple' (e.g. KS iii 38; and Hare himself at GS iii 46, GS iv 108). However, according to SnA 166 one is an ariyasāvaka* on account of having heard (Dhamma) in the presence of the ariyans* (ariyānaṁ santike sutattā ariyasāvako) and the whole passage therefore states that the ariyasāvaka* is one who has heard the Dhamma (in the presence of the ariyans*), one who is able to discern who are ariyans*, one who is conversant with the Dhamma of the ariyans*, one who is well guided* in the Dhamma of the ariyans*, one who is able to discern who are sappurisas*, one who is conversant with the Dhamma of the sappurisas*, and one who is well guided* in the Dhamma of the sappurisas*.

The main point of difference between the puthujjana and the sāvaka* is therefore that the former, unlike the latter, has not heard the Dhamma.

Now it is such sāvakas* who constitute the sāvakasaṅgha*, sometimes referred to as the ariyasaṅgha*, the stock description of which runs as follows (D iii 227; M i 37; S ii 69f, etc.):

> The Lord's sāvakasaṅgha* is of good conduct, the Lord's sāvakasaṅgha* is of upright conduct, the Lord's sāvakasaṅgha* is of right conduct, the Lord's sāvakasaṅgha* is of proper conduct, that is to say the four pairs of men, the eight individuals. The Lord's sāvakasaṅgha* is worthy of sacrifice, worthy of hospitality, worthy of offerings, worthy of añjali; it is the unsurpassed merit-field for the world.

Now these 'four pairs of men, the eight individuals' are said to be:

1 the sotāpanna*
2 the one practising for the sotāpatti-fruit*
3 the sakadāgāmin*
4 the one practising for the sakadāgāmin-fruit*
5 the anāgāmin*
6 the one practising for the anāgāmin-fruit*
7 the arahant* (although PED, sv sāvaka, wrongly claims that the sāvaka* is never an arahant*)
8 the one practising for the arahant-fruit*

[A iv 292; cp Sn 227 = Khp VI[6]; see also S i 233, A iv 293 which state that the four who are practising and the four who are established in the fruits make up the saṅgha that is upright (cattāro ca paṭipannā cattāro ca phale ṭhitā esa saṅgho ujubhūto)]. Thus one may infer that anyone who is an ariyasāvaka* must, at the same time, be one or other of these eight varieties of ariyapuggala*. This explains how it can be said that ariyasāvakas* are, through their possession of the four sotāpattiyaṅgas* (sometimes called the four floods of merit – e.g. A ii 56) of confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha plus possession of that morality (sīla) dear to the ariyans*, spared (further) rebirth in the hells, in an animal womb, on the peta-plane or in any of the four states of loss, in any bad destiny or in the downfall (so parimutto ca nirayā parimutto ca tiracchayoniyā parimutto ca pittivisayā parimutto ca apāyaduggativinipātā – S v 342), which is usually predicted of the sotāpanna* (e.g. A iii 211: khīṇanirayo 'mhi khīṇatiracchānayoniyo khīṇapittivisayo khīṇāpāyaduggativinipāto, sotāpanno 'ham asmi avinipātadhammo niyato sambodhiparāyano) and occasionally of the whole sāvakasaṅgha* (e.g. A iv 378ff). It was these same sotāpattiyaṅgas*, it will be recalled, that were possessed by Gopikā above; and anyone in whom they are lacking is considered a puthujjana (S v 362f, 381f, 386).

The most important distinguishing feature of the ariyasāvaka* and upon which, as we shall see, all of his other qualities depend, is his

possession of right view*. Unlike the puthujjana he understands as it really is* (yathābhūtaṁ) dukkha, the uprising of dukkha, the cessation of dukkha and the (eightfold) path* leading to the cessation of dukkha (A ii 202); that is to say, he has insight* (paññā*) into the Four Truths* (A iii 2, 53; A iv 4). This view and knowledge of the ariyasāvaka* is ariyan*, supermundane* (lokuttara) and not shared by puthujjanas (ariyaṁ lokuttaraṁ asādhāraṇaṁ puthujjanehi – M i 323f; cp M iii 115) and one who possesses such right view* (diṭṭhisampanna*, which the commentary explains as an ariyasāvaka* who is a sotāpanna* possessing the (right) view* of the (eightfold) path* – AA ii 1) is thereby incapable of behaviour associated with, and expected of, the puthujjana, such as to regard anything that is compounded as permanent, satisfactory or as the self (A i 27). The puthujjana, on the other hand, living apart from knowledge and conduct, being unversed in conduct, neither knows nor sees things as they really are* (A ii 163) and it is through his inability to understand anything as it really is* (S iii 81ff, 171ff) that he does not understand as it really is* that the mind (citta) is radiant, with the result that there is for him no cultivation (bhāvanā) of that mind (A i 10). Right view*, or seeing things as they really are*, is clearly the province of the ariyasāvaka* alone (S ii 43 = 44 = 58 = 79; cp S ii 80):

> He is called, monks, an ariyasāvaka* who possesses (right) view*, who possesses vision*, who has come to this true Dhamma*, who sees this true Dhamma*, who is endowed with the knowledge (ñāṇena) of the sekha* (i.e. a sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* or anāgāmin*), who is endowed with the wisdom (vijjāya) of the sekha*, who has attained the Dhamma-ear*, who has the ariyan* insight of revulsion, who stands having arrived at the door to the Deathless*

We may surmise that it is in virtue of this Dhamma-ear* (dhammasota – see also A iii 288, A v 329 and comments at GS v 96 n 3) that the ariyan* is called a hearer (sāvaka*) and described as one who has heard the Dhamma (sutavā). That sāvaka* has this restricted sense and never that of hearing in general is confirmed at KhpA 183: 'Now all these are sāvakas* of the Sugata since they hear (suṇanti) him. Of course others hear him too, but when they have heard him they fail to do the task to be done. These, however, when they have heard him, reach the paths* and the fruits* . . . which is why they are called sāvakas*'. Dhammapāla puts the matter more forcibly, defining the sāvaka* as one who becomes born of the ariyan* birth upon hearing the Dhamma from the Perfectly Enlightened One (sammāsambuddhassa dhammasavanante ariyāya jātiyā jātatāya taṁ dhammaṁ suṇanti tī sāvakā – VvA 194f). This is in strict accord with the statement of the Buddha that 'He, monks, who does not know, does not see, when the Tathāgata is thus announcing,

teaching, making known, establishing, revealing, analysing and setting out (the khandhas), him, monks, do I set at naught as a foolish puthujjana, blind, lacking vision, unknowing, unseeing' (S iii 140). Here we may recall the instance of Gopikā rebuking certain (former) monks saying, 'Where were your ears, good sirs, that you did not hear Dhamma from the Lord? (D ii 272) – to which Buddhaghosa adds 'Where were your ears? When the Lord was facing you and teaching Dhamma, where were your ears – were you absent-mindedly looking about you this way and that or were you sleeping?' (DA 707).

Thus either because he does not get to hear the Dhamma or, if he does, because he remains unaffected thereby, the puthujjana lacks the insight* that arises on hearing that Dhamma and thus fails to see things as they really are*. As a result he remains foolish (M iii 219) and continues to take delight in the five strands of the sense-pleasures (S iv 196, 201) which are elsewhere styled the puthujjana-happiness, the unariyan-happiness and the dung-like happiness (M i 454 = iii 236; cp A iii 342). Moreover, it is through this continued attachment to the sense-pleasures that he remains subject to Māra and as a consequence does not pass beyond old age, decay, disease and death – he is troubled by such sights of impermanence (A i 145f), remaining ignorant of the eightfold path* that leads to passing beyond these (A i 180). In short the puthujjana, unlike the ariyasāvaka*, is still subject to dukkha in all its forms (S iv 206–210; A iv 158): he is still subject to repeated rebirth, often of an unpleasant kind (A i 267; A ii 126ff), and even though he may temporarily gain a good birth, he continually gives rise to the khandhas (S iii 152). The puthujjana, then, unlike the ariyasāvaka*, is no end-maker (A ii 163).

> Sights, sounds, tastes, odours, things touched and objects of the mind are, without exception, pleasing, delightful and charming so long as one can say 'they are';
>
> These are considered sukha by the world with its devas and when they cease to be this is by them considered dukkha.
>
> The cessation of the existing group (of khandhas) is seen as sukha by the ariyans* – this (insight*) of those that can see is the reverse with the whole world:
>
> What others say is sukha, that the ariyans* say is dukkha; what others say is dukkha, that the ariyans* know as sukha. Behold this Dhamma, difficult to understand, wherein the ignorant are bewildered.
>
> For those enveloped there is darkness, blindness for those who cannot see; whilst for the wise there is an opening, like light to those with sight. Fools unconversant with the Dhamma (dhammass' akovidā – cp above), though in its presence, do not discern it.
>
> By those overcome by lust for becoming and who drift with the current of

becoming, gone to Māra's realm, this Dhamma is not properly awoken to; who else but the ariyans* are worthy of awakening to that place, that place by knowing which the anāsavas* (arahants*) parinibbāti with right aññā*? (S iv 127f = Sn 759–765; cp A ii 52).

It is clear from the above passages that the puthujjana was often looked upon with little short of disgust. Although the Buddhists sought to express the spiritual division of the Buddhist world by means of the terms sāvaka* and puthujjana, one cannot but wonder to what extent their synonyms, ariyan* and unariyan, continued to convey a racial sentiment. A detailed discussion of this problem will be held in reserve for a later chapter but here at least this may be anticipated a little by noting that the Buddha, reputedly of kṣatriyan origins, is on occasion portrayed as holding somewhat stronger views on racial purity than some of his brahmin contemporaries. In the Ambaṭṭha Sutta, for instance, we find him criticising the brahmin Ambaṭṭha – whose ancestry he traces to the black baby of a slave-girl of the kṣatriyans (D i 93) – on the grounds that brahmins would accept, and accord full brahmin status to, the offspring of a kṣatriyan–brahmin marriage. This the kṣatriyans would never do due to the impurity of descent on the brahmin side (D i 97ff) and indeed the Buddha's own clan are praised by him on the grounds that they went to the extent of incest rather than injure the purity of their line (D i 92). The manner in which the Āryan had shunned the non-Āryan, indigenous population seems to some extent perpetuated in the new ariyan* holding himself aloof from the low, pagan, unariyan practice of the puthujjana (hīno gammo pothujjaniko anariyo – S iv 330f; A v 216; cp Vin i 10) and to daub such a practice 'pagan' (gammo) – both literally 'of the village' – may well have been intended to convey some degree of racial feeling since it was often to the village beyond the city that the despised groups, often the products of mixed marriages (cp Encyclopedia of Buddhism III 4 692 n 6) and those from whom the truly Āryan should keep himself apart, were consigned.

Such a sense of exclusion can be felt in many of the passages dealing with the puthujjana: he is apart from various good states (M i 148); he lives apart from knowledge and conduct (A ii 163); whilst Buddhaghosa defines the puthujjana as one who is separate and apart from those who are ariyans* given to virtue and learning (Dhs trans 258 n 3; cp Mhv i 28 n 8). The happiness of the puthujjana is an unariyan happiness (M i 454 = iii 236) and since he does not possess the sotāpattiyaṅgas* possessed by the ariyasāvaka* (S v 397) nor the five indriyas of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant* (S v 202) he is, therefore, 'an outsider, one who stands in the ranks of the puthujjana' (bāhiro puthujjanapakkhe ṭhito – S v 202, 397). Thus as regards the meaning of the term puthujjana (Sanskrit pṛthag-jana) it is hard to credit the claim of

PED that 'one may even say that puthu[1] = pṛthak (separate, apart) is not felt at all in the Pali word' (PED sv puthujjana). Rather the evidence of the texts suggests that puthujjana, in its primary sense, meant not only one who was apart, separate, from those who alone had insight* into things as they really are* but also one from whom, for this reason, the ariyans* should keep themselves apart – and probably in much the same manner that their ancestors had shunned the indigenous non-Āryan. Moreover, had it been the intention of the authors of these texts merely to denote the 'manyfolk' or the 'world at large' as all the renderings mentioned earlier give us to believe they could have conveyed this quite adequately by means of such terms as mahājana (cp PvA 111 and passim) or bahujana: compare, for instance, how the Tathāgata is said to arise for the welfare of the manyfolk (bahujanahitāya), for the happiness of the manyfolk (bahujanasukhāya) (A i 22); one never finds puthujjana in such contexts (cp M i 179f; A ii 37, etc.). For translators to have continually rendered assutavant puthujjana as 'uneducated manyfolk' or as 'unlearned average man' has done nothing but serve to obscure the true spiritual division of the Buddhist world in the Nikāya period in terms of those who had heard the Dhamma and had, as a consequence, attained insight* as to how things really are*, thereby gaining the assurance of liberation, and those who had not (Dhp 58–59):

> Just as on a rubbish heap swept up on a main road a purely fragrant, delightful lotus might there spring up,
> Even so amidst those rubbish heaps (of men) does the sāvaka* of the Perfectly Enlightened One outshine in insight* the blind puthujjana

Sāvaka* laymen

Who, one may ask, were these sāvakas* and who these puthujjanas, these rubbish heaps of men? PED, sv sutavant, claims that assutavā puthujjano means 'laymen' which, if true, would make expressions such as gahapati ariyasāvako (A ii 65) and sāvakā gihī (M ii 23) somewhat difficult to explain. However, as mentioned already, the categories of the sāvaka* and the puthujjana transcend the purely social division of monk and layman and whilst no doubt many, perhaps most, laymen were puthujjanas, a good many others were not. We have, for instance, already found the laywoman Gopikā to have been possessed of the sotāpattiyaṅgas* and at A iii 213 it is said that any white-frocked householder might declare himself a sotāpanna* on finding himself possessed of these sotāpattiyaṅgas*. Indeed upon examination of the texts it becomes evident that a large proportion of those declared sāvakas* were

lay men and women. Several instances are to be found of the Buddha declaring of this or that deceased lay-follower that they had become anāgāmins*, sakadāgāmins* or sotāpannas* (e.g. M i 467f); whilst at M i 490f it is said that more than five hundred laymen and a similar number of laywomen, all householders and white-frocked, had become anāgāmins* and that, in addition, a similar number of each had all been 'doers of the Teaching who had accepted the exhortation, who had crossed over doubt and who, free of perplexity, had attained to confidence and dwelled independent of others* as to the Teaching of the Teacher'. This may lead one to recall how, shortly before his death, the Buddha was visited by Māra who reminded him of an earlier vow (given at D ii 112f) that he would not attain Parinibbāna until all his monks, nuns, male and female lay-followers had 'become sāvakas*, wise, guided*, mature, had attained peace from effort, had heard much, had become bearers of the Dhamma, practising in a manner that accords with the Dhamma (= practising that vipassanā that accords with the Dhamma of the ariyans* – SA iii 253), had become of correct conduct, acting in accordance with the Dhamma; until they, having themselves learned the Teaching, could announce, teach, make known, establish, reveal, analyse and set out (that Teaching), until they could refute any disputation easily refuted with the Dhamma and could teach that miraculous Dhamma', SA iii 253 adding that it is miraculous since it leads one out (of saṁsāra). Since, Māra argues, this vow of the Buddha has now clearly been fulfilled, it must be the time for his Parinibbāna (D ii 104f = S v 261 = A iv 310f = Ud 63).

In addition to these somewhat hypothetical suggestions that laymen could become sāvakas* more concrete examples may be cited. The leper Suppabuddha, clearly no monk, became a sāvaka* upon hearing the Dhamma and, when killed immediately afterwards by a calf, was declared to be a sotāpanna* (Ud 49f). At A v 185 Anāthapiṇḍika is numbered amongst the ranks of those white-frocked householders who are sāvakas* of the recluse Gotama and at S v 381f he is said to possess the sotāpattiyaṅgas*, whilst elsewhere he himself claims to have well seen dukkha through right insight* as it really is* and to understand as it really is* the escape beyond (saṁsāra) (A v 188). Anāthapiṇḍika also appears in a list of named householders who are said to have gone to the end, to have seen the Deathless* and to have their being in the realisation of the Deathless* (niṭṭhaṁ gato amataddaso amataṁ sacchikatvā iriyati – A iii 450ff). Nor was royalty excluded for shortly after he had set rolling the wheel of the Dhamma the Buddha journeyed to Rājagaha and established King Bimbisāra in the sotāpatti-fruit* (Vin i 36ff; PvA 21f); and later the deceased king appears before the Buddha as the yakkha Janavasabha and announces himself avinipāta* (spared further rebirth in

the downfall, an epithet of the sotāpanna* – see earlier) and desirous of becoming a sakadāgāmin* (D ii 206).

Although the sakadāgāmin* is encountered far less often than the other three varieties of sāvaka* – at least where its occurrence independent of the other three is concerned – we may note that at least two laymen, Purāṇa and Isidatta, were declared sakadāgāmins* and to have arisen in the Tusita abode (A iii 347f). This sutta is of particular interest in that in maintaining that Isidatta continued to enjoy sexual relations with his wife (abrahmacārī ahosi sadārasantuṭṭho) we are given an indication of the extent to which lay sāvakas* continued to participate in the household life. Purāṇa and Isidatta appear, with Anāthapiṇḍika, in the list of named householders who have their being in the realisation of the Deathless* (A iii 450f).

As to lay anāgāmins* mention may be made of the occasions upon which Ānanda informed the sick householders Sirivaḍḍha (S v 177) and Mānadinna (S v 178) that they had declared to him the anāgāmin-fruit*.

These and other passages demonstrate that there were many lay sotāpannas*, sakadāgāmins* and anāgāmins*. No evidence has been found of there having been lay arahants*, a curious finding but one in accordance with the traditional belief that any layman attaining arahantship* had either to take to the robe or to die that same day. This view seems first expressed in the non-canonical Milindapañha where Nāgasena maintains that for the householder who attains arahantship* there are two courses and no other: either he goes forth that same day or he parinibbāyaties (yo gihī arahattaṁ patto dv' ev' assa gatiyo bhavanti, anaññā: tasmiṁ yeva divase pabbajati vā parinibbāyati vā – Miln 264). Such a view has not been traced in the canon, though Kvu 267f, in discussing the question of lay arahants*, cites M i 483 where the Buddha is to be found denying that a householder can, without abandoning the householder-fetter, make an end of dukkha at the breaking up of the body. According to Kvu 267f this householder-fetter is such that one 'may carry on sexual relations, may suffer such matters to come into his life, may indulge in a home encumbered with children, may seek to enjoy sandalwood preparations of Kāsi, may wear wreaths, use perfumes and ointments, may accept gold and silver, may acquire goats and sheep, poultry and pigs, elephants, cattle, horses and mares, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants, may wear an attractively swathed head-dress, may wear white garments with long skirts, may be a house-dweller all his life' (Points of Contr 158). A somewhat abbreviated form of this list can be found at Miln 243 and again at Miln 348 and both of these passages leave no room for doubt that those so fettered could nonetheless be 'successful in the method*, in Dhamma and in what is skilled and realise the peaceful, uttermost goal of nibbāna (koci gihī agāriko . . . yena

santaṁ paramatthaṁ nibbānaṁ sacchikatan ti – Miln 348; cp Miln 348ff for further confirmation). Perhaps all that can be concluded from these passages is that although the tradition is somewhat confused as to the fate of a layman attaining arahantship*, it does not deny the possibility of a layman becoming an arahant*.

Thus we find that laymen could, at least in principle, become arahants* and that in practice many did become sotāpannas*, sakadāgāmins* and anāgāmins*. In the Aṅguttara Nikāya we find listed the names of those who amongst the Buddha's male and female lay sāvakas* were pre-eminent in a particular quality (A i 25f; cp A ii 164) and it must be concluded that at least during the Buddha's day there were a good many lay sāvakas* who were ariyan*, supermundane* and who had seen the Four Truths* as they really are*. And if so many laymen were sāvakas* then we must further conclude that the social division of the Buddhist world of monk and layman was not its spiritual division.

Sāvaka* devas

We can go further and say that many devas were also sāvakas*. For just as the work of Dumezil and others has shown that during the Vedic period the classification of the deities reflected the tripartite functions of Indo-European society, so also during the Nikāya period do we find on the divine plane a reflection of the spiritual division of the sāvaka* and the puthujjana. Thus it was as the yakkha Janavasabha that the deceased sotāpanna* Bimbisāra appeared before the Buddha and announced himself avinipāta* (D ii 206); Suppabuddha the leper, upon being killed by the calf, was pronounced a sotāpanna* and to have arisen in the Tāvatiṁsa realm (Ud 50); Anāthapiṇḍika is recorded as having arisen as the devaputta Anāthapiṇḍika in the Tusita abode (M iii 262; cp S i 55f), the same world in which the sakadāgāmins* Purāṇa and Isidatta were said to have arisen (A iii 348); elsewhere mention is made of twenty-four hundred thousand Magadhan sotāpannas* possessing the sotāpattiyaṅgas*, as well as sakadāgāmins*, who were subsequently dwelling in the Tāvatiṁsa realm (D ii 218). Indeed when Mahāmoggallāna visited Tissa Brahmā – himself the former monk Tissa who had now been reborn in the Brahmaloka – he discovered that sotāpannas* were to be found in all six realms of the kāmāvacara (A iii 331ff), just as the Buddha elsewhere tells Mahānāma that those possessing the sotāpattiyaṅgas* can be found, in addition, amongst the Brahmakāyika devas and those devas beyond them (taduttari – A iii 287).

The anāgāmin*, by definition no longer bound to this lower shore (e.g. A iv 380), is to be found in a variety of Brahmalokas, such as those of the

Brahmakāyika devas (A ii 126, 129), the Ābhassara devas (A ii 127, 129), the Subhakiṇha devas (A ii 127, 129), the Vehapphala devas (A ii 128, 129), as well as amongst the five realms of the Pure Abodes (A ii 128, 130) and the four realms of the arūpāvacara (A i 267f, ii 160). Brahmā Sahampati seems to be an anāgāmin* (S v 232f), which SnA 476 confirms, adding that he dwells in the Pure Abodes. More explicit is the case of Tudu the Paccekabrahmā who appeared to the Kokālikan monk who was dying on account of his abuse of Sāriputta and Moggallāna and who, on seeing Tudu, redirected his abuse towards him saying, 'Were you not declared an anāgāmin* (i.e. a non-returner) by the Lord, sir? Then why have you come back here? Behold the extent of this offence of yours!' (A v 171).

Indeed, the Pure Abodes are devalokas reserved exclusively for the sāvaka* since they are an arising not shared by the puthujjana (ayaṁ bhikkhave uppatti asādhāraṇā puthujjanehi – A ii 128, 130) and when the Buddha visited each of these five worlds in turn he encountered individuals who had lived the Brahmacariya* and who had purged sensual excitement under one or another of all the seven Buddhas, including Gotama himself (D ii 50ff). Since there can be no return to this world for those arising in the Pure Abodes (M i 82) it may be assumed that these individuals were anāgāmins* and the implication of this passage is that, during the lifetime of Gotama at least, there were abiding in each of the Pure Abodes anāgāmin* sāvakas* of all seven Buddhas.

It is no doubt such sāvaka* devas who show an interest in righteousness (A iii 309) and who get annoyed when they find it lacking in men (A ii 47f) or who frequently correct monks on various points of the Dhamma and then agitate them into proper conduct (S i 197–205; cp M i 440). Similarly, the Four Great Kings, their sons and their ministers, perambulate this world on behalf of the devas of the Tāvatiṁsa realm in order to ascertain whether many men are honouring mother and father, recluses and brahmins, paying due respect to elders in the clan, observing the Uposatha, being vigilant and performing meritorious deeds, since upon this depends the swelling of the deva-hosts and the diminishing of those of the asuras (A i 142f). It is of interest to note, in passing, that we have here a further reflection of the mundane world on the divine plane in that deva kings, like their mundane counterparts, were expected to act as Dhammarājas. Indeed, the following sutta suggests that like the ariyasāvaka* (A iv 388f) the devas themselves observe the Uposatha (A i 143ff); certainly nāgas do (S iii 241ff) and even sāla-trees might (A iv 259; AA iv 129 states that these trees are acetanā but were they to become sacetanā the observance of the Uposatha would be to their welfare and happiness for a long time: but it is more likely that it was the devatā inhabiting the tree that was meant here, just as at A iii 369ff Sakka

can be found instructing a sāla-tree devatā in the Dhamma for trees – rukkhadhamma – that he should observe); it is no doubt such sāvaka* devas who are said to be utterly devoted to Gotama (D i 116), to confess to him their transgressions (S i 23ff) and to go to him for refuge (D i 116 = M ii 167; A ii 24), as do yakkhas (Sn 179).

All this strongly suggests that sāvakas* continue, as devas, to follow the path* and indeed it would be impossible for anāgāmins* to complete the training – an underlying sense of parinibbāyati (KS ii 57 n 1) – were the Brahmacariya*, that is, the eightfold path* (S v 7f), not open to him as a deva. This fact may be presupposed by those many instances upon which devas can be found teaching one another Dhamma. Here may be cited the case of Hatthaka Āḷavaka, the famous lay sāvaka* who had had a following of five hundred lay-followers (A iv 218f) – one of seven laymen to have had such a following (SA iii 291) – and who had been a scale and standard by which other lay-follower sāvakas* might be measured (A ii 164). Having arisen as the anāgāmin* Hatthaka devaputta in the Aviha world of the Pure Abodes (A i 279) he one day visits the Buddha and the latter asks him whether things go on just the same as they had done when he was human. Hatthaka replies that they do, adding that just as the Buddha is now surrounded by monks, nuns, male and female lay-followers, by kings and kings' ministers, by sectarians and their own sāvakas, even so is he too surrounded by devaputtas who come from afar thinking, 'Let us hear Dhamma in the presence of Hatthaka devaputta' (A i 279). Also of interest in this connection is the sutta concerned with the four advantages of having come into hearing the Dhamma, of having considered it with the mind and well penetrated* it with (right) view*: that having died with memory confused and having arisen in a certain class of devas such a person might hear Dhamma taught by: (a) the happy ones; (b) a monk visiting that world through the exercise of his iddhi; (c) a devaputta who teaches Dhamma to that company of devas (the commentary citing amongst others Hatthaka Mahābrahmā – AA iii 171); or (d) an opapātika*; for in either case, memory (of the Dhamma) slowly arises and that person, as a result, very quickly reaches excellence (A ii 185ff) which the commentary takes as attaining nibbāna (atha so satto khippaṁ yeva visesagāmī hotī ti nibbānagāmī hotī ti attho – AA iii 170).

Thus it would seem that sāvaka* devas could, as devas, not only continue to follow the Brahmacariya* but also bring it to conclusion. But not all devas benefit in this way through hearing Dhamma for when the Tathāgata, the teacher of devas and men, arises in the world and teaches upon the arising and cessation of the khandhas, devas of long life-span, possessing beauty, intent on happiness and long established in lofty vimānas, on hearing that Dhamma are, for the most part, given to fear,

awe and trembling, realising that they are not the permanent, stable and eternal creatures they had thought themselves to be (S iii 85). This could not be the response of the sāvaka* deva who would have seen the Truth of impermanence, confirmation being found in the commentary which explains 'for the most part' (yebhuyyena) as 'except those devas in that world who are ariyasāvakas*' (SA ii 288). That is to say, although the expressions puthujjana-deva (or even puthu-deva) seem not to exist, it seems clear that some devas, perhaps most, are puthujjanas if only because they are not sāvakas*. Thus when Mahāmoggallāna visited Tissa Brahmā and asked him how many devas had the knowledge that they were sotāpannas*, avinipāta* and assured of enlightenment* Tissa stated that there were devas possessing such knowledge in all six realms of the kāmāvacara but that not all the devas in those realms possessed it – only those devas possessing the sotāpattiyaṅgas* had such knowledge (A iii 331ff). With this may be compared how, on another occasion, Mahāmoggallāna visited the devas of the Tāvatiṁsa realm and told them that some beings there (idh' ekacce sattā) would, through possession of the sotāpattiyaṅgas*, arise at death in a happy heavenly world (S v 366f). Woodward notes that 'apparently Moggallāna forgets that he is already in the next world; idha being generally used of "this world"' (KS v 319 n 2). But it is not necessary to impute such loss of memory to Moggallāna since idha can mean, apart from the restricted sense mentioned by Woodward, both 'here' in a general sense and also 'in the Buddha's Teaching' (cp CPD sv). In either case Moggallāna's remark would not be out of place since he could be understood as stating that (a) some beings here (in the Tāvatiṁsa realm), or (b) some beings here (in this, the Buddha's Teaching) will, through possession of the sotāpattiyaṅgas*, arise at death in a happy heavenly world, there being nothing peculiar in the suggestion that the sotāpanna* deva might be destined to arise in a similar devaloka in the future.

One further visit of Moggallāna to Tissa Brahmā is not without interest. When two devatās visited the Buddha and disagreed between themselves as to whether certain nuns were (merely) vimuttā* or anupādisesa* suvimuttā* Moggallāna visited Tissa to discover how many devas could distinguish the sa-upādisesa* from the anupādisesa*. Tissa states that such knowledge is possessed by the Brahmakāyika devas but not by all of them. Those who are satisfied with the Brahmā life-span, beauty, happiness, pomp and power and who do not understand as it really is* the escape beyond* (uttariṁ nissaraṇaṁ) do not possess it (A iv 74ff). MA ii 405 explains uttariṁ nissaraṇaṁ as the three other jhānas (since the world of the Brahmakāyika devas is the ādhidaivic counterpart of the first jhāna only), the four ways*, the four fruits* and nibbāna – that is to say, things with which only the sāvaka* would be familiar; whilst the

suspicion that such devas are sāvakas* is strengthened when it be recalled that only sāvakas* are able to discern who are, and who are not, ariyan*. Moreover, the fact that such devas are not satisfied with their existence as devas echoes the sentiment expressed elsewhere that 'the sāvaka* of the Perfectly Enlightened One delights in the destruction of craving; not even amongst the divine sensual pleasures does he find delight' (Dhp 187).

Yet whether or not he delights in his existence as a deva, the ariyasāvaka* is blessed with long life both heavenly and human (S v 390; cp S iv 275) whilst the almsgiving sāvaka* surpasses the non-giving sāvaka* in life-span, beauty, happiness, pomp and power whether he arises as a deva or as a man (A iii 32f). However, the most important difference between the sāvaka* and the puthujjana deva is soteriological. In the Kaṇṇakatthala Sutta King Pasenadi asks the Buddha whether the devas – and, later in the same sutta, whether the Brahmās – are returners to this present state or not (yadi vā te bhante devā āgantāro itthattaṁ, yadi vā anāgantāro itthattan ti – M ii 130), to which the Buddha replies that if they have been malevolent they do return, but otherwise not. An interesting aside then takes place in which Ānanda, the Buddha's (spiritual) son*, explains to Viḍūḍabha, Pasenadi's (actual) son, that the devas who have been malevolent are unable to drive away and banish those who have not been malevolent since they are unable to see such devas (M ii 131), an inability reminiscent of that of the puthujjana of discerning those who are ariyan*. A ii 159f makes the point a little differently stating that the reason why some devas of the nevasaññānāsaññāyatanūpagā world are returners to this present state, whilst others are not, is due to the former not being free of the five fetters that bind to this lower shore (orambhāgiyāni saṁyojanāni), that is, the fetters from which the anāgāmin* by definition is free.

However, the soteriological distinction between the sāvaka* and the puthujjana deva comes out most clearly, and altogether more sinisterly, in a series of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, for whilst it may have been supposed that 'this present state' (itthattaṁ) were with reference to this world of men, it would seem in such contexts rather to have the force of ayaṁ loko, of this shore in general, including its hells, its animal-wombs and its peta-plane. Whilst sāvaka* and puthujjana alike can attain birth amongst the Brahmakāyika, Ābhassara, Subhakiṇha and Vehapphala devas through practices of the first four jhānas, respectively (A ii 126–128), since these worlds are the ādhidaivic counterparts of these jhānas, or through cultivation of the mettā, karuṇā, muditā and upekhā Brahmavihāras, respectively (A ii 128f), or indeed birth in the four arūpāvacara worlds through practice of the respective arūpa jhānas (A i 267f; A ii 159f), nevertheless when they have enjoyed the life-span

appropriate to that world, the sāvaka* parinibbāyaties whereas the puthujjana arises in hell, in an animal-womb or on the peta-plane – 'Such, monks, is the distinction, such the specific feature, the difference between the sutavant ariyasāvaka* and the assutavant puthujjana in the matter of bourn (gati) and rebirth' (A ii 126–130). Now this difference in the matter of bourn and rebirth helps clarify the group of suttas constituting the Gatiyo Pañcakā Chapter (S v 474–477) in which it is stated that of beings falling from any of the five gatis, few gain birth either as a human or as a deva; far more numerous are those beings gaining birth in hell, in an animal-womb or on the peta-plane. The ratio is likened to the little dust taken up on the Buddha's finger-nail when set beside the mighty earth. And whilst these Aṅguttara suttas are silent as to why this should be so, save for saying that one was a sāvaka* and the other a puthujjana, these Saṁyutta suttas explain that the majority of beings attain these unwelcome births through their failure to see the Four Ariyan* Truths* (Taṁ kissa hetu – adiṭṭhattā bhikkhave catunnam ariyasaccānaṁ – S v 477). However, since this is, as we have seen, merely a defining characteristic of the puthujjana, it may be felt that the reason for this difference in the matter of rebirth had not been satisfactorily explained and it will have to await discussion in a later chapter as to why such freedom form these unwelcome births is guaranteed by seeing the Four Truths*. That such a miserable destiny could await those attaining these lofty births goes some way in explaining the otherwise curious remark of Anuruddha that deva-maidens and those possessing them are duggatā, destined to go to a miserable birth (S i 200). The commentary states that when they fall from there they will be reborn in hell (SA i 293) and given Anuruddha's final verse, from which it is clear that they are unaware of the Truth* of impermanence, it is likely that Buddhaghosa is right.

That the puthujjana should fall into such births, however unpleasant, is not all for the hells, the animal-womb and the peta-plane, together with the world of the asuras, constitute the vinipāta from which the sāvaka* is henceforth for all time freed. Now this vinipāta is characterised by there being no Dhammacariya there, no samacariya, no doing of what is skilled, no doing of what is meritorious. For this reason, sooner would a blind turtle, surfacing once in a hundred years, push his neck through a one-holed yoke drifting with the wind on the surface of the sea, than a person in the vinipāta regain human birth. If, in spite of such tremendous odds, human birth were regained, such a person would act wrongly in body, speech and deed and as a result at death be cast straight back into the vinipāta (M iii 169f). Indeed the commentary on the above Aṅguttara passages, in accordance with this, remarks of the puthujjana going to hell after birth in one of these high heavens that he does so through his

not having abandoned deeds leading to hell and, moreover, that he goes there successively, not just in his immediately following existence (nirayam pi gacchatī ti nirayagamanīyassa kammassa appahīnattā aparāparaṁ gacchati, na anantaram eva – AA iii 124 on A ii 127).

Throughout this discussion we have been concerned with those who, whilst human, became sāvakas* and who subsequently arose in the devaloka as sāvaka* devas. However, we should not overlook the fact that a Tathāgata arises for the welfare of the manyfolk, for the happiness of the manyfolk, out of compassion for the world, for the good, welfare and happiness of devas and men (A i 22; cp It 78, which interestingly predicates this also of arahants* and sāvakas*). Similarly, the wheel of the Dhamma was rolled for this world with its devas (sadevakassa lokassa brahmacakkaṁ pavattayī – A ii 24) just as it was to devas and men that their welfare, the method* and the Dhamma were made visible (hitaṁ devamanussānaṁ ñāyaṁ dhammaṁ pakāsayi – A ii 37). Now 'making visible the method* and the Dhamma' is, as we shall see, but another way of saying that the recipient becomes a sāvaka* – and since it is said here that these are made visible to devas it must be inferred that puthujjana devas can, like their human counterparts, become sāvakas*. Thus when the former Buddha Sikhin and his chief disciple Abhibhū visited a certain Brahmaloka and Abhibhū tried to teach the Brahmās there, the latter were offended since a sāvaka* was teaching in the presence of his Teacher (S i 156). After exercising his iddhi Abhibhū then exhorted them saying, 'Exert yourselves, renounce; apply yourselves to the Buddha's Teaching. Scatter Death's army like an elephant a house of reeds!' (S i 157 = Thag 256 = Miln 245). It is unlikely that such an exhortation would have been necessary in the case of sāvaka* Brahmās who, as anāgāmins*, would already have become free of Death, that is Māra, and of the vinipāta. Rather his words must have been addressed to those Brahmās who would be returners, with the implication that a puthujjana deva can, whilst still a deva, become a sāvaka* and thus conquer Māra. Here we may once more recall the incident during which Gopikā rebuked three former monks who had been reborn as mere gandhabbas through their failure to attend to the Buddha when he was teaching Dhamma. As a result of Gopikā's intervention, two of the three gandhabbas acquired mindfulness and thereupon re-appeared amongst the Brahmapurohita devas, whilst the third remained intent on sensual enjoyment (D ii 272). The verses that follow leave no room for doubt that these former monks came into possession of excellence through their knowledge of the Dhamma attained there, as gandhabbas, and that it was as a consequence of this that they joined the Brahmapurohita devas (yan te dhammaṁ idh' aññāya visesaṁ ajjhagaṁsu te kāyaṁ brahmapurohitaṁ duve tesaṁ visesagū – D ii 275; note how idha is here

used of the Tāvatiṁsa realm). The ability of devas to become sāvakas* can also be seen from the fact that Sakka acquired the Dhammacakkhu* (D ii 288) – the means by which the Four Truths* are seen – and declared himself a sotāpanna* (D ii 284; cp his verses at D ii 285f; elsewhere Sakka claims to be a fellow Brahmacārin* of Mahāmoggallāna – M i 255). This was not true of Sakka alone, for at the same moment eighty thousand devatās similarly acquired the Dhammacakkhu* (D ii 288f). Such a feature is in fact quite common. For instance when the Buddha exhorted Rāhula, who thereby became an arahant*, the Dhammacakkhu* at the same time arose to countless thousands of devatās (M iii 280 = S iv 107). Indeed even sāla-trees would be proclaimed sotāpannas* if they should know the well-spoken from the badly-spoken (S v 377); and when the Buddha was teaching the monks about nibbāna the yakkhinī Punabbasu-mātā, a vemānikapeta according to DA 509, silenced her children so that she might also hear that Dhamma teaching:

> Be quiet, little Uttarā! Be quiet, Punabbasu! that I might hear the Dhamma of the Teacher, the best of Buddhas. 'Nibbāna', the Lord did say, 'is the loosening of every tie' . . . Hearing that true Dhamma* releases living beings from dukkha . . . that is the Dhamma I wish to hear, so be quiet, Punabbasu!

Punabbasu then replies:

> I will not say a word, mother, and Uttarā has become quiet. Attend to the Dhamma, for hearing that true Dhamma* (brings) happiness. It is through lack of knowledge of that true Dhamma* that we undergo this dukkha, mother. This radiance-maker, with vision, the Buddha who bears his last body, teaches Dhamma to bewildered devas and men.

Punabbasu-mātā rejoins (S i 210):

> Good and wise indeed is this excellent son born at my breast – this son of mine holds dear the pure Dhamma of the best of Buddhas. May you be happy, Punabbasu! Today I am uprisen (from saṁsāra); seen are the Ariyan* Truths*! You too hear me, my Uttarā!

The commentary on this passage confirms that Punabbasu and his mother became sotāpannas*, adding that 'the Lord, examining that company just as he was teaching Dhamma, saw the potential of that yakkhinī and the yakkha-son alone (to realise) the sotāpatti-fruit* and, after repeating the teaching, elucidated the discourse on the Four Truths* (dhammaṁ desento yeva Bhagavā parisaṁ sallakkhayamāno

tassa yakkhiṇiyā c'eva yakkha-dārakassa ca sotāpatti-phalassa upanissayaṁ disvā, desanaṁ vinivattetvā, catu-sacca-kathaṁ dīpesi – SA i 311).

Thus whilst it remains not altogether clear as to whether devas can make merit, they are, with men and unlike those in the vinipāta, able both to embark upon and to continue to follow the Brahmacariya*. Those unfortunate creatures who arise in the various realms of the vinipāta on account of their not having embarked upon the Brahmacariya* are thereafter unable to embark thereon due to there being no Brahmacariya* in such realms and are, moreover, further incapable of generating the merit that would be required for their release from such realms.[4] This may be conveniently summarised as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. *Analysis of the Pañcagati*

Arūpāvacara				
Rūpāvacara	Devas	Cannot make merit?		
Kāmāvacara			Attained by merit	Can embark upon or continue to follow the Brahmacariya*
	Men	Can make merit		
Vinipāta	Petas Animals Hells (Asuras)	Cannot make merit	Attained by demerit	Not already on and cannot embark upon the Brahmacariya*

It is therefore quite inconceivable how many writers on Buddhism can write along the following lines: 'I think nothing more clearly and definitely proclaims the principle of just requital than the Buddhist doctrine of moral retribution and the law of causation. Recompense according to one's merit and demerit will be most precisely observed in these doctrines'.[5] Had kamma and rebirth conformed with this rather idealistic pattern whereby one might pursue meritorious deeds, enjoy the heavenly bliss that was their fruit, and then return once more to the human state whereupon one might once more replenish one's store of merit – a view suggested at It 76–78 (and most probably the wrong view of a puthujjana deva) and believed by many modern Buddhists – rather than it being a case of the world held solidly in the deluding jaws of Māra, of Death, the world might be thought to have little need of the saving intervention of a Buddha figure at all. As we have seen, though, this is not the way of the cosmos as portrayed in the Nikāyas, for not only was morality, in itself, insufficient – not even cultivation of the Brahmavihāras and a thorough familiarity with the eight jhānas could save the puthujjana from ending up in hell, in an animal-womb or on the peta-plane. It was the insight* provided by the Buddha into the Four Truths* possessed only by the sāvaka* that could alone guarantee salvation.

Puthujjana monks

I have, in the foregoing discussion, sought to show that during the Nikāya period the criterion of spirituality was always whether one were a sāvaka*, never whether one were a monk. To render such argument conclusive it remains to be shown that the monastic community was itself divided into those monks who were sāvakas* and those who were puthujjanas. For although the Buddha could declare the moment before he died that there was in the order of monks not one monk who had doubt or uncertainty as to the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, the path* or the means to the goal and that the most backward of those five hundred monks was a sotāpanna*, avinipāta*, assured* and bound for enlightenment* (D ii 155 = A ii 80), this cannot have always been the case or there would have been no need of his earlier vow to Māra, mentioned earlier, that he would not attain Parinibbāna until all his monks, nuns, male and female lay-followers had become sāvakas*, and so on (D ii 112f). That is to say that until this vow had been fulfilled by the time of the Parinibbāna there had been in the Saṅgha monks who were not sāvakas* – and thus, by implication, puthujjanas although explicit mention of the phrase puthujjana bhikkhu seems lacking in the Nikāyas.

That some monks were puthujjanas comes out clearly from the following:

> Monks, there are these two companies (parisā). What two? The ariyan* company and the unariyan company.
>
> And what, monks, is the unariyan company? Here, monks, in whatever company the monks do not understand as it really is* 'This is dukkha'; do not understand as it really is* 'This is the uprising of dukkha'; do not understand as it really is* 'This is the cessation of dukkha'; do not understand as it really is* 'This is the means leading to the cessation of dukkha' – this, monks, is called the unariyan company

the opposite, of course, being predicated of the ariyan* company (A i 71f). The commentary on this passage states quite clearly that the ariyan* company is the company of ariyasāvakas* and that the unariyan company is the company of puthujjanas (ariyā ti ariyasāvakaparisā; anariyā ti puthujjanaparisā – AA ii 145), as indeed it must be since we have seen that the failure to see the Four Truths* as they really are* is a defining characteristic of the puthujjana.

Other passages also imply the existence of puthujjana monks: at M ii 197 = A i 69 the Buddha points out that if of wrong conduct neither the householder (gihī) nor the one gone forth (pabbajito) can be successful in the method*, in the Dhamma and in what is skilled; elsewhere it is claimed that it is not possible for the monk whose mind is not applied to pierce ignorance, to obtain knowledge and to realise nibbāna, for just as it is not possible to see the contents of a pool when its water is stirred up, so also is it not possible for the monk whose mind is stirred up to realise the suprahuman states* (uttariṁ manussadhammā – defined at Vin iii 92; cp AA i 58), the distinctively ariyan* knowledge and vision* (A i 8f). Moreover, since we have found that the sāvaka* is for all time free of arising in the vinipāta, it can only be the puthujjana monk (A iii 3f) and the puthujjana nun (A iii 139ff) to whom the threat of being cast into hell in accordance with their deserts applies. Most interesting, perhaps, is the fact that only four sorts of person are said to be worthy of a stūpa: a Tathāgata, a Paccekabuddha, a sāvaka* of the Tathāgata and a wheel-turning king (D ii 142 = A ii 245). Here it may be recalled that Bāhiya of the Bark Garment, although not ordained, became an arahant* on hearing an exhortation-in-brief* (to be discussed later) and when, shortly afterwards, he was killed by a calf, the Buddha ordered that his body be cremated and that a stūpa be erected over his relics (Ud 8f). In keeping with this the commentary on A ii 245 seems to take it for granted that the sāvaka*, whether monk or lay, is worthy of a stūpa and queries only why the Lord allowed the erection of a stūpa for the deceased king but not for the virtuous puthujjana monk: 'Because he

is exceptional; for were a stūpa to be allowed for puthujjana monks there would be no room for any villages or cities in Tambapaṇṇadīpa (Ceylon), likewise in other places. Therefore, knowing that they would not be exceptional, he did not allow it. A king, however, arises singularly and for this reason the stūpa is for him an exception – although it is just as proper to pay great respect to the virtuous puthujjana as it is to the parinibbuta monk' (Rājā cakkavattī ti ettha kasmā Bhagavā kathayitvā kālakatassa rañño thūpakaraṇaṁ anujānāti, na sīlavato puthujjanabhikkhussa? Acchariyattā. Puthujjanabhikkhūnaṁ hi thūpe anuññāyamāne Tambapaṇṇadīpe gāmapaṭṭanānaṁ okāso ca na bhaveyya tathā aññesu ṭhānesu, tasmā anacchariyā te bhavissantī ti nānujānāti. Rājā eko va nibbattati, ten' assa thūpo acchariyo hoti; puthujjanasīlavato pana parinibbutabhikkhuno viya mahantam pi sakkāraṁ kātuṁ vaṭṭati yeva – AA iii 219 ≏ DA 583f).

Thus whilst there may be no mention in the Nikāyas of the expression puthujjana bhikkhu, it nonetheless seems assumed that a monk could be a puthujjana. The expression seems to occur first in the Milindapañha where it is stated, perhaps a little arrogantly, that the layfollower who is a householder and a sotāpanna* and thus freed from the states of loss, attained to (right) view* and one who has understood the Teaching must rise up and greet the puthujjana monk or novice (upāsako gihī sotāpanno pihitāpāyo diṭṭhipatto viññātasāsano bhikkhuṁ vā sāmaneraṁ vā puthujjanaṁ abhivādeti paccuṭṭheti – Miln 162); whilst its use in the commentaries is not at all uncommon. For instance, a mahāthera, no less, on being told by a wicked monk that his companion thera slanders him behind his back, is said, on account of his being a puthujjana, to have wavered thinking that it might be so (thero pi puthujjanabhāvavasena dveḷhakacitto 'evam pi siyā' ti – PvA 13); elsewhere the fact that a monk had been a puthujjana is often given in the commentaries to account for this or that bad behaviour on the part of a monk (e.g. the instances cited at MLS iii 316 n 2, 317 n 2, 318 n 5; KS iv 33 n 1, etc.). Instances of such badly behaved monks are encountered so frequently that the passage stating that a group of monks was unbalanced, puffed up, fickle, garrulous, of loose speech, not remembering to be mindful, inattentive, unconcentrated, scatter-brained, and with senses uncontrolled (e.g. S i 61 = v 269 = A i 70 = Ud 37) turns out to be stock. On another occasion we are introduced to monks who were disputatious, quarrelsome, contentious and who lived wounding each other with the weapons of the tongue (M i 321 = A i 70) and later in this same Majjhima sutta these monks seem contrasted to the monk whose view is ariyan*, supermundane* and not shared by the puthujjana (M i 323ff). It was no doubt such monks who were difficult to speak to, intractable, incapable of being instructed and thus not to be trusted by their fellow Brahmacārins* (M i

95), who would tease Tissa until he cried (S ii 282) and who despised the venerable Bhaddiya, the Dwarf (S ii 279 = Ud 76), UdA 369 adding that the puthujjana monks used to pull his hair and tease him.

Here it might be argued that although there had been monks of bad behaviour and thus not possessed of the fourth sotāpattiyaṅga*, the possession of that morality dear to the ariyans*, this can have been the case only until the Parinibbāna, when all monks were declared sāvakas*. This would be to ignore the fact that the Nikāyas are permeated with a fear of decline and of the disappearance of the true Dhamma* that will be marked by the monks not listening to those suttantas spoken by the Tathāgata, deep, deep in meaning, supermundane*, dealing with suññatā; they will instead prefer those suttantas made by poets, tricked out with fair-sounding phrases, external (to the Teaching – AA ii 147) and spoken (merely) by sāvakas* (S ii 266f; cp A i 72). At such a time the monks will become delicate, soft and tender in hands and feet; they will lie until sunrise on soft couches, on pillows of down; and to them Māra will gain access (S ii 268; for other prophecies of decline see e.g. S ii 208ff; A iii 105ff, 108ff; cp also A ii 147ff, iii 176ff; M i 444f, etc.). The fleeting glory achieved at the Parinibbāna was not to last and when Jantu devaputta appeared on the Uposatha to a great number of monks who were unbalanced, puffed up, fickle, garrulous, of loose speech, not remembering to be mindful, inattentive, unconcentrated, scatter-brained and with their senses uncontrolled, it was with much regret that he observed (S i 61 = 204):

> Happy-living were those monks who in the past were sāvakas* of Gotama – unhankering they sought their almsfood, unhankering their bed and board and, knowing the impermanence of the world, end-makers of dukkha were. But now, making bad men of themelves, (living) in a village like a village headman, craving the household life of others, they eat and eat until they sink to rest. I make the añjali salute to the Saṅgha and salute some (only) of those here; (the others) are discarded, without any refuge and just like petas; my speech is with respect to those (alone) who negligent dwell – to those who dwell diligent I pay due homage

The true analysis of the Buddhist world

Thus we find that with the temporary exception of the Parinibbāna a good many monks were, and no doubt still are, mere puthujjanas and that, moreover, there is no apparent distinction drawn between the monk and the lay sāvaka*, other than perhaps that the layman who attains arahantship* might have to take to the robe or to die that same day, nor one drawn between the monk and the lay puthujjana. There are,

rather, just sāvakas* and there are, similarly, just puthujjanas, irrespective of whether they be monk, lay or deva. It is this, the division of beings into sāvakas* and puthujjanas, that provides the spiritual division of the Buddhist world and not, as so many have supposed, the merely social aspect of whether one is a monk or a layman. Moreover, if it should be the case that so-called animistic beliefs are not in accord with the true Dhamma*, with the way things really are*, then it will be the sāvaka*, monk, lay or deva, who will have alone rejected such beliefs since he alone has seen with insight* things as they really are*. If this that he sees should make him adhere to some 'austere, godless, self-renouncing philosophy or way of life', then this too will be true only of the sāvaka*, whatever his social standing. At the same time any erroneous views ascribed to the puthujjana will be held as much by the monk and deva puthujjana as by the lay puthujjana. In short there is no continuum; there is simply sāvaka* and puthujjana and, as we shall see later, the transition from the plane of the puthujjana to that of the sāvaka* is instantaneous. Thus the true analysis of the Buddhist world is as follows:

1 sāvakas*, whether monk, lay or deva;
2 puthujjanas, whether monk, lay or deva, or indeed those who are outside Buddhism altogether such as those in the borderlands who are non-Āryan, not understanding the Āryan speech, and where the monks, nuns, male and female layfollowers do not go (D iii 264, 287; A iv 226).

This can be illustrated by means of Fig. 1, in which the shaded portion – common to devas, laymen and monks – represents those who are sāvakas*, whilst all others are puthujjanas, whether devas, laymen, monks or non-Āryans. The five inner circles may be seen as containing the racial community of the Āryans whose home was in the Middle Countries (majjhimesu janapadesu) the so-called Majjhimadesa including all but Gandhāra and Kamboja of the sixteen mahājanapadas: 'The people of Majjhimadesa were regarded as wise and virtuous. It was the birthplace of noble men (purisājanīyā), including the Buddhas, and all kinds of marvellous things happened there' (DPPN ii 419). The outer circle may then be seen as representing the borderlands (paccantimesu janapadesu) in which there were to be found those non-Āryans incapable of understanding the Āryan speech (aviññātāresu milakkhesu – cp Skt mleccha – which Budhaghosa glosses by 'Andhas (= people of Andhra Pradesh) and Damiḷas (= Tamils) who are non-Āryan (anariyako) and so on' – VA i 255 quoted B Disc i 47 n 3). It was therefore with much interest that I recently discovered this analysis corroborated and paralleled by a remarkably similar diagram purporting to be 'The Stratification of Indian Society' but from a Brāhmaṇic point of view

which I reproduce here (see Fig. 2). Indeed, as we shall see later, the similarities between the two models are more numerous than might at first appear.

At the beginning of this chapter it was shown that the ariyasāvaka* was one who had heard the Dhamma (in the presence) of the ariyans* whereas the puthujjana was an outsider (bāhiro) who had not heard that Dhamma. Furthermore, it was suggested that in styling the puthujjana 'unariyan' one could detect an undertone of the contempt that the Āryan people had had for the indigenous mleccha. The matter is perhaps rather more subtle for anariya is a negative compound, formed by the addition of the negative prefix an- to the stem ariya, and in Pali, as in English, negations of words can be used to express a variety of shades of meaning.



Fig. 1. The Stratification of the Buddhist World.

a view is elsewhere called the 'knowledge of specific kamma' (AA iii 415) and amounts to the belief that there is future kammic result from a certain, though ill-defined, range of deeds both good and bad and that there are in the world those who, through their unique spirituality, provide an unsurpassed opportunity for making merit, which the Buddhists of course claimed was represented by the sāvakasaṅgha* of those who alone were truly ariyan*, or, as I shall show later, of those who alone were the true brahmins* (see also discussion of abrāhmaṇa above). Indeed, as I shall also show later, just as people had hitherto generated puṇya through their participation in the Brāhmaṇic sacrifice, so now they were actively encouraged to generate puñña by means of the new sacrifice of charitable support of the new brahmin* in the form of the ariyasāvaka* who represented the supermundane* power within their midst.

Nor was it for nothing that puthujjanas were encouraged to observe the five precepts since these too were deemed a source of merit and whilst, as it happened, the puthujjana monk was in the main unable to acquire merit by way of participation in the new sacrifice, since this was by its nature a mainly lay activity, he was quite able to generate merit through his observance of the precepts, through virtuous behaviour in general and, in more modern times, through pilgrimage and worship of relics and so on. It was not, therefore, on account of any lack of mundane morality that the puthujjana was criticised but rather on the grounds that he continued to delight in the pleasures of the senses and to remain chained to saṁsāra, unlike the ariyan* who had transcended both merit and demerit and who was on the path* leading out of saṁsāra. Thus we find that the mundane right view of the puthujjana is styled 'with (or affected by the) āsavas, on the side of merit and ripening into rebirth' (sammādiṭṭhi sāsavā puññābhāgiyā upadhivepakkā – M iii 72) and thus quite distinct from the right view* of the ariyasāvaka* (that is, his insight* into the Four Truths*) that is ariyan*, without (or unaffected by the) āsavas, supermundane* and a factor of the (ariyan* eightfold) path* (sammādiṭṭhi ariyā anāsavā lokuttarā maggaṅgā – M iii 72).

Indeed, as the subsequent pages of this same sutta show (M iii 72ff) there was envisaged, alongside the ariyan* eightfold path* a mundane version consisting in a belief in the efficacy of almsgiving and in virtuous behaviour in general by means of which the puthujjana, both monk and lay, could generate merit for their present and future well-being in the cycle of rebirth. These two paths are frequently contrasted in the Nikāyas. For instance in the Dhammapada it is said (Dhp 75):

> One indeed is the means to gain whilst the other leads to nibbāna – thus aware of this the monk who is a sāvaka* of the Buddha should not delight in reverence but should cultivate aloofness

Similarly, when visiting the Buddha one night Brahmā Sahampati declared that he had seen (S i 154):

> In one Brahmacariya a thousand who have left Death (Maccu, i.e. Māra) behind (= arahants* SA i 221), five hundred sekhas* and more, ten hundred, who have all attained the ear* (sota, = (ariyan) path* SA i 221) and who will not go (again) to the animal-womb; as well as those other people who are on the side of merit

whilst elsewhere the Buddha, when questioned by Sakka about the successful generation of merit through sacrifice, distinguishes, quite explicitly, the supermundane* path* and the path of merit (S i 233):

> The four who are practising* and the four established in the fruits* – this is the Saṅgha that is upright and endowed with paññā* and sīla. What is given to this (ariya* – SA i 352) Saṅgha is of great fruit to those men who are sacrificing, to those beings desiring merit and who are performing meritorious deeds that lead to rebirth

It was no doubt such a distinction that the Buddha also had in mind when he advised Ānanda and the others not to bother themselves with worshipping the bodily relics of the Tathāgata since there were wise kṣatriyans, brahmins and householders who were devoted to the Tathāgata and who would perform such worship. Ānanda and the others should rather stir themselves, exert themselves, with respect to the true goal (= the supreme goal of arahantship* DA 583), apply themselves to that true goal and to dwell diligent, ardent and energetic as regards that true goal (Avyāvaṭā tumhe Ānanda hotha Tathāgatassa sarīrapujāya iṅgha tumhe Ānanda sadatthe ghaṭatha sadattham anuyuñjatha sadatthe appamattā ātāpino pahitattā viharatha. Sant' Ānanda khattiyapaṇḍitā pi brāhmaṇapaṇḍitā pi gahapatipaṇḍitā pi Tathāgate abhippasannā te Tathāgatassa sarīrapūjaṁ karissantī ti – D ii 141). It will be noticed that all these verbs are second person plural and it is not immediately obvious whom the Buddha had in mind when addressing Ānanda in this way: it could have been Ānanda's fellow monks, the whole order of monks or, indeed, some other group to which Ānanda may have belonged. The identity of this group forms the subject of one of Milinda's questions, Nāgasena replying that the advice applied only to those who were the Conqueror's sons, or Jinaputtas (Miln 177f), which BvA 99 explains as sāvakas*, and we may, therefore, infer that the Buddha had been addressing Ānanda as a member of the sāvakasaṅgha*.

From the vast amount of suttas extolling the benefits accruing to one showing charity to the sāvakasaṅgha*, which are particularly numerous in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, it would seem that, apart from considerations

of expediency, such almsgiving was not altogether condemned, especially where the individual concerned was incapable of becoming a sāvaka*. It is only when the path of the puthujjana is compared with that of the sāvaka* that a note of criticism is introduced (S i 174):

> Again and again when a master at almsgiving has given, again and again he goes to the heavenly place; . . . again and again that slow-witted one goes to the womb, again and again he gets born and dies, again and again they take him off to the cemetery.
>
> But when he has gained the path* for the sake of no more becoming – that one of extensive paññā* is no (longer) born again and again

For the path of meritorious deeds is the path of Māra – compare how at Sn 425–432 Māra visits the Buddha and exhorts him to live since in this way he might perform meritorious deeds, to which the Buddha replies that he himself has not the slightest need of merit and that Māra should go and speak to those in such need.

Thus we may distinguish: (a) the path* of the sāvaka* that transcends both merit and demerit, that is supermundane*, ariyan* and that leads to freedom from rebirth; and (b) the path of the puthujjana that is on the side of merit, that is mundane, that leads to repeated rebirth and that is dominated by Māra. Moreover we have seen that after a spell in one of the lofty devalokas the ariyasāvaka*, unlike the puthujjana, fails to return to this world and we may see in the paths of the sāvaka* and the puthujjana a parallel to the devayāna and the pitṛyāna found in the Upaniṣads, which are characterised as follows:

> *a* Those who seek for the Self by austerity, the Brahmacariya*, faith and knowledge, they, by the northern route, gain the sun . . . That is the Deathless*, the fearless, that is whither they are bound. From that they do not return. That is cessation (athottareṇa tapasā brahmacaryeṇa śraddhayā vidyayātmānam anviṣyādityam abhijayante . . . etad amṛtam abhayam, etat parāyaṇam (cp the sotāpanna* being bound for enlightenment, sambodhiparāyana), etasmān na punar āvartante, ity eṣa nirodhaḥ – Praśna U 1 10; cp BU VI 2 15; CU V 10 1–2);

and

> *b* Now those, verily, who worship thinking, 'This will store up meritorious deeds in heaven', they gain only the lunar world. These alone return again (tad ye ha vai tad iṣṭā-pūrte kṛtam ity upāsate, te cāndramasam eva lokam abhijayante, ta eva punar āvartante – Praśna U I 9; cp BU VI 2 16; CU V 10 3–7).

The parallel between these two paths and those of the sāvaka* and puthujjana, respectively, is greater than may, perhaps, at first sight

appear. For it will be recalled that we have already had cause to note that the ariyasāvaka* is on occasion said to have arrived at the door to the Deathless* (amatadvāram āhacca – S ii 43 = 44 = 58 = 79; cp S ii 80); and as we shall see later not only is this door to the Deathless* considered to be the sun but that, moreover, the sāvakasaṅgha* was thought to be in direct communication with that sun by way of the deva-yāna. Thus it is, no doubt, that the ariyasāvaka* comes to be surrounded by a wealth of solar symbolism and the merit-making lay puthujjana by lunar symbolism. Here we need simply note that:

> The swans go on the path of the sun, they go through the air by means of their iddhi; these wise ones are led out of this world, having conquered Māra and his army

(Dhp 175; the swan here, as elsewhere, denotes the arahant* – cp DhpA iii 177).

Thus we arrive at a picture of the Buddhist world in the Nikāya period as one sharply divided between the ariyasāvaka*, on the solar path* of no return – and thus assured of liberation – and the puthujjana on the lunar path of cultic acts of charity which, though earning him temporary respite in a lofty devaloka, seem ultimately capable of taking him only to the vinipāta and quite possibly for ever. If it seems somewhat less than compassionate for the Buddha to encourage people to act in such a way that took them, ultimately, to the vinipāta, it should not at the same time be forgotten that not only did the Buddha save all those capable of being saved but that in providing the puthujjana with an unsurpassed source of merit, moreover, he allowed a good many puthujjanas to stay afloat in saṁsāra longer than they might otherwise have done. For it would seem that only those possessing the potential of becoming sāvakas* could acquire right view* and although it is, to my knowledge, never explained how one came to possess that potential, it is quite likely that the reason for this was of a kammic nature. The Buddha can hardly be criticised for failing to save those whose inability to be saved was a cosmic fact.

Moreover, when the Buddha refused to be drawn on the ten questions he had not declared (avyākata) he was then asked by the wanderer Uttiya what it was that he had declared to which the Buddha replied, 'I, Uttiya, by means of my superknowledge, teach Dhamma to my sāvakas* for the purification of beings, for the transcending of sorrow and lamentation, for the going to rest of dukkha and dejection, for reaching the method*, for realising nibbāna' (A v 194). Uttiya then asks whether the whole world, one half or one third will get out (of saṁsāra) in this way but the Buddha remains silent. Ānanda, fearing that it would be to Uttiya's long term woe and dukkha were he to entertain the evil view that the Lord,

when asked a question whose answer could be known only to himself alone (sabbasāmukkaṁsikaṁ), had let it drop since he could not answer it, therefore explains that just as in a well fortified city with a single gate a shrewd watchman over that gate would, without knowing how many beings entered and left that town, nonetheless know that all who did so entered and left by means of that gate, so also is it to the Tathāgata not a matter of urgent concern as to whether the whole world, one half or one third will get out (of saṁsāra) in that way. What he does know is this: that whosoever has got out, is getting out or will get out from this world all do so by abandoning the five hindrances, by their minds being well established in the four arisings of mindfulness and by their cultivation of the seven bojjhaṅgas (A v 195). Since it is by cultivation of the ariyan* eightfold path* that these are brought to fulfilment (S v 49f) it is perhaps not surprising that Ānanda should have answered in this way. What is surprising is his statement that the question as to how many do get out in this way is not a matter of urgent concern to the Tathāgata. Yet this may only seem surprising so long as it is not remembered that it has never been a feature of Indian religions that all beings should benefit by them. The Vedic sacrifice was, and still is, restricted to those who are twice-born (dvija); the Upaniṣads are well known for the secrecy with which their teachings were surrounded; whilst the Jains and the Ājīvikas, who were the Buddha's contemporaries, similarly envisaged that but a few would benefit from their teachings. The lack of universality of the Buddhist salvation scheme, at least as portrayed in the Nikāyas, and the Buddha's apparent lack of interest in the number of beings saved thereby, demonstrate that the Buddha was every bit the Indian guru. For as Glasenapp has shown:

> The view that only a portion of all beings is capable of salvation is advanced by theistic schools. The Gītā 16, 6f already teaches a divine predestination; there are beings who are summoned to salvation, and those whom Viṣṇu has spurned. Madhava (M * 31, 63), Vallabha (Va 297) and the school of Caitanya assume that according to the will of God there are three classes of souls, those that can attain salvation, those who wander round in Saṁsāra for all eternity, and those who enter into 'blind darkness'. These theories appear to go back to old Pañcarātra works. Possibly we already come across in the obscure doctrine of the 'third place' in Chā Up 5 10 8 the idea that not all beings will attain salvation; here it mentions tiny beings returning again and again of whom it says, 'be born and die'. Perhaps there underlies here an idea that has a certain similarity with that of the Jains about the Nigoḍas (J 191, 234).
>
> The view that not all beings will arrive at salvation already existed in ancient times in India; this is clear from the Jain Canon. The Jains assume that there are souls capable of salvation (bhavya), and those that are not

(abhavya). It is not explained, and also it cannot be explained in the sense of the system, on what depend these primitive natural talents of the souls, for the idea of a divine election by grace is foreign to atheistic Jainism. Mahāyāna Buddhism has also developed a corresponding theory. The 'Siddhi' of Hiuen-tsang teaches that there are beings who are candidates for salvation, and those who are not. The former belong to the 'Gotras' (families) of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Tathāgatas, or are 'aniyata gotras', i.e. they are certain of future salvation, yet it is not settled in which form they will attain nirvāṇa. Opposed to these four categories are the 'Agotrakas' which by nature lack all assumptions for nirvāṇa'.[8]

Notes to Chapter 1

1 Some may object to the use of this term in this particular context; I use it in the absence of any better and trust that what I mean by it will become clear as the discussion proceeds.
2 T. O. Ling, *Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil* (London 1962), p. 13.
3 Mendelson, quoted by Ling, op. cit, p. 14.
4 This is, of course, not to deny the possibility that some of the beings arising in the vinipāta do so in order to expiate some specific demerit, rather than on account of an absence of merit. In such cases the possibility exists that when the debt has been paid there may in fact be some previously generated merit, over which this demerit has taken precedence, that will allow the individual concerned to regain the human state. This possibility is not entertained in the passages under discussion but it nevertheless exists. The workings of kamma are at best obscure, especially where the priority of one deed over another is concerned, and are beyond the scope of the present work, although some attention will be paid in later chapters to the relationship of sāvakas* to their previously generated kamma, both good and bad.
5 S. Tachibana, *The Ethics of Buddhism* (London 1975), p. 266.
6 I am indebted to Professor N. A. Jayawickrama of the University of Sri Lanka for this information.
7 Sammaggatā, sometimes rendered 'who have gone along rightly' (e.g. MLS iii 114) though it seems better to follow the rendering at Dial i 73 since this is surely what is being denied here – it is wrong view to deny that there are any who have achieved arahantship*, no doubt a common heresy levelled by rival groups of wanderers.
8 Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions* (Calcutta 1963), p. 74f.

Chapter Two

The Path*

Right view* and the eightfold path*

It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that western scholarship has, almost without exception, completely overlooked the fact that the ariyan* eightfold path* is supermundane* and thus restricted to those who are ariyan*, that is, the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant*. For just as the Four Truths* are ariyan* in the sense that their revelation turns one into an ariyan* (ariya-saccānan ti ariyabhāvakarānaṁ saccānaṁ – DA 542; cp AA ii 281), so is the fourth of these Truths*, the eightfold path*, similarly ariyan* in the sense that it is supermundane* (ariya-maggo ti lokuttara-maggo – SA i 36) and in the sense of its being restricted to those who are themselves ariyan* (D ii 151):

> In whatever Dhamma and discipline the ariyan* eightfold path* is not to be found, there too is neither the (first) recluse nor the second recluse nor the third recluse nor the fourth recluse to be found; whilst in whatever Dhamma and discipline the ariyan* eightfold path* is to be found, there too is the (first) recluse, the second recluse, the third recluse and the fourth recluse to be found

The commentary on this passage makes it quite clear that these four recluses are the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant*, respectively (samaṇo pi tattha na upalabbhatī ti paṭhamo sotāpannasamaṇo pi tattha n' atthi, dutiyo sakadāgāmi tatiyo anāgāmi catuttho arahatta-samaṇo pi tattha n' atthī ti attho – DA 589). Moreover, since this path* begins with the supermundane* right view* of insight* into the Four Truths* – the right view* which we have seen to be a factor of the path* and possessed only by the sāvaka* – it must follow that a pre-requisite of one's embarking upon this path* is that one be a sāvaka*. Yet so frequently does one find the eightfold path* presented as something which one could, if one so chose, begin to follow at, say, 2.30 pm tomorrow that one wonders how it can be that so many have so consistently failed to realise the supermundane* connotation of the term ariyan*

– and indeed the suspicion arises that in some cases this misrepresentation of the eightfold path* may have been due to a desire to universalise what was originally a very exclusive practice.

Typical of such misrepresentation, chosen more or less at random from countless such passages, is the view expressed at various places by the German monk Nyāṇatiloka:

> As many of those who have written about the Eightfold Path have misunderstood its true nature, it is, therefore, appropriate to add here a few elucidating remarks about it, as this Path is fundamental for the understanding and practice of the Buddha's teaching.
>
> First of all, the figurative expression 'Path' should not be interpreted to mean that one has to advance step by step, in the sequence of the enumeration, until, after successively passing through all the eight stages one finally may reach one's destination, Nibbana. If this really were the case, one should have realized, first of all, Right View and penetration of the truth, even before one could hope to proceed to the next steps, Right Thought and Right Speech; and each preceding stage would be the indispensable foundation and condition for each succeeding stage. In reality, however, the links 3–5 constituting moral training (sīla), are the first 3 links to be cultivated, then the links 6–8 constituting mental training (samādhi), and at last Right View etc. constituting wisdom (paññā)[1]

In this Nyāṇatiloka seems influenced by the three khandhas of sīla, samādhi and paññā which are encountered from time to time in the Nikāyas (e.g. D i 206; It 51) – as are those said to be endowed with these (sīla-, samādhi-, paññā-sampanna: e.g. A iii 134) – and which the commentarial tradition took as a tripartite analysis of the path (e.g. MA ii 32 on M i 71), such that:

Right view Right resolve	paññā-khandha
Right speech Right action Right livelihood	sīla-khandha
Right effort Right mindfulness Right concentration	samādhi-khandha

although there is in the Nikāyas little such explicit correlation. None the less, it is just such a correlation that most writers on Buddhism, including Nyāṇatiloka, take for granted when speaking of the eightfold path*. More importantly, they also assume, with even less support from the

Nikāyas, that these three khandhas are to be understood as progressive stages and in the order in which they are usually given, such that one begins with the sīla-khandha and progresses through that of the samādhi-khandha to that of the paññā-khandha. That is to say, they maintain that the path* follows the order of the khandhas, rather than vice versa, and in so doing believe they have avoided the somewhat irksome problem of the path* appearing to commence with right view*. For were right view* really the beginning of the path*, as the enumeration of its factors suggests, one would be faced with the impossible quandary as to how such 'penetration of the truth' might be acquired. Clearly it could not, ex hypothesi, be via the path* – and since that path* is really nothing more than a list of headings under which each and every aspect of Buddhist practice is subsumed, there would seem to be no practice by means of which right view* could be acquired.

However, to argue that the path* really begins with its third factor, right speech*, merely raises the problem as to why in the Nikāyas – the reputed word of the Buddha himself – the eightfold path* is consistently and unanimously enumerated as commencing with right view*. Moreover, such a 'solution' does not take account of the well known simile of the chariot in which it is said that 'Right view* races on ahead' (sammādiṭṭhipure javaṁ – S i 33), which it does according to the commentary, in order to prepare the path* (SA i 88). It also contradicts the quite unequivocal assertion, found elsewhere (M iii 75f; D ii 217; cp S v 1f), that:

> Right view* comes first . . . ; right resolve* proceeds for one of right view*; right speech* proceeds for one of right resolve*; right action* proceeds for one of right speech*; right livelihood* proceeds for one of right action*; right effort* proceeds for one of right livelihood*; right mindfulness* proceeds for one of right effort*; right concentration* proceeds for one of right mindfulness*; right knowledge* proceeds for one of right concentration*; right release* proceeds for one of right knowledge*

Other considerations also make it seem more likely that the path* commences, rather than ends, with right view* or its paññā-khandha. For instance, in the Aṅguttara Nikāya it is said that it is not possible to perfect right concentration* if right view* has not been perfected (A iii 423) which accords with the incident recorded in the Anthill Sutta (M-23) in which a sekha* monk is told to bring the tool of ariyan* paññā* to hack away at the five khandhas and so on, to clear away the five hindrances in the way of samādhi and thus attain arahantship* (M i 144). Indeed the primary position of right view* is to be seen from the fact that to try to make an end of dukkha without penetration* of the Four

Truths* as they really are* would be like trying to build the roof of a house before building its walls (S v 452). This is no doubt because in the ariyasāvaka* possessing paññā*, mindfulness and concentration are established as a matter of course (S v 222); compare how it is precisely this order of events that is recalled by Sirimā (Vv 16^{7-9}):

> And the Buddha, the rishi-bull, the guide, taught me of the impermanence of uprising and dukkha; of the unconditioned*, of the cessation of dukkha, that are eternal; and of this path*, not crooked, straight, auspicious.
>
> When I heard (of) the Deathless* place, the unconditioned*, the Teaching of the Tathāgata, the Unrivalled One, I was well and highly restrained in the precepts, firm in the Dhamma taught by the Buddha, the most excellent of men.
>
> When I knew the dustless* place, the unconditioned*, taught by the Tathāgata, the Unrivalled One, I right there reached the calm (supermundane* – VvA 84) concentration. That same highest assurance* was mine

Such passages give one to understand that the khandhas of sīla and samādhi were, if anything, dependent upon the prior acquisition of paññā*, rather than its antecedents, and that the path* should be understood in much the same manner as the causal sequence of the paṭiccasamuppāda, such that each new stage becomes a possibility only when its predecessor has been fulfilled. Moreover, if the khandhas were thought, in spite of their usual enumeration, to follow the order of the path*, rather than vice versa, this would further explain how on many an occasion it can be said of the sāvakasaṅgha* that its members are endowed with paññā* and sīla with no mention being made of samādhi:

> The four who are practising* and the four established in the fruits* – this is the Saṅgha that is upright and endowed with paññā* and sīla (paññāsīlasamāhito)

(e.g. S i 233 = Pv IV 3^{49} = Vv 34^{23}; cp Dhp 229), just as the lay sakadāgāmins* Purāṇa and Isidatta were similarly endowed (A iii 347ff). That is to say, if the khandhas followed the order of the path* one could, by factor five, be endowed with paññā* and sīla and yet still be wanting in samādhi, which would, incidentally, explain why Purāṇa and Isidatta did not attain rebirth in the Brahmaloka.

Finally it may also be remarked against the interpretation of the path* suggested by Nyāṇatiloka that on his analysis of the path culminating in the paññā-khandha we find that the path* must terminate, not with right view* as he suggests but with the second factor of the path, right resolve*, which is surely a somewhat remarkable goal. However as one of the above quotations made clear (M iii 75f; D ii 217) the eightfold path* is in fact merely part of a path* that is tenfold, the first eight factors being

the path of the sekha*, the ten that of the asekha* or arahant* (M iii 76). The ninth and tenth factors, right knowledge* and right release*, constitute the vimutti-khandha and it is this that forms the true goal of the path*. This explains how it can be said that it is possible for one endowed with sīla, samādhi and paññā* to go on to acquire aññā* (M i 71), which the commentary explains as arahantship* (MA ii 32). Thus the path* should be seen as commencing with paññā* – for those with paññā* are often portrayed as being a long way from the goal, as for instance when the Buddha said of Ānanda that he was a sekha* (and thus with much still to do) and that moreover it would not be easy to find his equal in paññā* (A i 225), or when Nārada maintained that though it was well seen by him with right paññā* as it really is* that the cessation of becoming is nibbāna, he was nonetheless no arahant*, explaining that he was like one who could see the water at the bottom of the well but who was not yet in a position to touch it (S ii 118). Sīla and samādhi may then be seen as dependent upon prior acquisition of paññā* – as Sirimā above claimed they were – and right knowledge* and right release* in turn dependent upon samādhi.

It may have been such considerations that led Nyāṇatiloka to go on to say:

> It is, however, true that a really unshakable and safe foundation to the path is provided only by Right View which, starting from the tiniest germ of faith and knowledge, gradually, step by step, develops into penetrating insight (vipassanā) and thus forms the immediate condition for the entrance into the 4 supermundane paths and fruits of holiness, and for the realization of Nibbana. Only with regard to this highest form of supermundane insight, we may indeed say that all the remaining links of the path are nothing but the outcome and attendant symptoms of Right View.

Elsewhere he says the same but with a few interesting variations and additions:

> An initial minimum of Right Understanding (as he now renders Right View), however, is required at the very start, because some grasp of the facts of suffering, etc., is necessary to provide convincing reasons, and an incentive, for a diligent practice of the Path. A measure of Right Understanding is also required for helping the other Path factors to fulfil intelligently and efficiently their individual functions in the common task of liberation. For that reason, and to emphasise the importance of that factor, Right Understanding has been given the first place in the Noble Eightfold Path.
>
> This initial understanding of the Dhamma, however, has to be gradually developed, with the help of the other Path factors, until it reaches finally that highest clarity of Insight (vipassanā) which is the immediate condition for entering the four stages of Holiness and for attaining Nibbana.

> Right Understanding is therefore the beginning as well as the culmination of the Noble Eightfold Path[3]

Now this seems to be somewhat of a muddle and one that is rather difficult to unravel. First we may note that the path* that Nyāṇatiloka had earlier claimed to be one in which 'in reality however the links 3–5 constituting moral training (sīla) are the first links to be cultivated' is now said to begin with and to culminate in right view*. Or is this what he is saying? For it would seem that at the same time he is talking of two quite separate paths – one that commences with sīla and culminates with paññā*, which it seems he understands as the 'immediate condition for the entrance into the 4 supermundane paths and fruits of holiness'. Thus it would seem that the goal of the eightfold path* is attainment of the four supermundane* paths*. Now whilst he does not say in what such paths consist it would seem from his statement that 'Only with regard to this highest form of supermundane insight, we may indeed say that all the remaining links of the path are nothing but the outcome and attendant symptoms of Right View' that he understands these four supermundane* paths* as themselves in some sense denoting the eightfold path* – and we arrive at the confusing conclusion that the eightfold path* begins with 'an initial minimum of right view' and culminates in the supermundane* paths* which are themselves the eightfold path*. That is to say, he seems to be arguing that the goal of the (supermundane*) eightfold path* is entrance into the supermundane* (eightfold) paths*, which is to assert that the goal of the path* is its own entrance and precisely the dilemma that he was attempting to solve.

Here it starts to become clear how he has got himself into this muddle: by denying, or ignoring, the fact that the eightfold path* is supermundane* from its very beginning. In this he is no doubt following the teaching of the Abhidhamma in which ariyamagga* was often understood as those javana-moments prior to phala, or fruition:

> According to the Abhidhamma, 'supermundane path', or simply 'Path' (magga), is a designation of the moment of entering into one of the 4 stages of holiness – Nirvana being the object – produced by intuitional Insight (vipassanā) into the impermanency, misery and impersonality of existence, flashing forth and for ever transforming one's life and nature. By 'Fruition' (phala) are meant those moments of consciousness, which follow immediately thereafter as the result of the Path, and which in certain circumstances may repeat for innumerable times during life-time[4]

It is only on the basis of such a view that one can say that an individual can begin to follow an eightfold path accompanied by 'some grasp of the facts of suffering' with the result that at some subsequent time this 'initial

minimum of Right Understanding' will blossom into the 'penetrating insight' of a vision of the Four Truths* that marks the successful attainment of one or other of the four states of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant*. Such a view is succinctly summarised by the Bhikkhu Sangharakshita when he says:

> Right Understanding . . . , the first stage of the eightfold Way, is most often defined as penetration of the Four Aryan Truths. In other words, the very first step on the Path consists in acquiring a clear understanding of the various doctrines which express, in one way or another, the central Buddhist principle of universal conditionality. This understanding, at first merely rational, is gradually transformed under the pressure of spiritual practice, into insight, and at the eighth stage, the stage of deep meditation, the disciple realises in his own spiritual experience the truth which in the first stage he had comprehended intellectually through its doctrinal symbols[5]

However, it must be said that this is a travesty of the teachings of the Nikāyas just as it is surely most peculiar to call the seventh of one single moment of consciousness (for javanas are sevenfold divisions of single moments of consciousness) a 'path'. Moreover it trades upon the belief that right view* can admit of degrees, a belief that finds no support whatsoever in the Nikāyas. For we have seen that there are in the Nikāyas only two kinds of right view distinguished: the right view that amounts to nothing more than a belief in the efficacy of almsgiving that is 'with (or affected by the) āsavas, on the side of merit and ripening into rebirth' – the mundane right view of the puthujjana – and the right view* of the supermundane* ariyasāvaka* that is 'ariyan*, without (or unaffected by the) āsavas, supermundane* and a factor of the (ariyan* eightfold) path*'. Of these the former, however much it might be developed, could lead only to an ever firmer conviction that cultic acts of charity to almsworthy arahants* would bear their expected fruit of a happy rebirth in a devaloka. There is in the characterisation of this right view no mention, however slight, of any 'grasp of the facts of suffering etc.' and it is difficult to see how such a right view could be developed, even in deep meditation, into the penetrating insight* of the impermanence of the phenomenal world. It is only the latter of these two right views that could conceivably start from the 'tiniest germ of faith and knowledge' and 'gradually, step by step' develop 'into penetrating insight' but as a survey of the passages in the Nikāyas dealing with this right view* will show such right view* was not one to advance step by step in this fashion.

For such right view* is variously defined as understanding (M i 48), or possessing knowledge of (D ii 312), the Four Truths*; it is to see with right paññā* the uprising and cessation of the world as it really is*, to

have, without dependence upon another*, no doubt, no uncertainty, that whatever uprises is dukkha and that whatever ceases is dukkha (S ii 17). Or alternatively, it is to be free of the vipallāsās, namely to perceive, consider and to see permanence in the impermanent, dukkha in what is not dukkha, self in what is not self and loveliness in the foul (A ii 52; cp the passage cited above where it was stated that what others say is sukha, that the ariyans* say is dukkha and that what others say is dukkha, that the ariyans* know as sukha). Indeed the commentaries often gloss right view* with yathāvādiṭṭhika, or seeing things as they really are* (e.g. AA ii 27 = 355 = v 66), and a series of parallel suttas leads one to understand that one who is an ariyasāvaka* endowed with (right) view* and possessing paññā* and who understands as they really are* the Four Truths* applied to dukkha (S v 459ff) is the same person who is elsewhere portrayed as having gained the Dhammacakkhu* and insight* into Dhamma (S ii 133ff). In yet other places possession of right view* means that one is an ariyasāvaka* who understands as it really is* the causal relation (of the paṭiccasamuppāda), its uprising, its cessation and the means to that cessation, one who is called an ariyasāvaka* who has attained (right) view*, who has attained vision*, who has arrived at the true Dhamma*, who sees the true Dhamma*, who is endowed with the knowledge (ñāṇena) of the sekha*, who is endowed with the wisdom (vijjāya) of the sekha*, who has attained the Dhamma-ear*, who has the ariyan* insight* of revulsion and who stands having arrived at the door to the Deathless* (S ii 43). Right view* is, in short, to see nibbāna (M i 510f; cp AA ii 195ff: sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe nibbānadassanaṁ), just as Nārada above claimed he had done. Moreover, acquisition of this Dhammacakkhu* – the means by which the Four Truths* are seen and thus the eightfold path* itself since this is the fourth Truth* – is frequently explained in the commentaries as equivalent to attaining one or another of the three supermundane* paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* and anāgāmin* (e.g. DA 237). There is, it will be noted, not so much as a hint even in these passages that such right view* admitted of degrees. Indeed even when right view* is associated with each of these three supermundane* paths* it is still none the less maintained that 'nothing new is added after the Truths* are seen; for the higher three paths* discern in them only what has been discerned (by the first path*)' (Asl 243). Nor is it at all clear what might be thought to count as 'lower forms of supermundane insight'. In short, there is, and always was, only one form of supermundane* right view* – that of seeing the Four Truths* as they really are* – and one simply has it or one does not.

What is perhaps remarkable is that the Nikāyas appear to be almost totally silent upon the question as to how such right view* was to be attained. Such silence, it may be noted, would be all the more remarkable

had the acquisition of right view* been considered an outcome of this or that aspect of the path*. So how does one come to be an ariyasāvaka*, born of the ariyan* birth (ariyāya jātiyā jāto – M ii 103) and possessed of the sotāpattiyaṅgas* such that one might say: 'I am a genuine son* of the Lord, born from his mouth, Dhamma-born, Dhamma-created, an heir to the Dhamma' (Bhagavato 'mhi putto oraso mukhato jāto dhamma-jo dhamma-nimmito dhamma-dāyādo – e.g. D iii 84)? The answer is remarkably simple – one becomes a sāvaka*, or 'hearer', through hearing Dhamma from the Buddha (or possibly from other ariyans*); one becomes born of the ariyan* birth by being born from the mouth of the Buddha.

The Dhamma as sound

At this point we have to be perfectly clear as to what is meant by hearing the Dhamma from the Buddha. In his excellent article 'Spiritual Practice in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra'[6], Andrew Rawlinson demonstrates with a wealth of material how in the earliest layers of the Lotus Sūtra terms such as the Dharma and the 'sound', 'voice' and 'word' and so on of the Buddha had an inner, transcendental meaning and that the Lotus originally conceived and experienced the Dharma as an inner sound. That is, the earliest practice was that of contacting the Dharma as an inner, transcendental entity manifesting itself, through the medium of the Buddha, as sound. This is evident from such passages as 'Let your voice, which has the excellent sound of the drum, go forth. Declare the Dharma such as it is' (para. 24) and Rawlinson notes that it is 'quite possible that the phrase "Dharma-dundubhi" (the drum of the Dharma) is not a figurative expression referring to the Buddha's broadcasting of his teaching, but a straightforward description of what the inner Dharma sounds like' (para. 33). In addition he shows that the sound of the Dharma has a curative effect and that whilst 'the ignorant (who are, in the preceding verses, clearly Lotus equivalents of the puthujjana) do not hear the beautiful voice of the Buddha in even a thousand koṭis of births' (para. 27), others benefit greatly: 'Wonderful is the voice of the Sugata; it dispels the doubt and pain of living beings. My āsravas have been destroyed and all my pain has gone now that I have heard that voice' (para. 19). With this may be compared the remarks of Conze, quoted elsewhere in the article, that it was a doctrine of the Mahāsaṅghikas that 'the Buddha by one single sound reveals the entire range of the dharmic world. He speaks one word only and all beings hear the Dharma in a fashion adapted to their own nature, and as capable of removing the defilement peculiar to each one of them. By one single sound the Buddha

can proclaim the entire Dharma, and his listeners will understand its meaning, be it gross or subtle, according to their own particular aptitude' (para. 57).

Later, however, when this inner contact with the Dharma was lost, an externalised, expositional Dharma in the form of the sūtra took its place, whereupon the words under discussion came to be used in the same external sense. Neither the Dharma, nor the word of the Buddha, was any longer the sound of Suchness* but merely the codified dogma in the memorised sūtra, whilst this latter tradition developed the tendency of reading this new meaning into the older passages, thereby misunderstanding, or passing over, their transcendental dimension.

It is possible to detect this same trend in the Nikāyas although the subsequent Pali and Theravāda traditions would seem to have been more thorough in their editing, so that only a few of the earlier, quite unambiguously transcendental passages now survive. They are given below accompanied, where appropriate, by examples taken from Rawlinson.

The Tathāgata is said to set rolling the Brahma-wheel, that is the wheel of the Dhamma, by roaring his lion's roar (M i 71; cp S ii 27; A iii 9, 417; A v 33), whilst elsewhere the Buddha's teaching on the Four Truths* applied to the wrong belief of sakkāya (A ii 33) or on the five khandhas (S iii 85) is similarly likened to the roar of a lion at evening time. When the recluse Gotama roars his lion's roar in this or that company, men deem it something to be heard; on hearing it they become devout and enter upon the path to Suchness*, achieving success therein (sīhanādañ ca samaṇo Gotamo nadati parisāsu ca nadati . . . sotabbañ c' assa maññanti, sutvā ca pasīdanti . . . tathattāya ca paṭipajjanti, paṭipannā ca ārādhenti – D i 175). Whilst this symbolism appears to be absent in the examples quoted by Rawlinson, it can also be found in a passage in the Milindapañha which, apart from this mention of the lion's roar, bears much similarity with one found in the Lotus Sūtra. I repeat the passage as it appears in the translation by Rhys Davids (The Questions of King Milinda i 35) since the original was not available to me:

> To the wise and discerning who came to him with listening ear he displayed the ninefold jewel of the Conqueror's word, he pointed out to them the path of righteousness, bore aloft for them the torch of truth, set up for them the sacred pillar of the truth, and celebrated for their benefit the sacrifice of the truth. For them he waved the banner, raised the standard, blew the trumpet, and beat the drum of truth. And with his mighty lion's voice, like Indra's thunder but sweet the while [cp Rawlinson para. 23: send forth your sweet and lovely voice (or sound)], he poured down upon them a plenteous shower, heavy with the drops of mercy, and brilliant with the coruscations of the lightning flashes of his knowledge, of the nectar waters of the teaching of the Nirvāna of the truth

With this may be compared the following (Rawlinson, para. 34):

> Reveal the Dharma, O Lord and Leader! move forward the wheel of the Dharma, make the drum of the Dharma thunder and blow the conch-shell of the Dharma. Shed the rain of the true Dharma over the world, and utter the sweet-sounding good word

and also the fact that (Rawlinson para 35):

> Mañjuśrī tells the assembly of Bodhisattvas that it is the Tathāgata's intention to give a great discourse on the hearing of the Dharma, on the pouring down of the great rain of the Dharma, the resounding of the great drum of the Dharma, the raising of the great banner of the Dharma, the kindling of the great torch of the Dharma, the blowing of the great conch-shell of the Dharma, the striking of the great kettle-drum of the Dharma, the great exposition of the Dharma

That the sound of the Dharma should here be likened to that of a great kettle-drum (mahā-dharma-bherī) is of great interest since such symbolism occurs not only elsewhere in the Lotus Sūtra: 'Let your voice, which has the excellent sound of the drum (vara-dundubhi-svarā), go forth' (Rawlinson, para. 24), but also in the Nikāyas, for when the Buddha was journeying to Sarnath to set rolling the wheel of the Dhamma by way of the First Sermon, he encountered the Ājīvika named Upaka and told him (M i 171 = Vin i 8):

> I am going to the city of the Kāsis to set rolling the wheel of the Dhamma, beating the Deathless*-drum (amatadundubhiṁ) in a world that has become blind

The setting rolling of the wheel of the Dhamma is similarly associated with the drum of the Deathless* (amṛtasya dundubhiṁ) in the Lotus Sūtra (Rawlinson, para. 22):

> Move forward the exalted, unsurpassed wheel! beat the drum of immorality! release (all) beings from hundreds of ills and reveal the path to Nirvāna

It is worth adding here that the terms amatadundubhi, Brahmacakka, Dhammacakka and so forth are, like most Pali compounds, ambiguous and despite its resolution in the Lotus passage the compound amatadundubhi could mean 'the drum of the Deathless', 'the drum from the Deathless', 'the drum that is the Deathless' and many others besides. In view of the assertion that the Dharma in such contexts is the Deathless*, the transcendental or supermundane* plane, I tend to favour the latter of

these. By the same argument, it should also be stated that, in spite of the fact that I have followed the convention of rendering Dhammacakka as 'wheel of the Dhamma', this term might better be construed as either 'the wheel that is the Dhamma' or, better perhaps, the 'wheel (that rolls) towards the Dhamma (as transcendental entity)'; Brahmacakka would similarly have to be seen as 'the wheel (that rolls) towards Brahman'.

One further passage in the Nikāyas using the symbolism of the drum is not without interest. It will be recalled how earlier we had occasion to note how it was predicted by the Buddha that the future decline would be marked by the monks not listening to those suttantas spoken by the Tathāgata, deep (gambhīrā), deep in meaning (gambhīratthā), supermundane* and dealing with suññatā and that they would instead prefer those suttantas made by poets, tricked out with fair-sounding phrases, external (to the Teaching) and spoken (merely) by sāvakas* (S ii 266f). This disappearance of the Dhamma is compared to the disintegration of a drum (S ii 266f):

> Once upon a time, monks, the Dasārahas had a drum (mudiṅga) called Summoner. As it began to split the Dasārahas added another peg until, monks, the time came that Summoner's original drumhead had vanished and that only the collection of pegs remained

It is tempting to see in this simile an allusion to the Deathless*-drum whose sound will, in future, similarly vanish with the loss of its drumhead. Moreover we should note that this disappearance of the Dhamma (as sound) will be marked by the monks turning away from the sound of the Dhamma and towards its attempted formulation in speech – having lost their inner contact with the Dhamma they will turn to an externalised, expositional Dhamma in the form of the sutta. This sympathy may be found expressed elsewhere, such as where the Buddha warns Ānanda that it is not fit that a sāvaka* should follow after a teacher for the sake of an exposition in the form of suttas and mixtures of suttas and verses (suttaṁ geyyaṁ); he should follow after a teacher for the sake of that talk which is a help to opening up the mind (cetovivaraṇasappāyā) and which conduces to enlightenment and nibbāna (M iii 115).

Rawlinson makes the interesting point that the fact that teachings are said to be deep (gambhīra) may suggest 'that gambhīra was originally a term that was used to describe the Buddha's voice or sound (i.e. the Dharma) which then came to have a metaphysical sense when applied to the Dharma as an ontological entity as opposed to the Dharma as a phenomenological or experiencable entity' (p. 120 n 14). Such a suggestion surely finds support in the Pali sources – except that is for the commentary on S ii 266f which explains gambhīra as 'difficult as a text,

similar to the Sallekha Sutta' (pāli-vasena gambhīrā, Sallekha-sutta-sadisā – SA ii 229) – for at D ii 211, 217 gambhīra is given as one of the eight characteristics of the voice of Brahmā Sanaṅkumāra's voice (saro), it being added that anyone possessing a voice (saro) endowed with such characteristics is called Brahmassaro, which we could take as 'Brahman-voiced', that is, 'sounding like Brahman'. Moreover, it is only when gambhīra in the Saṁyutta passage above is understood as referring to the sound of the suttantas spoken by the Tathāgata that the subsequent term, gambhīratthā, is not totally redundant; compare how in the Lotus Sūtra the voice of Avalokiteśvara is said to possess this very quality (Rawlinson, para. 38):

> One should remember Avalokiteśvara, whose sound is as the clouds and the drum, who thunders like a rain-cloud and possesses a good voice like Brahma (brahma-susvaraḥ – I would prefer 'like Brahman' here), whose voice is perfect

The suggestion that the Dhamma consisted of sound is confirmed most of all by the fact that those who participated in it and who had contact with it as a supermundane★ entity were called sāvakas★, hearers, and said to be sutavant★, who have heard the sound (of the Dhamma), in virtue of which they are further said to possess the Dhammasota★, the Dhamma-ear★ (S ii 43 = 45 = 58; cp A iii 285ff, v 329ff). That sota should be understood here as 'ear' rather than as 'stream' can be seen from the fact that the Dhammasota★ is said, in a context of hearing (savanena) the Dhamma, to save the one possessing it (A iii 348ff; A v 140). For just as the Buddha causes people to see the Four Truths★, to see nibbāna (M i 510f), by means of causing the Dhammacakkhu★, the Dhamma-eye, to arise within them, so too does he cause them to hear that same Dhamma by means of causing the Dhammasota★, the Dhamma-ear★, to arise within them. This is why the gift of the Dharma is likened to a blissful sound (Rawlinson, p. 124 n 25).

And in this the Buddha was thoroughly at one with the tradition that had gone before him, for the Upaniṣads are equally insistent that both the Ātman (BU II 4 5) and Brahman (Kaṭha U I 2 7) are to be heard as well as seen. Nor is this at all surprising when it is remembered that in the Ṛg Veda it is stated that the phenomenal world is merely one quarter of Speech, there being a further three quarters remaining unmanifest in that which lies beyond (RV I 164[45]):

> The Word (vāc) is measured in four quarters. The brāhmins★ who possess insight★ know these four divsions. Three quarters, concealed in secret, cause no movement. The fourth is the quarter that is spoken by men

Or as Dandekar has it:

> The Veda is eternal; it has been in existence from times immemorial. The Ṛṣis or seers were the first to 'discover' that Veda and propagate it among the people. The Veda is darśana, that is to say, it has been realised through direct vision rather than through indirect knowledge; and it is also said to be śruti, for it is the rhythm of the infinite which the ancient Ṛṣis 'heard' and broadcast to the people[7]

Parato ghosa

Thus when the sāvaka* is said to be one who 'has seen Dhamma, reached Dhamma, found Dhamma (and) plunged into Dhamma' (stock: e.g. M i 380) it is surely much more likely this inner, transcendental and supermundane* entity, the hidden three-quarters lying behind the phenomenal world, that is meant, rather than its attempted formulation in the externalised form of the sutta. In such contexts it is therefore tempting to drop the definite article and speak merely of Dhamma. Similarly, when translating Sirimā's verses above I left the second verse to read: 'When I heard (of) the Deathless* place . . .' since my preferred rendering: 'When I heard the Deathless* place . . .' would, without the intervening discussion, have appeared rather odd.

After this somewhat lengthy excursion we may now revert to our discussion of right view* and its place in the eightfold path*. Earlier I said that the Nikāyas appeared to be almost totally silent upon the question as to how right view* was to be attained. Such silence is not, however, complete for one cryptic passage, found only on two occasions, has come down to us, though not without its own ambiguity, and reads: 'Two conditions give rise to right view* – parato ghoso and wise attention' (M i 294; A i 87), the latter of these two passages also stating that parato ghoso and a lack of wise attention give rise to wrong view. AA ii 157 explains parato ghoso in the context of giving rise to wrong view as 'hearing that which is not the true Dhamma from the presence of another' (parassa santikā asaddhammasavanaṁ) and in the context of giving rise to right view* as merely 'hearing the true Dhamma*' (saddhammasavanaṁ). MA ii 346 is much more informative and states that wise attention is the method for Paccekabuddhas and Omniscient Buddhas since there is no parato ghoso for them; the parato ghoso is the means for sāvakas*, the commentary then citing the case of Sāriputta who, although he had fulfilled the perfections for one asaṅkheyya kappa and a hundred thousand kappas besides, was still unable to get rid of even the slightest kilesa of his own accord and yet who attained penetration* upon hearing one verse of Dhamma from the elder Assaji. In the

Vinaya account of this episode it is clear that as a result of hearing this verse Sāriputta acquired the Dhammacakkhu* (Vin i 40) whilst in a similar account in the commentary on the Dhammapada it is said that he became a sotāpanna* (DhpA i 92f).

It would seem that the commentaries understood parato ghoso as 'the voice of another' and such an interpretation would accord well with their other explanations of the ariyasāvaka* as one who hears (Dhamma) in the presence of the ariyans* (SnA 166) and so on. On the other hand there is much in what Woodward had to say on this phrase (GS i 79 n 1):

> 'If ordinary speech were meant I think vācā or vacī would have been used, and if another person were meant aññassa or aññatarassa would have been used'

The use of ghosa to refer to the ordinary human voice would be most unusual, whilst it is precisely this word ghoṣa that Rawlinson has shown to be used in anything but this sense in the early layers of the Lotus Sūtra (e.g. in paras 19, 24 and 27 quoted earlier). Thus it is of interest to find ghosaṁ associated at Sn 698 with the sound to be heard at the rolling of the excellent wheel by the Conqueror (sutvāna ghosaṁ Jinavaracakkavattane) – a sound that is, slightly earlier, referred to as ghosaṁ parato – and which, given the context, seems to have something of a supernatural quality. For when Asita the ṛṣi inspected the infant Gotama and found him to be possessed of the thirty-two marks signifying that he would attain enlightenment, he burst into tears as he realised that he, himself, would, in the meantime, die without having heard Dhamma from that One of Unequalled Resoluteness (ath' antarā me bhavissati kālakiriyā so 'haṁ na sussaṁ asamadhurassa dhammaṁ – Sn 694). He therefore urged his nephew that when he should one day hear the ghosaṁ parato indicating that the Buddha had reached enlightenment (Buddho ti ghosaṁ yada parato suṇāsi sambodhipatto – Sn 695f) he should go and follow the Brahmacariya* under him. Whilst the commentary seems silent as to the meaning of ghosaṁ parato here it nonetheless suggests that ghosaṁ at Sn 698 is what he will hear from devatās desiring his welfare (SnA 490), in much the same way that Asita had himself learned of the birth of Gotama (Sn 679–684). This passage, which seems to be the only other occurrence of the phrase parato ghoso, is worth noting since although it does not appear in the context of the arising of right view* it none the less demonstrates that parato ghoso meant something more than merely hearing something from another person. Indeed it is not altogether clear how, grammatically, it could mean this, since verbs such as suṇāti take the genitive of the person from whom something is heard – e.g. sussaṁ asamadhurassa (Sn 694 above), tesaṁ sutvāna (A ii 52

below), sammāsambuddhassa dhammaṁ suṇanti (VvA 194f) – whereas parato is distinctly ablative. Moreover, whilst para- is used to denote other people, it can also refer to the beyond, the further side and so on, as in, for instance, such terms as paraloka and the distinct possibility exists that the phrase parato ghoso may have originally meant 'the sound from the Beyond' in the sense of the sound of the supermundane* Dhamma; though it would at the same time also be true to say that it is 'the voice of another' in the sense that it requires another person – usually the Buddha but on occasion, as in the case of Sāriputta, some other ariyan* – to mediate it.

Such an interpretation, it may be objected, does not take due cognisance of the fact that parato ghoso is at A i 87 said also to give rise to wrong view. This is perhaps a powerful objection yet against it it may be said, first, that such an account of the origin of wrong view does seem most un-Buddhist for one might surely have expected some explanation in terms rather of the presence of the akusalamūlas, the kilesas or some other corruption of the mind; secondly, the two suttas – accounting, respectively, for wrong view and right view* – form a distinctly uneasy pair, in the sense that whilst 'wise attention' appears in the former in its negated form parato ghoso remains unchanged; finally, the commentary does seem unduly hesitant here. Moreover, the fact that this occurrence is, to my knowledge, unique in the Nikāyas might suggest that it had been coined, at some time when inner contact with the Dhamma as sound had been lost, to form a pair for inclusion in the Book of Twos, especially given the independent occurrence of its opposite in the Majjhima Nikāya.

Be this as it may, it seems clear that right view* is acquired upon hearing the Dhamma from the Buddha. Thus (A ii 52):

> When the Buddhas arise in this world, the radiance-makers, they make visible this Dhamma that leads to the calming of dukkha; and (men) hearing them acquire paññā*, regain their own hearts (from the clutches of Māra) and see that which is impermanent as impermanent, see that which is dukkha as dukkha; they see that which is not-self as not-self and that which is foul as foul; through their acquisition of right view* they transcend all dukkha

It is for this reason, no doubt, that MA ii 346 explains parato ghoso as 'hearing the beneficial Dhamma' (sappāyadhammasavanaṁ). And here it may be recalled how the Buddha explained to Uttiya that 'I, Uttiya, by means of my superknowledge, teach Dhamma to my sāvakas* for the purification of beings, for the transcending of sorrow and lamentation, for the going to rest of dukkha and dejection, for reaching the method*, for realising nibbāna' (A v 194). Right view*, seeing things as they really

are*, we may conclude came about by the Dhamma being revealed, both visually and aurally, by the Buddha, as it had been, in former times, by the ṛṣis, and, in his own day, similarly by Mahāvīra, for as Glasenapp states:

> It is not through the limited comprehension of an average man that Jainism arrives at its view-point of the world, but by revelation, or, better, by that which an omniscient man, a kevalin, has communicated[8]

However, such right view* was, as the enumeration of the factors of the path* shows, only the beginning of that path*. Those with right view* were, like Nārada above, able to see the water at the bottom of the well but were still not yet in a position to touch it. In short, the path* had still to be trodden. The Buddha, having established his sāvakas* on the path*, might be expected to guide them from time to time on this or that aspect of the other factors. For as noted earlier the eightfold path* is really nothing but a means of summarising the various practices, explained here and there in greater detail, that bring one to the goal. It is when the path* is cultivated that the four applications of mindfulness, the four best efforts, the four iddhipādas, the five indriyas, the five powers and the seven bojjhaṅgas all reach fulfilment (S v 49) and this is so since the four best efforts are precisely what is meant by right effort* just as the four applications of mindfulness are what is meant by right mindfulness* (e.g. M iii 251f), and so on.

Thus when we find the Buddha instructing various people in such practices it may be assumed that they are sāvakas*, that is to say, those who are already on the path* and this in turn implies that apart from those passages clearly concerned with puthujjana morality and alms-giving and so forth the greater part of the Nikāyas is made up of teachings that were intended solely for, and that were to be practised only by, those already supermundane*. When this is realised, it immediately becomes apparent as to why the Nikāyas are silent on the question of how right view* was to be acquired: for they are, in the main, teachings that were addressed to those who, as sāvakas*, were already possessed of right view*. They would have had no more need of being told how right view* was to be acquired than there would be for universities to provide courses for their students upon the subject of how to apply for admission; whilst the puthujjana, we have found, remained ignorant that there was a path* at all.

It must surely have been this silence of the Nikāyas that has misled so many, including Nyāṇatiloka, into the error of assuming that anyone could, whenever he so chose, begin to follow the ariyan* eightfold path*. Rather, one's ability to follow this path* depends upon one's ability to

acquire the first factor of that path*, namely the right view* that is its entrance and that arises on hearing the thunder of the Beyond when mediated by a Buddha. To have sought to universalise what were originally private teachings by ignoring the fact that the path* is supermundane* and the sole province of the sāvaka* – as indeed are all four khandhas (D ii 122f) and through possession of which one is deemed an unsurpassed merit-field (A iii 134) – has done nothing but render Buddhist studies a considerable misservice. The ariyan* eightfold path* was never a 'noble' eightfold path, any more than the Four Ariyan* Truths* were Four 'Noble' Truths. The ariyan* eightfold path* was the supermundane* eightfold path* trodden by the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant* alone and until this is appreciated Buddhist studies will remain in their present state of infancy.

The acquisition of right view*

This general failure to recognise that right view* was to be attained only by hearing the Dhamma from the Buddha is due no doubt in part to its having been forgotten that the society in which Buddhism arose was mainly, if not wholly, pre-literate. Moreover, even when writing was known, such was not for a long time considered a proper medium for the transmission of the teaching as the existence of bhāṇakas for each of the Nikāyas demonstrates. Indeed even when, in the late fifth century A.D., Dhammapāla composed his Paramatthadīpanī on the Petavatthu he still found it necessary to state in his introductory remarks that the text was comprised of as many as four recitation sections (bhāṇavārato catubhāṇavāramattaṁ – PvA 2), thus pointing to a continuing practice of oral transmission. If it be thought that the absence of a printed, or written, collection of the Buddha's utterances and the need therefore to seek out the services of the bhāṇakas to discover, or to refresh one's memory of, this or that aspect of his teachings, might present somewhat of an inconvenience – if not an obstacle – to a familiarity with those teachings as a whole, how much more difficult must this have been during the period prior to the Parinibbāna when such remembered utterances were as yet still uncollected. For the impression given by the Nikāyas is that the Buddha's ministry covered a remarkably wide area and that he would arrive in a particular district, establish various individuals on the path* and then move on to other areas. Neither the sāvakasaṅgha*, nor even the bhikkhusaṅgha, were, even in the beginning, a distinct and localised social entity and whilst the texts often portray the Buddha as on tour with a great number of monks – at times as many as twelve hundred and fifty – the picture that emerges is rather one

of local pockets of either saṅgha living more or less independently of one another and having to await one or another of the Buddha's infrequent visits for further instruction, when they might say, 'It has been a long time, Lord, since we heard Dhamma-talk from the Lord's own mouth; it were well, Lord, were we to get to hear Dhamma-talk from the Lord's own mouth' (cirassutā no bhante Bhagavato sammukhā dhammikathā, sādhu mayaṁ bhante labheyyāma Bhagavato sammukhā dhammikathaṁ savanāya – e.g. A iv 59).

Thus whilst it may be the case today that anyone who knows anything of Buddhism is likely to have read of the Four Truths*, the eightfold path* and so on, this can hardly have been so for those early followers who were the Buddha's contemporaries. This can further be seen from those passages recording instances upon which even those who might be considered his more or less constant companions went to him for clarification upon some point of the teaching that would appear rather elementary to one who had read and studied all the Nikāyas. Thus we find it recorded at A iv 378ff that Sāriputta visited the Buddha and asked him whether all those who die sa-upādisesa are free of arising in hell, in an animal-womb, on the peta-plane and in any of the four states of loss, in any bad destiny and in the downfall, to which the Buddha replied – as we might expect, given our knowledge of similar recorded utterances – that such is only the case with those of his followers who are ariyan* since all of these are completely free of arising in such realms. This sutta, moreover, ends with the interesting statement that 'Not until now, Sāriputta, has this Dhamma-discourse been spoken in reply to either monks, nuns, or male or female layfollowers. What is the reason for this? Lest after hearing this Dhamma-discourse they might resort to idleness; moreover this Dhamma-discourse has been spoken by me only because I was questioned thereon' (Na tāvāyaṁ Sāriputta dhammapariyāyo paṭibhāsi bhikkhūnaṁ bhikkhunīnaṁ upāsakānaṁ upāsikānaṁ. Taṁ kissa hetu? Mā yimaṁ dhammapariyāyaṁ sutvā pamādaṁ āhariṁsu, api ca mayā Sāriputta dhammapariyāyo pañhādhippāyena bhāsito – A iv 381f).

This suggests that all that the Buddha's contemporaries could hope to know of the Dhamma that he had rediscovered was what he chose to tell them. Moreover, although the Tathāgata was one to speak only of that which was fact, in accordance with the way things are and connected with the goal, he would only do so if and when he deemed it to be the right time for the exposition of that speech (M i 395). With this may be compared the reaction of Anāthapiṇḍika who, when dying, was exhorted by Sāriputta to train himself so as not to grasp after anything nor to have consciousness dependent upon anything and who, perhaps feeling such advice a little untimely, remarked 'Although I sat in attendance upon the

Teacher and upon the monks who are cultivating their minds for all that long time, never before did I hear such Dhamma-talk' (M iii 261; cp the response of Śāriputra upon first hearing of the existence of three vehicles in the Lotus Sūtra: 'Never before did I hear such a Dharma-discourse from the Lord' – Kern, p. 35). Anāthapiṇḍika going on to point out that there are young men of good family with but little dust in their eyes and who are coming to ruin through not hearing Dhamma (M iii 261).

Indeed it was only after a similar plea from Brahmā Sahampati – the anāgāmin* sāvaka* of the former Buddha Kassapa (SnA 476; cp S v 233) – that the Buddha agreed to teach at all. For the Buddha, immediately after attaining enlightenment, reflected upon the puthujjana-like habits of the world and felt a reluctance even to attempt to teach them (D ii 36 = M i 167f = S i 136 = Vin i 4f):

> This Dhamma that has been won by me is deep (gambhīro), difficult to see, difficult to awaken to, calm, excellent, beyond the realm of doubt, subtle, knowable only to the wise. But this is a generation delighting in attachment to sensuality, delighted by attachment to sensuality, rejoicing in attachment to sensuality. So for a generation delighting in . . . delighted by . . . rejoicing in attachment to sensuality, this were a matter difficult to see, that is to say, causal uprising by way of condition. This too were a matter difficult to see, that is to say, the tranquillising of all saṅkhāras, the rejection of all basis for rebirth, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna. And if I were to teach Dhamma and others were not to understand me, that would be a weariness to me, that would be a vexation to me

whereupon Brahmā Sahampati intervened and pointed out that there were beings in the world with little dust in their eyes and who were coming to ruin through not hearing Dhamma but who could become knowers of Dhamma. As a result the Buddha surveyed the world with his Buddha-eye and, recognising that there were such beings, agreed that he would teach for the sake of those beings. This motif is frequently encountered in the commentaries where the Buddha, emerging at dawn from the night's meditation, surveys the world with his Buddha-eye and, seeing some individual possessing the potential for realising the sotāpatti-fruit* (sotāpattiphalassa upanissaya), decides to go later that same day and to give (deti) them that fruit, that is to say, to establish them on the path* (e.g. PvA 38, 161).

It must be stressed, however, that although such beings may have had little dust in their eyes, or possessed the potential for realising the sotāpatti-fruit*, they were nonetheless still puthujjanas hemmed in by sense-pleasures and thus in bondage to Māra. Any rescue would require great skilfulness if Māra's devious tactics were to be countered. Thus it was that the Buddha chastised the novice Aciravata for having agreed to

teach Dhamma to Prince Jayasena only on the condition that if he did not understand what was said he should stay as he was and not question him further on the matter (M iii 130f):

> What is the good of that, Aggivessana (= Aciravata)? That Prince Jayasena, living as he does in the midst of sense-pleasures, enjoying sense-pleasures, being consumed by thoughts of sense-pleasures, burning with the fever of sense-pleasures, eager in the search for sense-pleasures, should know or see or reach or realise that which is to be known by renunciation, seen by renunciation, reached by renunciation, realised by renunciation – such a situation does not exist . . . It is as if, Aggivessana, there were a great mountain slope near a village or a market-town which two friends, coming hand in hand from that village or market-town might approach; having approached the mountain slope one friend might remain at the foot while the other might climb to the top. Then the friend standing at the foot of the mountain slope might speak thus to the one standing on the top, 'My dear, what do you see as you stand on the top of the mountain slope?' He might reply, 'As I stand on the top of the mountain slope I, my dear, see delightful parks, delightful woods, delightful stretches of level ground, delightful ponds'. But the other might speak thus, 'This is impossible, it cannot come to pass, my dear, that, as you stand on the top of the mountain slope, you should see delightful . . . ponds.'
>
> Then the friend who had been standing on the top of the mountain slope, having come down to the foot and taken his friend by the arm, making him climb to the top of the mountain slope and giving him a moment in which to regain his breath, might speak to him thus, 'Now, my dear, what is it that you see as you stand on the top of the mountain slope?' He might speak thus, 'I, my dear, as I stand on the top of the mountain slope see delightful . . . ponds'.
>
> He might speak thus, 'Just now, my dear, we understood you to say: This is impossible, it cannot come to pass that, as you stand on the top of the mountain slope, you should see delightful . . . ponds. But now we understand you to say: I, my dear, as I stand on the top of the mountain slope see delightful . . . ponds'.
>
> He might speak thus, 'That was because I, my dear, hemmed in by this great mountain slope, could not see what was to be seen'. Even so but to a still greater degree, Aggivessana, is Prince Jayasena hemmed in, blocked, obstructed, enveloped by this mass of ignorance. Indeed that Prince Jayasena, living as he does in the midst of sense-pleasures, enjoying sense-pleasures, being consumed by thoughts of sense-pleasures, burning with the fever of sense-pleasures, should know or see or reach or realise that which is to be known . . . seen . . . reached . . . realised by renunciation – such a situation does not exist

We have here in this Majjhima passage what must be an embryonic form of the upāya-kauśalya doctrine that was to see great elaboration in the schools of the Mahāyāna. For even those beings with little dust in

their eyes and capable of being established on the supermundane* plane of the ariyan* are, for the present at least, like Jayasena hemmed in by sense-pleasures, that is, by Māra. It will be no good the Buddha merely announcing the Dhamma that he has discovered in the vain hope that they will understand it; rather it will be necessary for him, standing on the lofty terrace of the Dhamma as might a man on a mountain peak (sele yathā pabbatamuddhani-ṭṭhito . . . tathūpamaṁ dhammamayaṁ . . . pasadam aruyha = D ii 39 = M i 168 = S i 137 = Vin i 5; and cp how in the opening verses of the Heart Sūtra Avalokiteśvara similarly looks down on this world), to descend from that height and take such beings by the arm and gradually lead them to the point from which they too, free of sense-pleasures, free of Māra, will be able to see for themselves what it is that he has alone discovered. The manner in which he did this is frequently documented in the Nikāyas and we may take as typical of this the case of Suppabuddha the leper.

It is said that on one occasion Suppabuddha the leper saw in the distance a great multitude which he took to be an almsgiving and that, hoping he might get something to eat there, he approached that multitude only to find that it was the Buddha teaching Dhamma. Nonetheless, he decided to remain and listen to Dhamma. Then the Lord surveyed the hearts of that whole company, wondering whether there were anyone present who was 'capable' (bhabba: used to the ability to realise a supermundane* state – cp A iii 421, 438 – and clearly the Pali equivalent of the Jain category of bhavya, of those souls alone capable of salvation, mentioned in the quotation from Glasenapp at the end of Chapter 1) of understanding Dhamma and, seeing Suppabuddha the leper seated in that company, realised that he was so capable. So for the sake of Suppabuddha (Ud 48f):

a He talked a progressive talk, that is to say, talk on giving, talk on moral habit, talk on heaven; he made visible the peril, the vanity, the defilement of the pleasures of the senses and the advantage in renouncing them. When the Lord knew that the heart of Suppabuddha the leper was ready, malleable, devoid of the hindrances, uplifted, devout, then did he make visible to him that Dhamma teaching that the Buddhas have themselves discovered: dukkha, its uprising, its cessation and the path*. And as a clean cloth without black specks will easily take dye, even so, as Suppabuddha the leper was (sitting) there on that very seat, the Dhammacakkhu*, dustless, stainless, arose to him that: 'Whatever is of a nature to uprise, all that is of a nature to cease'.

b Then Suppabuddha the leper as one who had seen Dhamma, reached Dhamma, found Dhamma, plunged into Dhamma, who had crossed over doubt, put away uncertainty, one who had attained to self-confidence, not dependent upon another, as to the Teacher's teaching,

[rose from his seat and approached the Lord. Having approached he saluted the Lord, sat down at one side and, so seated at one side, Suppabuddha the leper said this to the Lord]:

c 'It is wonderful, Lord! It is wonderful, Lord! It is as if, Lord, one might set upright what had been upturned, or might reveal what was hidden, or might point out the path* to one who had gone astray, or might bring an oil-lamp into the darkness so that those with eyes might see material shapes – even so is this Dhamma made visible in countless ways by the Lord. I go to the Lord as refuge, Lord, to the Dhamma and to the order of monks.

d May the Lord accept me as a layfollower, as one gone for refuge from this day forth for as long as life lasts'.

Then Suppabuddha the leper,

e as one who had had (something) indicated to him, who had been made to take it up, who had been made keen and who had been purified with Dhamma-talk from the Lord [and delighted by what had been spoken by the Lord, showed his appreciation, rose from his seat, saluted the Lord, circumambulated him by the right, and then departed]

I have interspersed this quotation with the letters *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* and *e* in order to isolate the five stock passages of which it is composed. All of these passages are found on numerous occasions elsewhere and in a variety of permutations: for instance at D i 110 we find *a*, *b*, *c* and *d*; at M i 379f we find *a* and *b*; at S i 173ff and A i 156ff we find *c* and *d*, although their occurrence here is not immediately obvious given the abbreviated form of the text in the PTS translations (KS i 219ff; GS i 140ff). On yet other occasions *d* is replaced by:

f May I, Lord, receive the going forth in the presence of the Lord; may I receive ordination

when we find such permutations as *a*, *b*, *c*, *e* and *f* at D ii 41f and *d* and *f* at D i 176, and so on. Further information as to such permutations can be acquired on examination of Table 4 listing such occasions.

Thus here we have a clear instance of an individual being established on the supermundane* plane through hearing Dhamma in the presence of the ariyans* – in this case the Buddha – for it is through hearing that Dhamma that he acquires the Dhammacakkhu*, the Dhamma-eye* by means of which he is then able to see the ariyan* Truth* of impermanence. The commentaries are unanimous in asserting that the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* signals the attainment of one or another of the three supermundane* paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* or anāgāmin* (e.g. DA 237) and most often the first of these (e.g. DA 278; AA iv 102; cp AA ii 356 on A i 242) and indeed the passage in question goes on to confirm that Suppabuddha became a sotāpanna* (Ud 50).

Neither here nor in any of the other passages recording the acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* in this way are we given any information as to the degree of spiritual accomplishment achieved by such individuals prior to undergoing this experience; but it is nonetheless possible in most cases to infer from their social status – since some are kings but most lay Brahmins – that they had not hitherto been leading the secluded life of the recluse. Nor do we have any firm evidence for supposing that the majority had previously practised any form of meditation: for it seems at least somewhat unlikely that courtesans such as Sirimā mentioned earlier and lepers sustaining themselves by begging such as Suppabuddha here would have engaged in such practices. How, therefore, Suppabuddha came to be one who was capable (bhabba) of understanding the Dhamma, or how others came to be those possessing the potential of realising the sotāpatti-fruit*, remains by and large a mystery. It may be that the reason is kammic since there is only one timely, seasonable occasion for the Brahmacariya* and that is to be born in the Middle Countries when a Tathāgata has arisen in the world and is teaching Dhamma that leads to enlightenment and that, moreover, one be not dull nor deaf and dumb, but possess insight and be competent in discerning as to whether a matter has been well or badly spoken of (A iv 227; cp D iii 263ff = 287). Such birth is, no doubt, like all births, a kammic outcome, just as it is believed by modern Buddhists in Ceylon that it will be possible to attain rebirth at the time of the next Buddha, Metteyya, through the performance of meritorious deeds. Yet such an explanation is at best partial since many of those attaining even this auspicious birth nonetheless seem to have failed to hear the Dhamma. For whilst this progressive talk seems to have been given most often in private, it was in this instance given in public and yet there is nothing in the sutta to suggest that anyone else present benefited in the same way as Suppabuddha. Rather, the impression given is that the teaching went completely over their heads as it no doubt also had in the case of the three monks whom Gopikā rebuked by saying 'Where were your ears, good sirs, that you did not hear the Dhamma from the Lord?' (D ii 272); the teaching was given for the sake of Suppabuddha alone since he alone out of those present was capable (bhabba) of understanding it. Why he alone was so capable and how it could be that the others failed to hear it remain a mystery – and in view of the complete silence of the texts any ideas on our part are nothing but mere speculation. What is worth noting, however, is that if such a progressive talk – which culminated in the path* being made visible – could be given in public without the majority seeing that path*, then we can assume that all those who lacked the potential for realising the sotāpatti-fruit* will have remained ignorant of the existence of any such path*. That is to say, that during the Buddha's day at least the

existence of the ariyan* eightfold path* was known only to the sāvaka*.

Now Suppabuddha, though capable of understanding the Dhamma, is for the present, like Prince Jayasena, hemmed in by the pleasures of the senses, by Māra. For the Buddha merely to announce the existence of the Four Truths* will be as efficacious as the former of the two friends announcing what is to be seen from the top of the mountain slope. Rather the Buddha, like that former friend, will have to descend to Suppabuddha's level, take him by the arm and then, by means of a progressive talk, lead him gradually into a position, or state of mind, wherein, free of sense-desire and the other hindrances, he too will be able to see nibbāna, that 'delightful stretch of level ground' (S iii 109).

Thus the progressive talk begins at the level of Suppabuddha and is concerned with talk on giving, talk on moral habit, talk on heaven – that is to say, talk connected with kamma and rebirth in which Suppabuddha, for the present a puthujjana, is still involved. We may suppose that the form that such talk takes is not one to encourage continued participation in such practices for it is at this point that the Buddha makes visible the peril, the vanity, the defilement of the pleasures of the senses and the advantage in renouncing them. I see no reason for not taking pakāsesi (from pra + √kāś) other than literally here – as I did also in my rendering of A ii 52 earlier – rather than adopt some more ambiguous term such as 'manifest' or the altogether too weak 'explain' as at, for instance, MLS ii 45. For what is surely involved here is the Buddha bringing it about, through his iddhi, that Suppabuddha sees the sufferings of beings in the other realms by making those beings visible to him – a not uncommon phenomenon: cp PvA 56, 171 where petas are made visible in this way; PvA 212 for both devatās and petas; see also Ud 22f where the Buddha takes the love-sick Nanda to the Tāvatiṁsa to show him the beauty of the deva-nymphs in order to cure him of his affection for a human girl who in comparison appears like a mutilated monkey with ears and nose cut off. One may further suppose that there might also be involved in this talk on heaven and demonstration of the peril of the sense-pleasures some reference to the puthujjana being ultimately bound for the vinipāta despite temporary sensual enjoyment in the heavens. The point of this part of the talk is not to encourage such practices but instead to demonstrate the advantages in renouncing them.

In so doing the Buddha brings Suppabuddha to a state of mind in which he is said to be:

(i) ready (kallacittaṁ) in the sense that he is ready to receive the teaching on the Four Truths*. AA iv 101 glosses this with arogacittaṁ, with a mind that is healthy (since 'health' is a synonym for nibbāna – M i 511), or with a mind that is free of disease (since disease is a name for sense-desire – A iii 310f, A iv 289f);

(ii) malleable (muducittaṁ) – normally the mind is said to become malleable as a result of having attained the fourth jhāna (e.g. A i 164f). Thus the probability is that the Buddha has brought Suppabuddha to a state of mind comparable to, if not identical with, that more usually acquired by means of the fourth jhāna. Here it may be recalled how earlier we had occasion to note how Sirimā had claimed to have reached the calm (supermundane*) samādhi upon hearing the Deathless* place (Vv 16$^{8-9}$). This suspicion would seem to find support from the fact that his mind is also said to be:

(iii) devoid of the hindrances (vinīvaraṇacittaṁ) since freedom from these hindrances is a necessary pre-requisite of jhāna (M i 270 and passim) – compare how it is also stated in the Lotus Sūtra that people will become free of the hindrances by listening to the Dharma (e.g. Kern, p. 120). Now these five hindrances – *a* sensuous desire (kāmacchanda), *b* ill will (vyāpāda), *c* sloth and torpor (thīna-middha), *d* restlessness and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca) and *e* doubt (vicikicchā) are all devices of Māra to prevent either the attainment of jhāna or, as M i 323 points out, seeing things as they really are*. However, whilst Māra is on occasion identified with sloth and torpor and with doubt (Sn 437) it is above all with the first of these five hindrances that he is associated: 'Those pleasures of the senses that belong to these seen conditions and those pleasures of the senses that belong to the life to come . . . these are Māra's realm, Māra's sphere, Māra's pasturage' (M ii 261f). Thus to say that one is slave to sensual passion – as is the puthujjana – is another way of saying that one is enslaved by Māra: 'There are, monks, forms cognisable by the eye, forms desirable, pleasant, delightful and dear, connected with sense desires, impassioning. If a monk delights in them, welcomes them, persists in clinging to them, then that monk, monks, is called "Gone to Māra's residence, gone to Māra's dwelling. Māra's noose encircles him; bound is he with Māra's bond, one with whom the Evil One can do as he likes"' (S iv 91; cp It 56), whilst it is the fate of those not free of Māra's bonds, of those not conversant with the Dhamma of the ariyans*, to swell the various realms of the vinipāta (It 92f). Indeed, the identification of the puthujjana with those in bondage to Māra comes out most forcibly where the stock phrase 'ariyan*, supermundane*, not shared by puthujjanas' is replaced by 'ariyan*, supermundane*, beyond the range of the Evil One' (M iii 115). To seek after that which is impermanent and to be enslaved, entranced and enthralled by attachment to such things is the unariyan quest; the ariyan* quest, on the other hand, is to seek after the unborn*, the Deathless*, nibbāna (M i 161ff). Moreover, those who are so enslaved, entranced and enthralled by the pleasures of the senses and who do not therefore see the peril in them, having no insight* as to the escape from them, are ones with whom

the Evil-doer can do as he likes, as might a trapper with a deer caught in his snares; whereas those who can enjoy the pleasures of the senses without being so enslaved, entranced and enthralled by them, who do see the peril in them and who do have insight* as to the escape from them, are not ones with whom the Evil-doer can do as he likes – they are like deer who can lie down on a trapper's snares without getting caught in them. And just as such a deer is out of the trapper's reach, so is the monk who, aloof from pleasures of the senses, enters upon the various jhānas similarly beyond the reach of Māra since he is called one who has put a darkness around Māra, and having blotted out Māra's vision so that it has no range, goes unseen by the Evil One (M i 173f). Thus we may say that when, during his progressive talk, the Buddha made visible the peril in the pleasures of the senses, or Māra, Suppabuddha was brought to a state of mind that was devoid of the hindrances and malleable, that is akin to that state of mind more normally brought about by way of the fourth jhāna. As such he was thus freed of Māra's snares, Māra's delusory tactics that would prevent him from seeing things as they really are*, and similarly was no longer visible to Māra. Thus it is that he is also said to have been brought into a state of mind that is:

(iv) uplifted (udaggacittaṁ) out of the kāmāvacara, out of the sense-pleasures that had hemmed him in at the foot of the mountain slope and the sole extent of Māra's influence, and onto the top of that mountain slope, into the rūpāvacara, the ādhidaivic counterpart of the various jhānas, with the result that his mind is now said to be:

(v) devout (pasannacittaṁ) in the sense that he can now exercise his capacity for faith and, for the first time, see things as they really are*, since Māra is no longer able to fulfil his desire of depriving him of vision (vicakkhukammāya – S i 11ff). That is to say, the progressive talk has had the effect of exorcising him from possession by the arch-yakkha Māra (Sn 449), for just as in modern Ceylon the exorcism of cases of yakkha-possession proceeds by first placing a protective cordon around the victim in order to prevent further demonic interference and then sets about effecting a permanent cure by removing the cause of the trouble – which is often spoken of by way of the metaphor of bondage – so too did the Buddha place a protective cordon around Suppabuddha by causing him to become devoid of the hindrances whereby, free of Māra's bonds (for which symbolism see also S i 77; Dhp 345–346; cp EV i 162 on Thag 187) and of further interference from Māra, he could exercise his capacity for faith, could realise his potential and accept that teaching that the Buddhas have themselves discovered: dukkha, its uprising, its cessation and the path*. During his progressive talk the Buddha has descended from the lofty terrace of the Dhamma, from the top of the mountain slope, and, having taken Suppabuddha by the arm, has led him out of the

world of the sense-pleasures that had hemmed him in at the foot of the mountain slope and that had deprived him of vision and has led him to the top of that mountain slope whereupon he too can see everything that formerly only the Buddha could see – that delightful stretch of level ground that is nibbāna (S iii 109); with the aid of the Dhammacakkhu* he too can see that 'Whatever is of a nature to uprise, all that is of a nature to cease'.

That acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* is equivalent to acquisition of right view* is clear not only from the fact that the commentaries frequently gloss Dhammacakkhu* with attainment of the sotāpatti-path* but also from a series of parallel suttas in the Saṁyutta Nikāya in which we find that the person described as an ariyasāvaka* possessing (right) view* and who has gained the Dhammacakkhu* (S ii 133ff) is the same person who is elsewhere depicted as an ariyasāvaka* possessing (right) view* and who understands as it really is* dukkha, its uprising, its cessation and the path* thereto (S v 459ff). That is to say, acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* is paralleled here by understanding the Four Truths* – which is hardly surprising given the sequence of the progressive talk – and since at D ii 312 right view* is defined as understanding the Four Truths* we may justly infer that the acquisition of right view* comes about through acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* in this way. In confirmation of this we may further note that on other occasions right view* is explained as seeing the khandhas or the senses to be impermanent (S iii 51 = iv 142) or alternatively as seeing the uprising and cessation of the world and to know that whatever arises is dukkha and that whatever ceases is dukkha (S ii 17) which is precisely the insight furnished by the arising of the Dhammacakkhu*.

Here it might be objected that seeing that 'Whatever is of a nature to uprise, all that is of a nature to cease' or, in other words, the impermanence of the phenomenal world is not the same as seeing the Four Truths* of dukkha, its uprising, its cessation and the path*. It is perhaps with this in mind that DA 278 points out that 'Whatever is of nature to uprise, all that is of a nature to cease' was said in order to show the manner in which the sotāpatti-path* arose, for he took cessation as his starting point and by way of what had to be done there thus arose penetration of all conditioned things (cp AA iv 102). Such an account may also have been felt necessary since by the time of Buddhaghosa the belief had become current that the paths* could arise through insight* into any of the three marks of anicca, dukkha and anattā (Vsm xxi 75). In the Nikāyas, however, it would seem that the path* was thought attainable only by way of insight* into impermanence – that is by means of the Dhammacakkhu* – with insight* as to the other two marks following on as a consequence of this, for the matter is always put as follows: x is imper-

manent; that which is impermanent is dukkha; that which is dukkha is not attā; that which is not attā is not mine, I am not it, it is not attā for me: thus is x to be regarded with right insight* as it really is* (x aniccaṁ; yad aniccaṁ taṁ dukkhaṁ; yaṁ dukkhaṁ tad anattā; yad anattā taṁ n' etam mama n' eso 'ham asmi na m' eso attā ti; evam etaṁ yathābhūtaṁ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṁ – e.g. S iv 1). Indeed, although it is claimed in the above passage that the Buddha makes visible the Truth* of dukkha, it is difficult to see what this would amount to since the fact that something is dukkha is surely something to be felt rather than seen; and we may suppose that it is impermanence that is shown and which in turn gives rise to the realisation that such things are, therefore, dukkha and, moreover, anattā. Or as S iii 51 = iv 142 has it: he sees that it is impermanent, this being right view*, and he, rightly seeing, feels aversion (aniccan ti passati; sāyaṁ hoti sammādiṭṭhi; sammāsampassaṁ nibbindati).

That it is the impermanence of the phenomenal world that is witnessed can be seen from the fact that Nārada claimed to have seen with right insight* as it really is* that the cessation of becoming is nibbāna (S ii 118), whilst elsewhere Sāriputta seems to say much the same thing when he recalls that as one perception arose to him so did another cease that 'the cessation of becoming is nibbāna, the cessation of becoming is nibbāna', likening the experience to one flame arising from a blazing fire of chippings as another flame ceases (A v 9f). Similarly, at M i 509ff the Buddha points out to the wanderer Māgandiya that just as a physician and surgeon might, with the appropriate remedy, restore the sight of a man blind from birth, so can the Buddha, that unsurpassed physician and surgeon (It 101), by teaching Dhamma – that is by beating the Deathless*-drum in a world that has become blind (M i 171 = Vin i 8) – make people see nibbāna and that with the arising of that ariyan* vision they see the origin of dukkha and get rid of desire and attachment for the upādānakkhandhas. Compare how in the Lotus Sūtra (II[66] – Kern) the Buddha likewise claims that he makes beings see Nirvāṇa.

Thus, it cannot be stressed too often, given the weight of scholarly opinion to the contrary, that in the Buddha's day at least the Four Truths* were known only to his sāvakas*. They were not four axioms to be trotted out in philosophical debate, nor were they even statements of empirical fact. Indeed they were not a subject for discussion at all but rather something to be seen and then only when they had finally been made visible by the Buddha following a preparatory talk of considerable length; whilst it was, moreover, this vision of the Four Truths*, this right view*, that lifted one out of the mundane sphere and on to the supermundane* plane of the ariyan* whereupon one could be said to have seen Dhamma, reached Dhamma, found Dhamma and plunged into Dhamma.

To say that one has seen Dhamma, reached Dhamma, found Dhamma, plunged into Dhamma suggests that this vision involved more than a mere vision of the impermanence of phenomena in the process of becoming – thus, perhaps, the hesitancy of DA 237 where it is stated that the Dhammacakkhu* is 'either vision as to (ultimate) dhammas or vision consisting in Dhamma' (dhammesu vā cakkhuṁ dhammamayaṁ vā cakkhuṁ). For the Dhammacakkhu* grants one sight of nibbāna, which is much more than the uprising and cessation of dhammas – it is also the unborn*, the unageing, the undecaying, the Deathless*, the sorrowless*, the stainless*, the utmost security from bonds (M i 167; cp A ii 247), to mention but a few synonyms, just as to see the Four Truths* is to see the Deathless* (Thag 295f). The Deathless* was quite clearly conceived of as a place, as implied by expressions such as amataṁ padaṁ (e.g. S ii 280) and 'going to the Deathless* region' (gacchato amataṁ disaṁ – Sn 960). It should not be forgotten that there had been in India ever since the Vedic period the belief that the phenomenal world of becoming was but one quarter of all that is, there being a further hidden three-quarters beyond in which that process of becoming – and thus being born and dying – did not exist, and was on this account referred to as the amṛtaṁ* or the Deathless*. In the Upaniṣads this hidden three-quarters was naturally spoken of as Brahman (Muṇḍaka U II 2 10–12; cp ŚU VI 14, Kaṭha U II 2 15):

> In the highest golden sheath is Brahman, stainless*, without parts; Pure is it, the light of lights. That is what the knowers of the Self know. The sun shines not there, nor the moon and stars, these lightnings shine not, where then could this fire be? His shining illumines all this world. Brahman, verily, is this amṛtaṁ*

This finds an extraordinary parallel at two places in the Nikāyas (Ud 9):

> Where water, earth, heat and wind find no footing, there no stars gleam, no sun is made visible, there shines no moon, there the darkness (tamo – Māra's realm) is not found; and when the sage, the brahmin, himself in wisdom knows (this place) he is freed from the rūpa- and the arūpa-realms, from happiness and dukkha

and similarly (Ud 80):

> There is, monks, that sphere where there is neither earth, water, heat, wind; nor the spheres of infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness; nor this world nor a world beyond nor both together nor sun and moon. There too, monks, I say there is no coming to birth nor going to another destiny, no duration, no falling,

> no arising. It is without support, without foundation, without basis whatsoever. This is indeed the end of dukkha

It is of interest to note here that such a place must be the goal of the eightfold path* since it is often said that that path* leads to the cessation of dukkha. Elsewhere the goal of the eightfold path* is said to be the Deathless* (S v 8; Thig 222; AA iii 361), no doubt because the eightfold path* is said to plunge into the Deathless* (S v 41, 43, 54) – just as Suppabuddha had plunged into Dhamma. Indeed without some positive counterpart to the purely negative cessation of becoming, Buddhism could well be charged with the annihilationist doctrines that the Buddha so frequently denied; at the same time, there would be no true escape from Māra and incessant becoming (Ud 80f):

> Monks, there is that which is not born*, not become, not made, not conditioned. Monks, if there were not that which is not born*, not become, not made, not conditioned, there could be made known no escape from that which is born, become, made, conditioned here. But since, monks, there is that which is not born*, not become, not made, not conditioned, therefore the escape from that which is born, become, made, conditioned, is made known

It is because there is the Deathless*, a realm that is inaccessible to Death (Maccu) or Māra (M i 227), that there is an escape from his realm and all that it entails. And it was through the Buddha's decision to teach Dhamma that the door to that Deathless* was flung wide open (D ii 39 = M i 169 = S i 138 = Vin i 6). Moreover, since to make visible the Four Truths* is at the same time to make visible the Deathless* place (Thag 295f) we can easily see how it is that the ariyasāvaka* can be said to stand, having arrived at the door to the Deathless* (S ii 43, 58, 59). To see the Four Truths* is to see nibbāna, the Deathless*, and just as the named lay householders noted earlier were said to have seen the Deathless* and to have their being in the realisation of the Deathless*, so too did Sāriputta, on gaining the Dhammacakkhu*, claim that he had attained the Deathless* (Vin i 41). Moreover, Sāriputta told Assaji who had shown him that Deathless* that he must have penetrated as far as the sorrowless* (Vin i 40) which is said elsewhere to be known only to the ariyasāvaka* (S iv 210; A iv 159) and that 'knowing the stainless*, sorrowless* place he rightly understands and has gone beyond becoming' (padañ ca ñatvā virajaṁ asokaṁ sammappajānāti bhavassa pāragū ti – S iv 210 = A iv 157 = 160). The sorrowless* and the stainless* are given as synonyms of nibbāna (M i 167; cp AA iv 73) and make an interesting appearance in verses appended to an occurrence of the passage beginning 'Monks, there is that which is not born* . . .' of Ud 80f quoted earlier (It 37f):

> That which is born, become, arisen, made, conditioned, non-constant, conditioned by old age and death, a nest of disease, perishable, produced through agency of food, – that were not a thing to take delight in.
>
> (But) the escape therefrom is that which is true, beyond the sphere of doubt, constant, not born*, not arisen – the sorrowless*, stainless* place that is the cessation of things dukkha, the tranquilisation of saṅkhāras, – happiness

That it is a place that is seen by means of the Dhammacakkhu* is further suggested by the fact that the second friend is shown, on reaching the top of the mountain slope, delightful parks, delightful stretches of level ground, delightful ponds. For at S iii 109 'a delightful stretch of level ground' is given as a synonym for nibbāna, whilst at M i 76 the attainment of nibbāna is likened to a man, overpowered by the heat, coming upon a delightful pond of cool, clear water close to a forest thicket; he plunges into that pond, allays his fever and distress and then lies down in that forest thicket experiencing feelings that are exclusively pleasant.

It must, of course, be admitted that what is actually seen on the arising of the Dhammacakkhu*, on vision of the Four Truths*, is by and large a mystery and necessarily so to those who have not undergone the experience. Moreover, the already noted ambiguity of Dhamma as the sound from the Beyond and of Dhamma in the form of an expositional sutta clearly finds its parallel in the visual aspect of the Dhamma and it would be easy to misinterpret the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* as little more than arriving at an intellectual understanding of the fact that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent. However, it would be at least a little strange were such intellectual grasp likened to an eye – and very much so when we find the arising of that stainless*, dustless* eye compared to the sun leaping into a clear, cloudless autumn sky, banishing all darkness from the heavens, shining, burning and brilliant (A i 242). Nor would it well accord with the Buddha being called the veil-lifter for the world (loke vivattacchaddo – D i 89 = ii 16 = iii 142 = Sn p 106; cp Sn 1003 and see also A ii 44; Sn 372, 374, 378) and the statement at DA 251 that everywhere becomes full of light when the Buddha lifts the veil for the kilesa-blinded world that is covered with the seven veils of passion, hatred, delusion, pride, (wrong) view, ignorance and bad conduct. We may perhaps conclude also that when the Dhammacakkhu* arose to Suppabuddha he not only saw dukkha and the origin of dukkha – that is the impermanence of the phenomenal world, in that whatever is of a nature to uprise, all that is of a nature to cease – but that he also saw the cessation of that dukkha – the timeless, hidden beyond that is the Deathless* place where such becoming is unknown – and the

(eightfold) path* thereto: in other words, the Four Truths*. This would explain his response that it was as if one might reveal what was hidden, or might point out the path* to one who had gone astray, or might bring an oil-lamp into the darkness so that those with eyes might see material shapes.

This visual aspect comes out most clearly when understanding the Four Truths* as they really are* is likened to a man seeing material shapes in the dark of night during a flash of lightning (A i 123f), the commentary claiming that this is what the vision of nibbāna is like on gaining the three supermundane* paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* and anāgāmin* (AA ii 195f). This theme is taken up at Asl 388f where the comparison is to a man going along on a cloudy night and the path, obscured by the darkness, being revealed to him during a flash of lightning. This equation of the Dhammacakkhu* with seeing the Deathless* as though in a flash of lightning is of great interest for it is precisely in this way that the Upaniṣads claim that the formless Brahman is perceived (BU II 3 6; Kena U IV 4) and in his translation of this Kena passage Radhakrishnan notes that 'The masters of the spiritual life tell us that the hidden word comes to them all on a sudden for one brief moment' and quotes, amongst others, the remarks of Augustine that 'In this first flash when thou art as if struck by lightning, when thou hearest inwardly the affirmation "Truth" there remain if thou canst'.[9] Moreover, we can note in passing the affinity borne by the Buddha's mediation of the parato ghosa to that of the mantra which has been characterised as 'a formulation of the truth in sound and as a formula which embodies in its sound the special power to bring into reality the truth it expresses'[10] and which is imparted by way of 'the whispering into the candidate's ear of the rahasya (secret doctrine) or the mantra (magic formula) of the cult through which power and enlightenment appropriate to his grade is communicated to him in a flash . . . The initiate of a sect is said to be superior to the rest of the world'[11] – just as, indeed, the sāvaka* is the world's unsurpassed merit-field (anuttaraṁ puññakkhettaṁ – M i 37). This further suggests that for Hui Neng to become enlightened upon overhearing the Diamond Sūtra[12] is no more an innovation than the Tibetan Book of the Dead in which it is said that 'this "Great Liberation through Hearing" is a teaching which enlightens without meditation, a teaching which liberates just by being heard, a teaching which leads great sinners on the secret path, a teaching which severs ignorance in one moment, a profound teaching which gives perfect instantaneous enlightenment so that sentient beings whom it has reached cannot possibly go to lower existences',[13] except perhaps to say that the progressive talk is not recorded as having been given to corpses (however, see later for details of the Brāhmaṇic practice of addressing the

dead to guide them heavenward). Indeed to Snellgrove's observation concerning tantra that:

> The final truth was a mystery, concealed rather than revealed by the texts which sought to describe it, and it could be gained only as a result of years of training under a master, who himself possessed that truth, and who would bestow it sacramentally on his pupil, once he knew he was ripe to receive it. This was a very different kind of 'enlightenment' from that envisaged by the followers of the early Mahāyāna (that is the long path of the Bodhisattva, etc.) . . . The tantras, those strange texts which were certainly sponsored to begin with by non-monastic yogins, introduced a very different conception of the goal of 'enlightenment' or 'buddhahood'. It was now something that could be gained in the course of a single life, if only one could find a qualified master able and willing to impart the truth[14]

we may add that if the tantra were deviating from the beliefs of the early Mahāyāna they were nonetheless preserving or resurrecting a practice known as early as the Nikāya period.

In conclusion, we may note that although it was a very frequent means the progressive talk was not the sole means by which the Buddha caused the Dhammacakkhu* to arise since we find that the Dhammacakkhu* arose to Koṇḍañña whilst the Buddha set rolling the wheel of the Dhamma during the First Sermon (S v 420ff; Vin i 10ff). Other instances of individuals acquiring the Dhammacakkhu* during the deliverance of a discourse are not difficult to find: it happened to Dīghanakha (M i 501), to an unnamed monk (S iv 47), to Sakka and eighty thousand devatās (D ii 288f) as well as to further thousands of devatās who were eavesdropping upon an instruction the Buddha was giving to Rāhula (M iii 280 = S iv 107). Moreover, since we have found stock passage (*c*) to be a common acclamation following acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* followed by an individual either becoming a lay-follower or going forth, we may suppose that when we encounter this same acclamation following a discourse on Dhamma and accompanied by a similar decision either to become a lay-follower or to go forth, there has been acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* even though no specific mention of this is made. Some fifty or more instances of this have so far been traced as can be seen from Table 4. Besides the discourse we find that Sāriputta and Moggallāna both acquired the Dhammacakkhu* on hearing a concise verse on Dhamma (Vin i 40f) as perhaps did Aṅgulimāla (M iii 100) whilst on other occasions certain individuals acquired the Dhammacakkhu* whilst being exhorted with Dhamma-talk: for instance, the remaining four of the Group of Five (Vin i 12f) and the five hundred monks who had belonged to Devadatta's schism (Vin ii 200).

Thus we find in all four separate means employed in causing the Dhammacakkhu* to arise:

1 the progressive talk
2 during a discourse
3 a concise verse on Dhamma
4 exhortation with Dhamma-talk

and details of the various occasions on which these methods were used can be seen from Table 4.

Benefits accompanying right view*

Thus we may say that, contrary to the views of Nyāṇatiloka and others, right view* is indeed the beginning of the ariyan* eightfold path* and that this was always acquired in the course of an oral initiation by the Buddha when a glimpse of the sanctuary lying beyond the phenomenal world of dukkha – and the path* thereto – were gained. We may go further, though, and say that without the prior acquisition of right view* any progress along that path* would be impossible, for there are six benefits accompanying acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*: (1) acquaintance with the path* to be followed; (2) a desire for renunciation; (3) possession of faith*; (4) possession of morality; (5) the guarantee of the generation of no fresh kamma; and (6) the annihilation of the majority of kamma hitherto generated. Each of these benefits contributes to satisfactory progress along the path* and it is with a discussion of these that the remainder of this chapter will be concerned.

It will be recalled that upon being shown the perils in the pleasures of the senses and the dukkha of the phenomenal world Suppabuddha asked to go for refuge – for refuge from Māra and all that his realm entails – and also to be accepted as a lay-follower – stock passage (*d*). Others often asked instead to be allowed to go forth – stock passage (*f*) – and, as a glance at Table 4 shows, it was an unfailing consequence that those acquiring the Dhammacakkhu* either became lay-followers or went forth. Thus at Thag 1253–1255 we find Vaṅgīsa saying:

> Drunk with skill in composing poetry, formerly we wandered from village to village, from city to city. Then we saw the Enlightened One who had reached the far shore of all phenomena.
>
> That Sage who had reached the far shore of dukkha taught me Dhamma. Hearing Dhamma we believed; faith* arose in us.
>
> Hearing his utterance . . . I went forth into the homeless life

whilst at M ii 68 Raṭṭhapāla explains that it is through having known, seen and heard four Dhamma-indications indicated by the Perfectly Enlightened One who knows and sees that he has gone forth: (1) that this instable world is brought to an end; (2) that the world is no refuge, no guard; (3) that the world is not one's own and one must go away leaving everything (behind); and (4) that the world lacks and is unsatisfied, being a slave to craving. He adds in the verses that follow (M ii 74):

> Divers sweet, delightful sense-pleasures in various ways disturb the mind; having seen the peril in sense-pleasures, your majesty, I have, for that reason, gone forth

Indeed to go forth on hearing Dhamma seems to have been the general expectation for at M i 179 it is said that when a Tathāgata arises in the world and teaches Dhamma, making visible in its entirety the whole Brahmacariya*, a householder, on hearing that Dhamma, gains faith* and, subsequently reflecting that the household life impedes fulfilment of that Brahmacariya*, makes the decision to go forth.

This suggests that it was only subsequent to the acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* that individuals went forth. That is to say, just as the state of the sannyāsin seems originally to have been a mode of life adopted as a consequence of having realised the identity of the ātman and Brahman – rather than as a means to that realisation – so also in the Nikāya period did persons go forth as a consequence of gaining the Dhammacakkhu* rather than as a means thereto. This is surely what we might expect when it be recalled that they alone were conversant with the path*, the Brahmacariya*, leading to the goal beyond the impermanence of the phenomenal world, for it should not be thought that because they had been granted a glimpse of nibbāna they had thereby reached the Buddhist goal. They had been led to the top of the mountain slope, had been shown the delightful stretch of level ground and also the path* thereto, but for the present that delightful stretch of level ground lay in the distance: if it were to be reached and made a living reality that path* would have to be trodden. Thus it was that Nārada, when questioned by Saviṭṭha, maintained that although he had seen by right insight* as it really is* that the cessation of becoming was nibbāna, he was nonetheless no arahant*, explaining that it were as if there were on a path in the wilderness a well but no rope or bucket and a man coming along who was parched and so on might look down that well and know that there was water there but not be able to touch it physically (S ii 118). In other words, awakening to truth upon hearing Dhamma must be distinguished from attainment of that truth* (M ii 173).

Thus we may say that in the beginning the ariyan* eightfold path* was the sole province of the sāvaka*, but inevitably news of that path*

eventually filtered down to the puthujjana with the result that he misunderstood it (M i 510), whereupon we begin to encounter puthujjana monks. It is worth noting that Saviṭṭha, a monk of similar standing to Nārada, though possessing some theoretical knowledge of the Dhamma, is clearly ignorant as to the real nature of both the path* and its goal and indeed seems completely unaware that there is any path* to be followed after such insight*: in short, he seems to imagine, like Nyāṇatiloka and others, that such insight* is the goal rather than the beginning of the path*.

However, as we have seen, the insight* or right view* provided by the Dhammacakkhu* was nothing more than a momentary glimpse of a reality which though realisable was nonetheless for the present merely akin to seeing material shapes in the dark of night in a flash of lightning. That reality had to be transformed into permanent realisation: thus Asl 242, likening the arising of the first three paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* and anāgāmin* to bringing an oil-lamp into the darkness so that those with eyes might see material shapes, goes on to assert that the arising of the path* of the arahant* is like the appearance of the sun when those material shapes become permanently visible.

Thus one may say that the first contribution that the Dhammacakkhu* makes to the realisation of the Buddhist goal is that it reveals that there is a path* to be followed and grants one a glimpse of that path*. This, it seems, has the effect of 'casting off the knot':

> And when I saw the path*, (the means of) embarkation on the ship (that is the ariyan* path* – cty), I, not fixing my mind on the self, saw the supreme landing-place.
>
> The dart, that which has its origin in the self, and that which is produced by that which leads to renewed becoming – he taught me the supreme path* for the cessation of these. The Buddha, remover of the ill effect of poison, cast off the knot which had long been latent in me, and had long been established in me

(See Thag 766–768; cp D iii 230 for an enumeration of these four knots.) The Upaniṣads similarly speak of the cutting of a knot upon sight of Brahman (Muṇḍaka U II 2 6–12):

> May you be successful in crossing over to the farther shore of darkness (tamasaḥ – cp S iv 127 where tamo is the blindness of the puthujjana) . . . The wise perceive clearly by the knowledge (of Brahman) the blissful Deathless* (amṛtaṁ) which shines forth.
>
> The knot of the heart (hṛdaya-granthiś) is cut, all doubts are dispelled and his deeds terminate, when He is seen – the higher and the lower (parāvare = Pali orapāraṁ, this shore and the other shore – cp Sn 9).

> In the highest golden sheath is Brahman, stainless*, without parts . . . That is what the knowers of the Self know . . . Brahman, verily, is this Deathless*

it being further stated later in this Upaniṣad (III 2 9) that:

> He, verily, who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman himself . . . He crosses over sorrow. He crosses over sins. Liberated from the knots of the secret place (of the heart) he becomes Deathless* (amṛto)

According to Glasenapp the Jains also spoke of such a knot: 'With this karaṇa (process of removing karma) the knot (granthi) within us (the disturbances of belief and conduct, residing in the heart) is split, then the road is open to spiritual progress'.[15] Thus it would seem that all three traditions were united in the belief that it was only when this knot (of wrong view) was severed that the path* to spiritual progress became a possibility; in the Buddhist context this knot was thought dispelled by right view* upon acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*.

Secondly, we may observe that the progressive talk begins with the Buddha making visible the peril in the pleasures of the senses and the advantage in renouncing them – nekkhamme (M i 379), nikkhame (Ud 49) – and ends with the individual concerned seeing with right view* that the phenomenal world is impermanent and thus dukkha whereat he as a result feels aversion (S iii 51 = iv 142). Now the derivation of the term nekkhamma has been the subject of some dispute (cp Dial ii 343 n 1 and PED sv) but it seems more probable that it is derived from niṣ + √ kram rather than from niṣ + √ kāma. That is to say, its meaning should be seen as renunciation in the sense of 'departing from', 'issuing forth' rather than in the sense of 'being devoid of sense desire'. This grammatical uncertainty as to its true derivation has to some extent been exploited by the authors of the Nikāyas for we find nekkhamma used both for renunciation in the sense of renunciation of the household life by way of going forth – as, for instance, at S iv 232 where six kinds of happiness connected with renunciation (nekkhammasitāni) are contrasted with six connected with the household life (gehasitāni) – and also for renunciation in the form of abstinence in matters connected with the pleasures of the senses – as, for instance, at A iii 245 where nekkhamma is clearly contrasted with sense pleasures (kāmaṁ). Which of these two possible meanings was intended to be understood in stock passage (*a*) is thus uncertain, although the presence of the variant reading nikkhame at Ud 49 might be thought to argue in favour of the former of these, or at least would have done had the context not been that of the sense pleasures. And in any case it might be felt that the difference was mainly one of our own making for whatever its strict derivation 'the connection with

kāma is pre-eminently felt in the connotation of nekkhamma' (PED sv); that is to say, if meaning is use, the meaning of nekkhamma was usually that of abstinence from sense pleasures in general but this could, on occasion, be narrowed to refer more to the means by which such renunciation might be effected, such as by renouncing the household life where such pleasures were thought to predominate. This issue is of some importance since at D ii 312 the second factor of the path*, right resolve*, is defined in terms of, amongst other things, the aspiration towards renunciation (nekkhamma-saṅkappo) – and since we have found such an aspiration to follow on from the insight* afforded by right view* and the making visible of the advantages of such renunciation during the progressive talk, it might reasonably be inferred that right resolve* were thought consequential upon right view*, or as it is put elsewhere that 'right resolve* proceeds for one of right view*' (M iii 76; D ii 217; cp S v 1f). The fact that many of those gaining the Dhammacakkhu* went forth should not mislead us into thinking that right resolve*, therefore, meant renunciation of the household life, as the presence of so many lay sāvakas* confirms. Rather we may conclude that the renunciation spoken of in stock passage (*a*) is the renunciation of sense pleasures, the realm of Māra, and the fact that many seem to have found going forth the most practical means of fulfilling this aspiration is to be viewed as purely incidental; since this aspiration came into being upon acquisition of right view* we may further conclude that a second way in which the Dhammacakkhu* makes the path* possible is by giving rise to its second factor, right resolve*.

This is to be seen, moreover, from the fact that it is only when one sees things as they really are* that one will generate the desire and energy necessary for doing something about it (M i 25f). Hence, no doubt, the otherwise curious response of Upāli, hitherto a supporter of the Jains, who upon acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* said to the Buddha merely, 'Well, and now we must be going, Lord; there is much to be done, we have much to do' (handa ca dāni mayaṁ bhante gacchāma, bahukiccā mayaṁ bahukaraṇīyā ti – M i 380). The translation given at MLS ii 45 – 'Now, I, revered sir, must be going, I am very busy, there is much to be done' – suggests that it was his mundane affairs that he found pressing, surely an unwarranted and rather ungrateful response towards someone who had just granted him sight of nibbāna. If this should express instead the sense of urgency felt with respect to the work towards the goal of the supermundane* eightfold path* on to which he had just been translated by the Buddha, his remark would not seem out of place at all.

Thirdly, we may say that a further benefit of the Dhammacakkhu* is that it gives rise to faith*. The role of faith has tended to be ignored by many,

and especially by those who would present us with a view of Buddhism as a purely rationalistic and empirically based philosophy or way of life, whilst those that do acknowledge its place in Buddhism have generally failed to notice that, just as there are two kinds of right view, so are there two kinds of faith. For there is the faith of the puthujjana, who is bent on making merit, which consists in little more than a belief in the efficacy of almsgiving and which is summarised as the mundane right view that there is result from giving and there are in the world those providing an unsurpassed merit-field for the world and so on (e.g. M iii 72), and such a firm belief in the lofty fruition of kamma is sometimes said to be necessary for a gift to be abundant in gain (e.g. M iii 257). Similarly, it is said that, although they readily acknowledge the visible fruits of almsgiving, nonetheless certain individuals go to the Lord in faith in the invisible fruit of almsgiving in that the giver of the gift arises after death in the happy heavenly world (e.g. A iii 39f; iv 82). This is a very different kind of faith, however, from that possessed by the sāvaka* such as that, for instance, acquired by Vaṅgīsa above (Thag 1254):

> That Sage who had reached the far shore of dukkha taught me Dhamma. Hearing Dhamma we believed; faith* arose in us

as a consequence of which he went forth into the homeless life. The failure to notice this important distinction has resulted in a considerable amount of misunderstanding as may be seen from the fact that when the Buddha announced, following his initial hesitation, that he would after all teach Dhamma, he announced that decision in the following manner (D ii 39 = M i 169 = S i 138 = Vin i 7):

> Opened for those who can hear are the doors to the Deathless* – let them give forth faith* (Apārutā tesaṁ amatassa dvārā ye sotavanto pamuñcantu saddhaṁ)

and which, we may note in passing, is very reminiscent of a similar request found in the Upaniṣads (BU V 15 1 = Īśa U 15):

> The face of truth is covered with a golden disc (i.e. the sun). Unveil (apārvṛṇu) it, Pūṣan (the sun), so that I who love the truth may see it

As Lamotte once pointed out regarding this Pali passage 'Cette stance a toujours exercé la sagacité des traducteurs, tant anciens que modernes' and that '"pamuñcantu saddhaṁ" peut signifier "qu'ils rejettent la foi" ou "qu'ils accordent la foi"'.[16] A glance at the various renderings offered in the editions of the Pali Text Society bears this out for we find it

rendered 'Let them give forth their faith' at MLS i 213; earlier Miss Horner had rendered this 'Let them renounce their faith' (B Disc iv 9) in which she seems to have been guided by the commentary since she appends the note that 'Saddhā must refer to their (own VA 963) present wrong beliefs' (B Disc iv 9 n 4). In her latter interpretation she was in agreement with Woodward who somewhat dogmatically asserted that 'Pamuñcantu saddhaṁ – a much discussed phrase and wrongly translated by the early Pali scholars by "give faith", "put forth belief", etc. – but it undoubtedly means "put away"',[17] and also with Rhys Davids who rendered the phrase 'Let those . . . renounce their empty faith' (Dial ii 33) adding the note that 'The expression is ambiguous. Oldenberg, "Vinaya Texts", I 88, renders it "Let them send forth faith to meet it". We think it means let them give up their faith in rites, and gods, and ceremonies, with especial references to the offerings to the dead' (Dial ii 33 n 2). Why he should have thought this is far from clear, especially when it is recalled that, far from abandoning the practice of making offerings to the dead, the Buddhists actively encouraged this and indeed, as the Petavatthu makes abundantly clear, they also used this as a means of proselytisation by transforming the Brāhmaṇic sacrifice, hitherto the means of sustaining the dead, into the practice of giving alms to the sāvakasaṅgha*. Moreover, since there is no suggestion in the passages concerning the insight* acquired on gaining the Dhammacakkhu* that such insight* should entail that one give up the compassionate practice of sustaining deceased relatives we may suppose that the fact that the sāvaka* was no longer in need of such ritual for ensuring his salvation did not preclude that his deceased puthujjana relatives still were.

At KS i 174, Mrs Rhys Davids suggests 'Let those . . . renounce the faith they hold' and quotes the commentary to the effect that 'Let them give up (vissajjantu) their own faith (saddhaṁ)' (KS i 174 n 1), whilst Lamotte, apparently also following the commentary, states 'Pamuñcantu saddhaṁ signifie: que tous rejettent, c'est-à-dire expulsent leur (ancienne) foie à eux'.[18] However, when we examine the commentaries we find a number of different readings: at DA 471 we find 'pamuñcantu saddhan ti sabbe attano saddhaṁ muñcantu vissajjentu' with which MA ii 181 agrees if we adopt its vl muñcantu for pamuñcantu, whilst SA i 203 reads 'pamuñcantu saddhan ti sabbe attano saddhaṁ pamuñcantu vissajjantu'. All three, however, are unanimous in continuing '. . . idāni pana sabbo jano saddhā-bhājanaṁ upanetu, pūressāmi nesaṁ saṅkappan ti'. Such differences are slight and for the purposes of the following discussion I will adopt the reading at DA 471. The real difficulty lies in the fact that verbs such as muñcantu, vissajjentu and upanetu are, if anything, more ambiguous than pamuñcantu itself. For instance, PED sv muñcati lists amongst others 'to release, deliver, set

free, send off, let out of the yoke, emit, send forth, bestow' and many of these express the meaning elsewhere conveyed by vissajjeti: e.g. to release (a caught fish back into the water – PvA 178); sending out or despatching (a person – PvA 283); sending off (collected taxes – PvA 111); giving forth (an answer – PvA 10); or that of dispensing (food – PvA 119) which is in strict agreement with the definition of vissajjeti at AA ii 157 in terms of 'to give to others' (vissajjetī ti paresaṁ deti). Indeed, the suggestion that pamuñcati, muñcati, vissajjati and vissajjeti mean 'to reject' is somewhat of a deviation from their more usual meaning and had this been the meaning intended one might have expected a verb such as pajahati in such places. The same argument applies, moreover, in the case of upaneti which can be found in such contexts as presenting (grass and water to a dead ox in the pretence that it can still eat – PvA 39); giving (someone heavenly food and drink – PvA 43); presenting (someone with a cloak – PvA 49; cp PvA 74); or giving (a gift of cake as alms to a thera – VvA 61). Thus whilst it is true that Lamotte cites the existence of a similar phrase in a rather different version of this verse occurring in the Mahāvastu (iii 319) rendered by him as 'rejettent leur croyance pernicieuse'[19] and by Jones as 'let those . . . shed the faith that is based on a harmful idea (Mahāvastu translation iii 308) there seems nothing in the Pali tradition (which Jones thought had the greater claim to represent the original tradition – Mahāvastu translation iii 308 n 2) that would unquestionably support our taking pamuñcantu, muñcantu, vissajjentu and upanetu in the sense of 'to renounce' or 'to reject' rather than 'to release' or 'to send forth'. Indeed, there seems no reason why we should not take the verse as saying 'let them give forth faith' and the commentary as 'let them give forth faith: let them all release, send forth, their faith. . . . Now, however, let all people bestow their separate faith and I will fulfil their wishes' (pamuñcantu saddhan ti sabbe attano saddhaṁ muñcantu vissajjentu . . . idāni pana sabbo jano saddhābhājanaṁ upanetu, pūressāmi nesaṁ saṅkappan ti).

Such an interpretation, somewhat surprisingly, finds peculiar confirmation in a series of Chinese texts which Lamotte took as preserving a quite different tradition: 'Mais à côté de cette tradition, que j'appellerais la tradition pâlie, il en existe une autre qui donne à la stance une valeur toute différente: le Buddha annonce qu'il va ouvrir les portes de l'Immortel; les croyants (śraddhāvantaḥ et non plus śrotravantaḥ) profiteront de son enseignment. . . . Cette tradition est représentée par toute une série de textes chinois, parmi lesquels le Mppś: Ekottarāgama T 125, k 10, p 593b: "Le dieu Brahmā vient exhorter le Tathāgata à ouvrir les portes du Dharma. Les auditeurs ayant une foie sincère comprendront le Dharma profond. *Comme au sommet d'une haute montagne on découvre toutes sortes d'êtres, moi, que possède ce Dharma, je monterai sur*

le temple (?) et je manifesterai l'oeil du Dharma" '.[20] This, it seems to me, is precisely the tradition also preserved in the Pali texts – that those who possess the capacity for faith* and of understanding the Dhamma will be shown a vision of the Dhamma in the same manner as if they had been led to the summit of a mountain and shown the various sorts of beings below. That is to say, when the Buddha opens the doors to the Deathless* it is, from that moment onwards, possible to hear the sound of the Deathless*, the parato ghosa; and those who are capable (bhabba) of hearing and understanding that Dhamma, or in other words of gaining the Dhamma-ear* which pulls out the knowledge and insight* latent in them and causes them to reach the plane of the ariyans* (AA iii 375), are thenceforth able to exercise their hitherto unusable capacity for faith*:

> Opened for those who can hear (its sound) are the doors to the Deathless* –
> let them release their faith*

We have seen how Vaṅgīsa claimed such faith* had arisen in him on hearing Dhamma from the Buddha (Thag 1254) and how it is elsewhere claimed that when a Tathāgata arises in the world and teaches Dhamma a householder, hearing the Dhamma, gains faith* in the Tathāgata (M i 179), such faith* consisting in the fact that the Lord is a Perfectly Enlightened One, that Dhamma is well taught by the Lord and that the (sāvaka-)saṅgha* is of good conduct (M i 320). Such faith* cannot be destroyed by anyone, including Māra, since it is rooted in vision (dassanamūlikā – M i 320) and anyone in whom such faith* is settled, rooted, established, firm, may declare himself a true son* of the Lord, born from his mouth, Dhamma-born, Dhamma-created, an heir to the Dhamma (D iii 84). Such faith* moreover constitutes the power of faith* (saddhābalaṁ) which is to be seen in the four sotāpattiyaṅgas* (A iii 11f).

At S i 44 one meets the extremely cryptic 'faith packs up what is necessary for the road' (saddhā bandhati pātheyyaṁ) and it is not at all clear from the context whether this be the path of rebirth of the puthujjana, and thus faith in almsgiving and so on, or the eightfold path* of the sāvaka*, and thus the faith* of the sotāpattiyaṅgas*. The commentary is similarly unhelpful and states merely that having given rise to faith one gives alms, keeps the precepts and observes the duties of the Uposatha (saddhaṁ uppādetvā dānaṁ deti, sīlaṁ rakkhati, uposatha-kammaṁ karoti – SA i 101). This could apply just as easily to the sāvaka* as it could to the puthujjana, for there is nothing unusual in the idea of an ariyasāvaka* giving alms (e.g. A iii 32ff), keeping the precepts (A iv 210, 246, etc. and cp the fourth sotāpattiyaṅga* of possession of that sīla dear to the ariyans*) and observing the Uposatha (e.g. A iv 248ff). Yet whatever type of faith were originally intended here it is

nonetheless clear that faith*, as the indriya of faith* (saddhindriya) plays an important part in the successful accomplishment of the Brahmacariya*. Thus it is that the indriya of faith* is said to plunge into the Deathless* when cultivated and made much of (S v 220ff), Sāriputta incidentally confirming here that though others might go about in trust of others as to this, he has come to know it, seen it, found it, realised it and contacted it by means of insight*, just as the following sutta maintains that for the ariyasāvaka* possessing insight* faith* is established as a consequence of that insight* (S v 222). When it is recalled that that insight* was the vision provided by the Dhammacakkhu* of the Deathless* it is hard to credit the remark of the Lama Govinda that 'faith in a divine revelation . . . cannot be found in the Buddha's teaching'.[21] Rather we might say that the indriya of faith*, which is the power of faith* (S v 219) and thus also the fourth sotāpattiyaṅga*, and which ensures successful progress along the path* through giving rise to the indriya of energy and combating the hindrances of sloth and torpor and of doubt thus paving the way for samādhi, would be quite impossible without the prior revelation of the Deathless* by the Buddha and we may perhaps conclude that a third way in which the Dhammacakkhu* makes the path* possible is by giving rise to faith*. For (M i 227):

> To those who think they should listen to me and place faith* in me, there will be welfare and happiness for a long time . . . This world and the world beyond are fully made visible by the one who knows; and what is accessible to Māra and what is not accessible to Death. By the Buddha, by the one who understands, knowing through his superknowledge every world, is opened the door to the Deathless*, for reaching nibbāna, security.
>
> Cut across is the stream of the Evil One, shattered, destroyed; let there be abundant rapture, monks, let security be reached

However, the indriya of faith* is not going to plunge into the Deathless*, nor is that security going to be reached, without the ariyasāvaka* being moral and cultivating the sīlakkhandha of the path* and it is in the role of guaranteeing such morality that we find the fourth benefit of gaining the Dhammacakkhu* to lie. For at A i 241 three sorts of aloofness are to be found: (1) the aloofness from immorality of the monk who is moral; (2) the aloofness from wrong view of the monk who has right view*; and (3) the aloofness from the āsavas of the monk in whom the āsavas are destroyed. That is to say, it distinguishes: (1) the virtuous puthujjana for whom the path* is still out of reach; (2) the sekha*; and (3) the asekha*, or arahant*, who has reached the end of the path* and is, as this sutta puts it, one who has reached the essential* and one who is established in that essential* (sārappatto sāre patiṭṭhito; cp M iii 118).

Now the first of these three monks is moral (sīlavā) in the sense that he is endowed with the fourfold morality consisting in purification (catupārisuddhisīlena samannāgato – AA ii 355), that is, he is endowed with restraint with regard to the Pāṭimokkha and to the faculties, with purity of livelihood and with morality with regard to the four requisites (for details see Nyāṇatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, p. 171 and cp Vsm i 126). There is no reason for supposing him to be ariyan★ on the basis of such morality and he is no doubt rather to be classed with the virtuous puthujjana (puthujjanasīlavante) ranked, in the hierarchy of almsworthy persons at M iii 255, as next but one above the animal and well below the various members of the sāvakasaṅgha★. Indeed in the hierarchy this virtuous puthujjana is placed below one who is said to be 'beyond and without attachment to sense-pleasures' (bāhirake kāmesu vītarāge) of whom the commentary states 'in regard to the five mundane superknowledges he is a speaker on the deed and on the efficacy of the deed' (MA v 71, quoted at MLS iii 302 n 3), which though somewhat obscure, would seem to be a reference to those puthujjanas who can attain the mundane superknowledges associated with the mundane jhānas. We should not be misled by the fact that a puthujjana could be virtuous that this absolved him from all criticism; for it was rather on the basis of his failure to see the Four Truths★ as they really are★ and of his resulting continued attachment to the pleasures of the senses that he was judged. In his case to be virtuous meant control of the appetite, not its transcendence through renunciation enjoyed by the ariyan★, and it is no doubt for this reason that he is ranked below the one who though still mundane was nonetheless altogether more removed from the sphere of sensual enjoyment. In short, any morality or virtue that the puthujjana may possess is of a different order to that possessed by the ariyan★.

Indeed, just as we earlier had cause to note how most of those gaining the Dhammacakkhu★ were unlikely hitherto to have practised any meditation, so here we may add that not only is there similarly little evidence for suposing an enhanced degree of morality in those being given a progressive talk – there was often in such individuals a pronounced absence of morality. For the Dhammacakkhu★ was given to a good many kings – for instance Abhaya (M i 396), Avantiputta (M ii 90), Pasenadi (S i 70), Udena (S iv 113), Bimbisāra (PvA 22) – and to generals such as Sīha (A iv 186) and we may doubt whether either kings or members of the armed forces would have had their hands completely unstained by blood spilt in battle; whilst kings were well known to be surrounded by sensual pleasures to excess (M i 504; cp D ii 21, A i 145):

> Now I, Māgandiya, when I was formerly a householder, endowed and provided with the five strands of sense-pleasures, revelled in them . . .

> (sense-objects) agreeable, pleasant, liked, enticing, connected with sensual pleasures, alluring. I had three palaces, Māgandiya, one for the rains, one for the cold weather, one for the hot weather. I, Māgandiya, during the four months of the rains being delighted in the palace for the rains by women musicians, did not come down from that palace.

No doubt this luxury that the Buddha recalls surrounded him – a mere prince of the Sākyans – was modest in comparison to that which surrounded great kings such as Bimbisāra and Udena. Yet not only did Bimbisāra and Udena become sāvakas* – so also apparently did five hundred women in Udena's harem (Ud 79) and courtesans such as Sirimā (VvA 75). Other unlikely candidates for conversion who may be cited are: five hundred monks of Devadatta's schism who all gained the Dhammacakkhu* when taught by Sāriputta and Moggallāna (Vin ii 200); the Buddha's would-be assassin (Vin ii 192); and above all 'the robber named Aṅgulimāla, a hunter, bloody-handed, bent on death and destruction, merciless to living creatures. Through him villages were depopulated and market towns were depopulated and country districts were depopulated. From his constant killing of people he wore a garland of fingers (aṅgulīnaṁ mālaṁ – hence the name)' (M ii 97f). Yet Aṅgulimāla followed after the Buddha in hope of hearing Dhamma in a verse of his, went forth (M ii 100) and subsequently became an arahant* (M ii 104).

Thus we may say that just as the mundane virtue of the puthujjana was of no advantage in the acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* so neither was a complete absence of morality any bar to such acquisition. Such morality as was possessed by the sāvaka* came as a result of conversion, for as Sirimā told Vaṅgīsa (Vv 16[8]):

> When I heard the Deathless* place, the unconditioned, the Teaching of the Tathāgata, the Unrivalled One, I was well and highly restrained in the precepts, firm in the Dhamma taught by the Buddha, the most excellent of men

Similarly it is only as a consequence of gaining the Dhammacakkhu* that the sāvaka* comes into possession of the four sotāpattiyaṅgas*, of which the fourth is possession of that morality dear to the ariyans*, morality unbroken and in its entirety, unspotted, unblemished, granting freedom, praised by the wise, morality untainted that leads to samādhi (e.g. A ii 56f and passim). Such morality grants freedom (bhujissehi) from slavery to craving (taṇhādāsavyato mocetvā – AA iii 345), that is, from Māra, and it is not possessed by the puthujjana (S v 382ff).

Indeed, that such morality is acquired only after gaining the Dhammacakkhu* can be seen most clearly from the fact that on one occasion

Aṅgulimāla was advised by the Buddha that he could help a woman in difficult labour by addressing her in the following manner: 'I, sister, am not aware of having intentionally deprived any living thing of life since I was born. By this truth may there be well-being for you, well-being for the unborn child'. Aṅgulimāla, misconstruing the Buddha's meaning, asks whether this would not be a deliberate lie on his part, at which the Buddha rephrases the statement in a more explicit manner, telling him that he should say to her rather 'I, sister, am not aware of having intentionally deprived any living thing of life since I was born of the ariyan* birth. By this truth may there be well-being for you, well-being for the unborn child' (M ii 103). Moreover, the ariyasāvaka* is aided in this new-found morality by his possession of the powers of the sekha* amongst which are the shame and self-reproach that he feels when acting wrongly and when finding evil, unskilled states present in him together with the energy he possesses to rid himself of such things (A iii 2), powers that without which a monk is duly cast into hell (A iii 3). He possesses such powers because he is also possessed of the power of insight* into the rise and fall of things and of the ariyan* penetration* of the way leading to the complete destruction of dukkha (A iii 2). That is to say, such morality is possible for him since he is no longer blinkered by Māra who might otherwise persuade him into thinking that a course of action really to his detriment were right. This can be seen from the chaos that ensued when the eighth in a line of wheel-turning kings failed to consult his predecessor concerning the ariyan* duties of a wheel-turning king and chose rather to govern his kingdom in the manner he deemed fit (D iii 64ff), suggesting that what we might consider good social ethics are not, in fact, ultimately so. Interesting in this connection is the case of the monk Saṅgāmaji who was visited by his former wife and charged with the support of the child he had fathered which the Buddha seems to have considered as rudeness on her part (Ud 5f). Why he did so is not explained but we may surmise that what may have, to us, seemed a somewhat legitimate request was, from the point of view of the ariyan*, misguided in the sense that Saṅgāmaji, as a member of the world's unsurpassed merit-field, was providing both his wife and child a far greater service than he could as a mere provider of physical sustenance since as a source of merit he was providing them both with an opportunity of well-being both in this life and in the life to come.

Thus we may say that a fourth way in which acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* aids progress along the path* is by making possible that morality which is alone beneficial, the morality that is dear to the ariyans* and, moreover, the morality which leads to samādhi (samādhisaṁvattanikehi – A ii 57 and passim), the next stage on the path*. At this point it is of interest to recall that we have already found

that the puthujjana was equally thought capable of attaining samādhi for it was through his attainment of the various jhānas that he could secure rebirth in one or another world of the rūpa- and arūpa-lokas, although thereafter, unlike the ariyasāvaka*, he seemed doomed to perpetual suffering in the vinipāta (A ii 126–130). Why this should be so is nowhere explained, other than to say that it is through his failure to see the Four Truths* (S v 477). However, it would seem that samādhi admitted of the mundane–supermundane* distinction, a view expressed in the commentaries as already noted in the case of Sirimā who reached the supermundane* samādhi on hearing Dhamma (VvA 84) and a view made explicit by the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra of the Sarvāstivāda in which it is stated: 'Le chemin de la méditation est de deux espèces; le chemin de la vue est pur. Le chemin de la méditation est mondain (laukika) ou impur (sāsrava) et supramondain (lokottara) ou pur (anāsrava)',[22] a view that would be most compatible with the distinction noted earlier between the right view of the puthujjana that is with, or affected by, the āsavas (sāsavā) and the right view* of the sāvaka* that is supermundane* and without, or unaffected by, the āsavas (lokuttarā anāsavā) found at M iii 72.

In spite of all that has been written on Buddhism, it remains a lamentable fact that the bulk of its technical terminology still awaits serious study. Included amongst such terminology is the āsava, a word of most uncertain meaning and one which has seen a variety of interpretation. The difficulty involved in the attempt to discover its meaning is hindered both by its infrequent occurrence outside stereotyped formulae, such as the arahant* being one in whom the āsavas are destroyed (khīṇāsava) or one who is without, or unaffected by, the āsavas (anāsava), and by what may well be a somewhat later and scholastic classification of the āsavas into first three, and later still, by the addition of that of the diṭṭhāsava, into four categories: the āsavas of sense-desire (kāmāsava), becoming (bhāvāsava), ignorance (avijjāsava) and (wrong) view (diṭṭhāsava). These categories are, to my knowledge, nowhere fully explained in the Nikāyas – it is never said how these four categories of āsava differ from one another nor how the āsavas themselves were thought to cause their equally unspecified consequences. Indeed, one is sometimes made to wonder whether the term āsava had not been in current usage with a distinct technical meaning amongst one or more sects prior to, or contemporary with, the Buddhists and that the expression 'an arahant in whom the āsavas are destroyed' had not originally been taken into Buddhism and used in a purely honorific sense, the need for its accommodation within Buddhist technical terminology being felt only later, whereupon the above categories come into existence bearing little if any apparent connection with the linguistic derivation of the term. For āsava

is to be derived from ā + √sru and thus means 'something that flows towards (one)', and it is in this sense that it occurs as a well-defined technical term amongst the Jains, where it seems to mean the influence of previous karma flowing in upon and disturbing the soul. This sense of 'flowing' may be felt when the āsavas are called 'floods' (D iii 230) and also in those few suttas in which the term appears other than in its stereotyped form, such suttas often involving a dispute with the Jains. Hence at A ii 196ff we find Moggallāna asking Vappa, a follower of the Jains, whether he sees any cause owing to which the āsavas experienced as dukkha might flow in upon, at some future time, a man who is restrained in body, speech and mind due to the waning of ignorance and the arising of knowledge, to which Vappa replies that he does see such a cause – there might be some previously done evil deed whose fruit had not yet ripened owing to which the āsavas might flow in upon (āsavā assaveyyuṁ (vl anvāssaveyyuṁ)) such a man. As Woodward notes, with assaveyyuṁ (3rd per pl pot of āsavati) 'we have the verb which gives the real meaning of āsava, "a flood which overwhelms"' (GS ii 207 n 3). Vappa's reply is in accordance with the view elsewhere attributed to Nigaṇṭha Nāthaputta (usually thought to be Mahāvīra) to the effect that 'If there is a previously done evil deed done by you, then wear it away by this severe austerity. That which is the non-doing of an evil deed in the future is from being restrained in body, speech and mind here and now. Thus by burning up, by making an end of former deeds, by the non-doing of new deeds, there is no flowing (anavassavo) in the future. From there being no flowing in the future is the destruction of deeds; from the destruction of deeds is the destruction of dukkha' (M i 93; cp M ii 214ff). It will be clear from passages such as these that there was, at least in the Jaina usage of the term, a distinct idea of āsavas as karmic consequences flowing in upon one, and the association of this with dukkha, both of which can be detected on occasion in purely Buddhist uses of the term. AA v 32, for instance, speaks of āsavas belonging to the future as katapāpamūlakā, as rooted in some evil deed that one has done, whilst at A iii 414 we are told that there are five different kinds of āsavas: (1) āsavas leading to (rebirth in) hell; (2) āsavas leading to (rebirth in) an animal womb; (3) āsavas leading to (rebirth on) the peta-plane; (4) āsavas leading to (rebirth in) the world of men; and (5) āsavas leading to (rebirth in) the devaloka, and it will be clear from both of these passages that the relationship of the āsava to the karmic consequence seems at times to have been, if not one of identity, then at least extremely close; whilst as to its association with dukkha we may note that at A iii 414 the ariyan* eightfold path* is said to be the practice leading to the cessation of the āsavas, whilst elsewhere the term āsava replaces that of dukkha in the formulation of the Four Truths* (e.g. D i 84; Vin iii 5).

This apparently karmic connotation of the term āsava is also to be seen from the fact that the mundane right view of the puthujjana is said to be sāsavā puññābhāgiyā upadhivepakkā, with, or affected by, the āsavas, on the side of merit and ripening into rebirth (M iii 72), whilst the supermundane* right view* of the ariyasāvaka* is anāsavā lokuttarā, without, or unaffected by, the āsavas and supermundane*, as indeed is the whole of the ariyan* eightfold path*. That is, the use of the term sāsavā in the case of the puthujjana whom we have already seen to be on the path of merit and the use of anāsavā in the case of the sāvaka* whom we have seen to be, instead, on the non-kammic path of no-return strongly favours the karmic interpretation in this passage too. If the whole of the ariyan* eightfold path* is supermundane*, and thus anāsava, then so too must be its eighth factor, right concentration*. Thus to revert to the question of the puthujjana, although skilled in the various jhānas, arising in the vinipāta after a spell in the lofty heaven worlds, we may say that the Sarvāstivādin assertion of there being two forms of bhāvanā – one mundane (laukika) and with, or affected by, the āsavas (sāsrava) and the other supermundane* (lokottara) and without, or unaffected by, the āsavas (anāsrava) – is one that would be not only quite compatible with the views expressed in the Nikāyas but one that would also explain certain questions left unanswered by the Nikāyas and it could be that we have here a doctrine that predated the schism of the Third Council. The reason that the puthujjana arises in the vinipāta is that, as Vappa might say, there might be in his case some previously done evil deed whose fruit had not yet ripened owing to which the āsavas might flow in upon him; moreover, as a puthujjana he would lack that sīla dear to the ariyans* which leads to the supermundane* samādhi, and by virtue of which the sāvaka* has no terror, no stupefaction nor fear of dying in the next world (S v 385ff) since he has already conquered Death – that is, Māra. In short, whilst the puthujjana may, through skill in the jhānas, attain temporary freedom from Māra – since the worlds of the rūpa- and arūpa-lokas are not accessible to Māra – he will, when finally falling from those worlds, once more fall prey to Māra and his own former deeds, and in this connection it is of interest to note how the fear of death in the world to come was a common Brāhmaṇic preoccupation:

> It was first and foremost the belief in the repeated death in the hereafter, i.e. the fear of the menace of a death in that existence which was to follow the present span of life in this world, which led to the conviction that those who had not freed themselves from the power of death in this life must, in the beyond, die again and again. Says ŚB 2 3 3 8 'And whomsoever goes to yonder world (amuṁ lokam) not having escaped that Death (mṛtyum), him he causes to die again and again in yonder "world", even as in this world,

> one regards not him that is fettered, but puts him to death whenever one wishes'[23]

To say that the sāvaka* was free of Māra in this way does not entirely explain how he was altogether spared having to suffer the effects of some previously done evil deed that had not yet ripened and owing to which the āsavas might still flow in upon him and assail him. For although he had, through acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*, gained the supermundane* eightfold path* that was without, or unaffected by, the āsavas in the sense that its practice did not lead to the generation of any fresh kamma, he might still nonetheless be troubled by that kamma generated previous to his acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*. That is to say, we find at S iv 132f a distinction made between old kamma (purāṇakammaṁ) and new kamma (navakammaṁ), the former being defined as the faculties of the six senses that have been brought about as a base for feeling (its effects), whilst the latter is said to be that kamma that one performs now by means of body, speech or mind. Since the cessation of kamma is here defined as the cessation of such kamma performed by means of body, speech and mind – such cessation being brought about by way of the ariyan* eightfold path* – we must infer that that path* can only guarantee that no new kamma be generated. With this may be compared how elsewhere the knowledge associated with the four (supermundane*) paths* (AA iii 212) and the ariyan* eightfold path* (A ii 236) are said to be that kamma which is neither black nor white and which conduces to the destruction of kamma. Clearly the path* cannot affect that old kamma that has already been brought about as a base for feeling; moreover, when we realise that at S i 91ff it is claimed that (old) kamma can take up to fourteen births before its full effects have been undergone, we are made to wonder how it can be that the sāvaka* can be so utterly assured that there is no previously generated, as yet unexpiated, kamma lurking in the background that would necessitate his arising in the vinipāta for its expiation and thus stand in the way of his attainment of the goal of freedom from rebirth altogether.

Here it may also be said that, just as it is a fifth benefit of gaining the Dhammacakkhu* that one is so translated onto a path* that guarantees the generation of no fresh kamma, so it is also a sixth benefit that one is spared having to experience the majority of that kamma generated prior to such conversion:

> Even so, for the ariyasāvaka* possessing (right) view*, for the person possessing understanding*, this is quite the greater dukkha, this that has been destroyed, has been put to an end, whilst that which remains is infinitely small and does not amount to one hundredth, does not amount to

> one thousandth, does not amount to one hundred thousandth, when set beside the former mass of dukkha that has been destroyed, has been put to an end – that is, at most a term of seven (births): so great a good is (it to have) insight* into Dhamma, so great a good is it to acquire the Dhammacakkhu*

(S ii 134; cp similar at S v 458 where the explanation is instead given in terms of understanding the Four Truths* as they really are*.) This suggests that the acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* brings it about that the ariyasāvaka* is spared having to expiate all except a tiny fragment of that kamma he had generated prior to such acquisition and that the amount of time left in saṁsāra for such a person is infinitessimal when compared to the amount of time already suffered therein (S ii 185f = It 17f; cp A ii 52):

> The pile of bones of (all the bodies of) one person who has lived for one kappa alone would make a heap the equivalent of a mountain – so said the Great Rishi – it was proclaimed to be as high as Mount Vepulla to the north of the Vulture Peak in the Magadhans' Giribbaja. But when he sees with right insight* the ariyan* Truths* – dukkha, the uprising of dukkha, the transcending of dukkha and the ariyan* eightfold path* leading to the allaying of dukkha, that person, running on at most seven times, makes an end of dukkha through the destruction of all saṁyojanas

From the simple fact that in the course of a single lifetime an individual continually accumulates numerous deeds of such a nature that each will require a separate birth in the future for its expiation – and that this process repeats itself in birth after birth – it is easy to see how the traditional belief arose that all of us drag around behind us a huge mountain of as yet unexpiated kamma. Had acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* done nothing more than to translate the individual onto a path* that guaranteed that no further kamma would be added to that mountain, nonetheless the existence of that mountain would surely have delayed attainment of the cessation of rebirth and certainly for more than seven lives. This consideration seems particularly pertinent in the case of Aṅgulimāla whose wanton destruction of life would, had he not gained this insight*, have required an enormous amount of expiation and would certainly have prevented him from becoming an arahant* in that same life. However, Aṅgulimāla did become an arahant* and shortly afterwards, when going about for alms, suffered three blows on the head (M ii 104; cp his verses at M ii 105):

> Then the venerable Aṅgulimāla, with a broken head streaming with blood, his bowl smashed, and his outer cloak in tatters, approached the Lord. The Lord saw the venerable Aṅgulimāla coming in the distance; seeing him, he

> spoke thus to the venerable Aṅgulimāla: 'Do you endure it, brahmin, do you endure it, brahmin. You are experiencing in these seen conditions the ripening of that kamma through the ripening of which you would (otherwise) have boiled in hell for many years, many hundreds of years, many thousands of years'. Then the venerable Aṅgulimāla, as he was meditating in private, experienced the bliss of freedom

It is only on account of this added benefit of the Dhammacakkhu* – that it destroys the majority of one's unexpiated kamma, or at least alters the mode in which it is to be expiated – that attainment of the goal of the path* becomes a possibility. In this the Buddhists are not alone for as Glasenapp observes:

> Ignorance which must be overcome is the innate want of knowledge taught by the various systems, namely, the erroneous idea that there is a permanent I or ego (Buddhism), that the individual soul is real (Saṅkara's Vedānta), that it is united with matter (Sāṅkhya), that it is not subject to God in everything (Madhava, Vallabha), and so on. The abolition of ignorance produces in man a complete reversal of his thinking, and thus brings about the great change that makes of the man bound to karma the man delivered therefrom.
>
> The first appearance of salvation is now said to render impossible the creation of new karma as well as to be capable of destroying karma that has been piled up, but has not yet come into operation. The cessation of karma creation is explained by the theory that the work clings as little to the redeemed man as water to a lotus blossom (Chand Up 4 70/14 3; Īsha Up 2). The same view is also found among the Jains, namely, that action wanting in passion (kaṣaya) does not cling to the soul, because the activity of the person without passion lacks the resin (kaṣaya) that keeps the karma substances firm in the soul (Tattv VI 5). The karma that he 'binds' thus has only momentary duration, and therefore no longer exercises any pernicious influence on the soul. The Yoga Sūtra IV 7 declares that the karma of the perfect one is neither 'white' nor 'black', that is to say, is neither good nor bad, and for this reason no longer produces any fruit.
>
> But how does the redeemed person become free from his karma already piled up? Some assume that for this is needed the undertaking of particular acts. Thus Vācaspatimiśra teaches that the saint is said to create through the power of Yoga special phantom bodies (nirmāṇa-kāya), to which he transfers his remaining karma, so that it operates in these bodies, but no longer in himself (Nyāyavārttika-Tātparya-ṭikā, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, p. 6 according to Jacobi, SPAW 1930 XXII, p. 322). According to another theory, the first appearance of salvation already brings about of itself the destruction of accumulated karma. In the Gita 4 37 it says that 'the fire of knowledge makes all karma into ashes', and likewise the Upaniṣads (Muṇḍaka 2 2 8) teach that the works of him who has seen the truth come to naught. If the previously produced karma is annulled through salvation,

> then logically every karmically conditioned effect was bound to cease, in other words, a salvation was bound to have as consequence the annihilation of the body and a complete deliverance from the bonds of the empirical world. Many philosophers have in fact drawn this conclusion, and have assumed that there can be only one salvation in the bodily condition (videha mukti). On the other hand, the majority teach that a salvation is possible already during one's lifetime, but that the karma already on the point of realization cannot be stopped; it runs on like a potter's wheel that goes on turning by virtue of the impulse previously received, even when the pot has long since been finished.
>
> It follows from this that not all karma can be abolished. Even the redeemed person must still enjoy the fruits of his former actions that have become 'ripe'[24]

Whilst Glasenapp seems to have remained unaware of the fact, it is clear from this most interesting passage that much of what he says here is equally applicable in the case of Buddhism and that the position of the Nikāyas on these issues is in broad agreement with the mainstream of Indian thought. The first appearance of salvation, the Dhammacakkhu*, in translating the individual onto the eightfold path*, renders impossible the creation of any new kamma and at the same time reduces to ashes the great majority of old kamma that has not yet come into operation, to the extent that the sāvaka* can expect a maximum of no more than seven further births. It cannot, however, destroy that kamma 'already on the point of realization' which it seems is responsible for these few more births – a point to be taken up and developed in the next chapter.

Here it may be asked whether there might not be any kamma that even the Dhammacakkhu* cannot destroy and it is interesting to note in this connection that at D i 85f it is stated that Ajātasattu would have gained the Dhammacakkhu* had he not murdered his father, King Bimbisāra. That this prevented him from gaining the Dhammacakkhu* whilst Aṅgulimāla became an arahant* despite his wanton bloodshed can only be accounted for on the grounds that parricide was considered, unlike ordinary murder, to be one of the five misdemeanours causing one to be doomed to hell where one would remain incurably for a kappa (A iii 146 – with the adoption of the reading of kappaṭṭho with A iii 402; M i 393; Vin ii 202 for text's parikuppā). This would also accord with the explanation given by Nāgasena as to why some cannot become arahants* (Miln 255ff; cp also The Questions of King Milinda ii 78 n 1) for such an offence renders them incapable of 'rising to the knowledge of the Truth' (The Questions of King Milinda ii 81) and with the fact that AA iii 406 on A iii 402ff cites Ajātasattu as an example of such incurable (atekiccho) individuals whom A iii 402ff likens to a person who has fallen into a cesspool and is so completely covered that there is not even so much as a

hair tip that is unsmeared and which one could grasp in order to pull him out. Or, indeed, as VA 1276 puts it, 'now it is not possible to cure (such a person) even with a thousand Buddhas' (quoted B Disc v 283 n 7). It is nonetheless worth noting that DA 238 adds that after a period in the Iron Cauldron Hell Ajātasattu will eventually become the Paccekabuddha Viditaviseso.

Thus we may assume that Aṅgulimāla, for all his killing, was not incurable in this way since none of his victims had been his father. How he was able to nullify the karmic effects of mass murder by suffering no more than three blows to the head remains, by and large, a mystery though some clue may be found in the fact that 'The Yogasūtrabhāṣya III 22 compares the effect of a karma to the drying of a damp cloth; if it is spread out, it dries more quickly than when it is rolled up (cf Tattv II 52). The man who is initiated is in a position to cause his karma to be rapidly used up'.[25] A similar view seems expressed at A i 249ff where it is said that a deed done by an uncultivated person whose insight is limited and who is himself limited, a person having a small self and abiding in what is finite (according to AA ii 361 a puthujjana), goes to hell for doing the slightest evil deed, whereas a cultivated person whose insight* is cultivated and who is himself unlimited, a person having a great self and abiding in what is boundless (according to AA ii 361 an arahant*), does not even notice the result of such a deed whose result is to be experienced in these seen conditions; the appended simile explains that just as a little cup of water would be rendered undrinkable by the addition of a grain of salt, so is the one with the small self ruined by the slightest evil deed, whereas just as the Ganges is not rendered undrinkable by the addition of such a grain of salt, so is the one with a great self not affected by a similar evil deed. Indeed, on many an occasion one encounters the view that those on the path*, or those who have reached the goal of the path*, have in some sense acquired great size: the ariyasāvaka* cultivating the Brahmavihāras comes to know that 'Formerly this heart of mine was limited, not cultivated, but now this heart of mine is boundless, well cultivated' (A v 300); similarly, the ariyasāvaka* dwells at all times with a heart that is spacious, become great, extensive, boundless (A iii 315). Greatness is said to be the desired goal (A i 227) and it is due to this no doubt that arahants* (A i 266) and Tathāgatas (A i 227) are described as 'immeasurable' (appameyya), on account of which it is impossible to harm the Tathāgata with abuse: 'Who should think to pollute the sea with a pot of poison – he would not pollute it with that, for sublime is the great ocean; so he who with abuse afflicts the Tathāgata' (It 86 = Vin ii 203), echoing, in turn, the sentiment that the Tathāgata is deep, immeasurable and hard to fathom, just like the great sea (S iv 376).

Some elucidation of this obscure notion of size can also be found in the

fact that Gonda, in speaking of the nayana-dīkṣā, or 'instruction and initiation by the eye' in Śaiva Siddhānta, states that 'The guru while looking at the disciple destroys the last remnants of the fundamental evil conditioning the soul's delusion that it is limited and in so doing enlightens him', whilst a similar practice, forming part of the upanayana ritual 'is considered to be a spiritual rebirth on which no rebirth will follow'.[26] In much the same way, he notes, Śrī Lakṣmī 'is in one of her manifestations expected to appear to, and glance with a hundred eyes at, those sages who will remember her (Lakṣmī T 9 34). As long as an embodied soul is not seen by Lakṣmī moved by pity he remains limited in knowledge (ibidem 13 33)' for as the goddess says 'The embodied souls which are beheld by me, Śrī, are free from sorrow* . . . Those whom I look at enjoy pacification of their karman (karmasāmya-), i.e. the extinction of the effects of karman'.[27]

Thus we may speculate that it was by means of an increase in size, either physical as some of the Pali passages suggest or figuratively with respect to an increase in knowledge as indicated by these passages taken from Gonda, that Aṅgulimāla managed to minimize the effects of his past actions, an achievement that he had anticipated in his conviction that he would soon get rid of evil on hearing Dhamma in a verse from the Buddha (M ii 100). Mi-la-ras-pa, in some ways the Tibetan counterpart of Aṅgulimāla, seems to have entertained a similar belief. For he is said to have caused his enemies' house to collapse on them and also to have ruined their fields by conjuring up hailstorms by means of black magic and when all these spells – performed in retribution for his paternal uncle having confiscated the family property when Mi-la-ras-pa's widowed mother would not marry him – were concluded, the demons he had conjured up appeared before him, carrying the bloody heads of their victims in their hands. At this Mi-la-ras-pa was filled with remorse (cp Miln 255) for he knew that according to the laws of karma his next incarnation was certain to be in hell and that only by following the dangerous direct path* of the Vajrayāna could he avoid the fate that he had prepared for himself. He therefore had to raise himself to a state in which neither sin nor virtue was of any significance and which led to enlightenment in this life itself[28] and after some six years of torment succeeded in receiving the necessary initiation from his teacher Mar-pa. For as Mi-la-ras-pa, like Aṅgulimāla, very well knew, without such initiation there could be no hope of salvation, especially for one of his conduct, and in this Tibetan legend we have what seems to be nothing more than a perpetuation of the position of the Nikāyas – that unless he acquired, by means of an oral transmission of the Dhamma, the Dhammacakkhu* and its resultant freedom from the majority of his past kamma, he was doomed.

Summary

In the foregoing discussion I have attempted to show that the ariyan* eightfold path* was, in the Buddha's day, known only to those who were themselves ariyan*, that is the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant*, and that it began, as the Buddha always said it did, with right view* in the form of a vision – and a hearing – of the Deathless*, the hidden three-quarters lying beyond the phenomenal world of change and where being born and dying was unknown. I have also tried to demonstrate that such right view* was not the outcome of any specific practice but that it was occasioned rather by the Buddha descending from the terrace of the Dhamma, from the top of the mountain slope, and, by means of a progressive talk, guiding a person to the summit of that same mountain slope whereupon he too could discern that which the Buddhas had alone discerned: the Four Truths* of dukkha, the uprising of dukkha, the cessation of dukkha which is nibbāna, and the path* leading to the cessation of dukkha, the ariyan* eightfold path*. It is only at this point that that path* becomes a possibility for that person whilst, moreover, even at this point progress along that path* would not be possible without six benefits said to accompany acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*. These are:

1 right view* itself, the acquaintance with the fact that there exists beyond the phenomenal world of dukkha a sanctuary, together with sight of the means of reaching that sanctuary;

which gives rise to:

2 right resolve*, the second factor of that path* and which includes both renunciation of sense pleasures and an impetus to set out upon that path*;

as well as to both:

3 the faith* and confidence required for such an undertaking;

and:

4 possession of that morality dear to the ariyans*, the next three factors of the path*, and which in turn leads on to samādhi, the last three factors.

However, even these would be to no avail were it not also for the fact that through acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*:

5 one is translated onto the supermundane* plane and is thus freed of generating any fresh kamma; and
6 at the same time the great majority of one's previously generated and as yet unexpiated kamma is destroyed,

since without such freedom the cessation of the rebirth process would be impossible.

In addition to this I have argued that progress along the path* should be understood to occur in the order in which it is always enumerated and that, as with the paṭiccasamuppāda, each successive factor is dependent upon successful accomplishment of its predecessor. That this is so can be seen from a long, mainly stock (since it is curtailed at some places and elaborated at others) passage that occurs at several places in the Majjhima Nikāya and that also forms the basis of the Sāmaññaphala Sutta on which most of the subsequent suttas of the first book of this Nikāya are modelled (e.g. D i 62ff ≏ M i 179ff ≏ A ii 208ff). It begins with the statement that a Tathāgata arises in the world and teaches Dhamma, making visible in its entirety the whole Brahmacariya* and a householder, on hearing that Dhamma, gains faith* – which we may take as denoting right view* for reasons already stated. He reflects that the household life impedes fulfilment of that Brahmacariya* and, having set his affairs in order, shaves his head and beard, dons the saffron robe and goes forth into the homeless life – this is his right resolve* in the form of renunciation. Having gone forth he sets about perfecting his morality, whereupon 'possessed of the ariyan* sīlakkhandha' (ariyena sīlakkhandhena samannāgato) he obtains complete control over his sense-organs; whilst with this morality and control of the senses he is able, together with ariyan* mindfulness, to get rid of the five hindrances to jhāna and thus attain samādhi. Having passed successively through the four jhānas he emerges from the fourth jhāna and turns his mind to the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas, whereupon his mind becomes freed from the āsavas and in that freedom comes the knowledge that he is freed – that is to say, he attains the right knowledge* and right release* that are the ninth and tenth factors of the path* and its true goal.[29]

In conclusion we may speculate, since such a view is to my knowledge nowhere made explicit, that when the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant* came to be looked upon as progressive stages in attainment of the goal, it was against such an understanding of the path* that these four stages were seen. For whilst it is clear that the sotāpanna* and sakadāgāmin* must be in possession of both the paññā- and sīlakkhandhas since these are right view* and the fourth sotāpattiyaṅga*, respectively, it is by no means clear that they also had attained to the

samādhikkhandha. Indeed, the fact that they continue to take birth only in the kāmāvacara suggests that they were lacking in the practice of jhāna necessary for birth in the rūpāvacara, which is the destiny of anāgāmins*, and thus thought not to have progressed beyond the fifth factor of the path*. This, together with our analysis of the path* as a whole, can best be seen in Table 2.

Notes to Chapter 2

1 Nyāṇatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary* (Colombo, 1972), p. 93; cp also his *The Word of the Buddha* (Kandy, 1971), p. 27.
2 *Buddhist Dictionary*, p. 93.
3 *The Word of the Buddha*, p. 27f.
4 *Buddhist Dictionary*, p. 21.
5 Bhikshu Sangharakshita, *A Survey of Buddhism* (Bangalore, 1966), p. 133f.
6 Andrew Rawlinson, 'Spiritual Practice in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra', in *Wege zur Ganzheit: Festschrift zum 75en Geburtstag von Lama Anagarika Govinda* (Almora, 1973), pp. 110–43.
7 R. N. Dandekar, *Some Aspects of the History of Hinduism* (Poona, 1967), p. 30f.
8 Helmuth von Glasenapp, *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy* (Benares, 1942), p. xix.
9 S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads* (London, 1953), p. 591
10 Thomas J. Hopkins, *The Hindu Religious Tradition* (California, 1971), p. 19.
11 Benjamin Walker, *Hindu World* i 486, sv Dīkṣā.
12 See e.g. P. Yampolsky, *The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York, 1967), pp. 127, 133, 134.
13 Francesca Freemantle and Chögyam Trungpa (trans.), *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (Berkeley, 1975), p. 59.
14 D. L. Snellgrove and H. E. Richardson, *A Cultural History of Tibet* (London, 1968), p. 116.
15 Helmuth von Glasenapp, *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy* (Benares, 1942), p. 71.
16 E. Lamotte, *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna* i 60 n 1.
17 F. L. Woodward, *Some Sayings of the Buddha* (New York, 1973), p. 7 n 5.
18 Loc cit.
19 Loc cit.
20 Loc cit.; my italics.
21 Lama Anagarika Govinda, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (London, 1961), p. 13. In spite of this, however, the Lama is to be congratulated on his understanding of the verse announcing the Buddha's decision to teach, for he says 'This kind of faith . . . is the positive attitude of our mind and our whole being, without which no spiritual progress can be attained. It is the saddhā which the Buddha demanded from those who wanted to follow him on his way . . . "Pamuñcantu saddhaṁ" means: "Let your faith, your inner trust and confidence, stream forth, remove your inner obstacles and open yourself to the truth!"' see *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism* (London, 1969), p. 30.
22 Louis de la Vallée Poussin (trans.), *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Bruxelles, 1971), iv 119 (text VI 1 c–d).
23 Jan Gonda, *Loka: World and Heaven in the Veda* (Amsterdam, 1966), p. 143.
24 Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions* (Calcutta, 1963), p. 56f.

Table 2. *The Four Varieties of Sāvaka* Correlated with the Tenfold Path*

Paññā Khandha	Right view*	Hearing Dhamma Seeing nibbāna Faith
	Right resolve*	Renunciation of sense-pleasures Energy (Going forth)
Sīla Khandha	Right speech*	Sīla dear to the ariyans* that leads to samādhi
	Right action*	
	Right livelihood*	
		Control of senses Freedom from the hindrances
Samādhi Khandha	Right effort*	
	Right mindfulness*	
	Right concentration*	The four jhānas
Vimutti Khandha	Right knowledge*	Freedom from āsavas = no more rebirth = realising nibbāna
	Right release*	

Sotāpanna*

Sakadāgāmin*

Anāgāmin*

Eightfold path* of the sekha*

Arahant*

Tenfold path* of the asekha*

which young men of (good) family rightly go forth into the homeless life, abided in it. He comprehended 'Destroyed is birth, brought to a close is the Brahmacariya*, done is what was to be done, there will be hereafter no more of this state of things'. So the venerable Bhāradvāja became an arahant*

Moreover, we may even say that Vacchagotta, who had gone forth upon being shown nibbāna, was somewhat slow in that it was all of two weeks before he visited the Buddha and said 'I, Lord, have attained as much as can be attained through the knowledge and wisdom of the sekha* (sekhena ñāṇena sekhāya vijjāya). May the Lord teach me final Dhamma (uttariṁ dhammaṁ)', whereafter Vacchagotta soon became an arahant* (M i 494ff). How long he actually took in this matter is not said but since elsewhere the Buddha claims that a sāvaka*, if instructed in such Dhamma in the evening, would attain excellence (visesaṁ adhigamissati; cp AA iii 170: visesagāmī = nibbānagāmī) in the morning, or if so instructed in the morning, would attain excellence in the evening (M ii 96) we may suppose it not to have taken very long. Since the paragraph recording the attainment of arahantship* by Bhāradvāja is, with the exception of the first nine words, a stock paragraph used in cases where this final Dhamma is given, we may perhaps further suppose that in general the time involved was very short; and the implication of the various passages so far discussed is that the Brahmacariya* that the Buddha invited those he ordained to follow lasted at the most two weeks whereupon, as a result of a further teaching, that Brahmacariya* was brought to a close.

Five different methods of conveying this final teaching seem to have been used and we may conveniently refer to these as: (1) hearing a discourse; (2) being exhorted with Dhamma-talk; (3) receiving an exhortation in brief; (4) the four verbs; and (5) reviewing Dhamma heard. The first of these we have seen to have been the means employed in the case of the Group of Five who became freed of the āsavas upon hearing a discourse on the impermanence of the khandhas (Vin i 13f). This means was also employed in the case of the Buddha's own son, Rāhula, for it is said that the Buddha reflected that 'Mature now in Rāhula are the things that bring freedom to maturity. Suppose I were to train Rāhula finally (uttariṁ) in the destruction of the āsavas?', whereupon he took Rāhula aside and gave him a discourse on the impermanence of the senses during which Rāhula became freed of the āsavas (M iii 277ff = S iv 105ff). Similarly, on another occasion the Buddha, when visited by thirty monks from Pāva, thought 'These thirty monks from Pāva are all . . . still in possession of the saṁyojanas (sasaṁyojanā). Suppose I were to teach them Dhamma in such a way that, whilst (sitting) on that very seat, their hearts might become freed of the āsavas?' which he then did with equal

success (S ii 187ff). Other cases of this phenomenon are to be found such as that of an unnamed monk (S iv 48), four (apparently separate) groups each of sixty monks (M iii 20, 287; A iv 135; Sn p 149) and, on one occasion, a group of no less than one thousand monks (S iv 19f).

Exhortation with Dhamma-talk which we have seen to have been the means by which Yasa's fifty-four friends became freed of the āsavas also occurs elsewhere, as for instance also in the case of Vacchagotta mentioned above (M i 494ff), Anuruddha (A i 281f), Kassapa (S ii 220f) and an unnamed monk (A iii 70). Most interesting, perhaps, is the case of Soṇa whose wavering in his meditation led him to consider reverting to the lay life. The Buddha, intuiting this psychically, flew cross-legged through the air and exhorted Soṇa with Dhamma-talk with the result that Soṇa very soon afterwards became freed of the āsavas (A iii 374ff ≏ Vin i 182ff).

More numerous, however, are those instances upon which named individuals visited the Buddha and requested that the Buddha teach them Dhamma in brief (saṁkhittena dhammaṁ desetu) with which they might abide alone, aloof, diligent, ardent and self-resolute. The teaching given on such occasions varied but in the majority of cases tended to be concerned with the impermanence either of the senses (e.g. S iv 63f) or of the khandhas (e.g. S iii 187). Formally, such teachings seem not to have differed from those elsewhere given by means of a discourse and in spite of the term 'in brief' (saṁkhittena) they were, with one or two possible exceptions, no shorter than discourses given on other occasions. Such an exception is the teaching given to Māluṅkyaputta (S iv 72f) and Bāhiya (Ud 8) to the effect that they should train themselves so that:

> There will be in the seen just the seen; there will be in the heard just the heard; there will be in the felt just the felt; there will be in the cognised just the cognised; whereupon you will have no 'there'; and when you have no 'there', then you will have no 'this place' nor 'the other place' nor that 'between the two': this is quite the end of dukkha

which it seems Māluṅkyaputta immediately understood. As to the others, however, no reason is apparent as to why such teachings were qualified as 'in brief'. Buddhaghosa's remarks at MA v 60 (quoted MLS iii 293 n 1) that 'the whole teaching of Dhamma by the Buddhas is "in brief"; there is no extended teaching. Even the whole of the Paṭṭhānakathā is in brief' clearly goes no way to explain why so many of the Buddha's contemporaries felt the need to qualify the way in which they desired the Buddha to teach them. Whilst it is true that most of the teachings he subsequently gave do not appear to have been particularly brief, that some are brief and, moreover, reminiscent of other terse

summaries of Dhamma found elsewhere in the Nikāyas may suggest that the teachings actually given on such occasions have not survived and that their place has been taken by some more conventional statement of the Dhamma. Be this as it may we may note that having been given this teaching such a person is said to have departed and:

> . . . abiding alone, aloof, diligent, ardent, self-resolute, not long afterwards (nacirass' eva), by his own superknowledge, having precisely in these seen conditions realised that unsurpassed culmination of the Brahmacariya* for the sake of which young men of (good) family rightly go forth into the homeless life, abided in it. He comprehended 'Destroyed is birth, brought to a close is the Brahmacariya*, done is what was to be done, there will be hereafter no more of this state of things'. So the venerable . . . became an arahant*

The fourth method by which this final teaching was conveyed was that of what I have called 'the four verbs', for when the former Buddha Vipassin had caused the Dhammackkhu* to arise to Khaṇḍa and Tissa, his chief two sāvakas*, he thereafter by means of Dhamma-talk indicated (sandassesi) something, made them take it up (samādapesi), made them keen (samuttejesi) and purified them (sampahaṁsesi) as a consequence of which they very shortly became freed of the āsavas (D ii 42). The process was apparently repeated, firstly with eighty-four thousand inhabitants of Bandhumatī and then also with eighty-four thousand persons who had gone forth (D ii 42ff). Similarly at D iii 27 the Buddha tells Bhaggava that he set a company of eighty-four thousand free of the great bondage (of the kilesas DA 829) and lifted them out of the great distress (being a name for the four floods (or āsavas) – he lifted them out of these and established them in the fruit of nibbāna – DA 829) by means of these four verbs, whilst at Ud 74 Sāriputta is said to have likewise freed Bhaddiya the Dwarf from the āsavas. That is to say, in this process the individual first has something indicated to him, according to the commentaries the khandhas and so on (SA i 177; cp DA 473) and as though he were face to face with it (AA ii 353). Then he makes him take it up, which the commentaries gloss with the most ambiguous term gaṇhāpesi which might mean many things but here perhaps 'makes him grasp it' in the sense of adopting some practice – DA 473 suggests as much, as does SA i 177 which explains the following term, samuttejesi, in terms of causing there to be born in him the earnestness, or vigour, necessary for the undertaking (samādānamhi ussāhaṁ janeti). It is also a making keen in the sense of encouragement for samuttejeti is derived from saṁ + ud + √tij, √tij meaning (a) to make sharp, with a piercing point as well as (b) to heat up. Thus it is making keen either in the sense of whetting (since one can either whet a knife on a whet-stone or whet the

appetite) or in the sense of making ardent (which can mean both 'burning' and 'eager'). Finally he purifies him (sampahaṁsesi). One would normally suppose sampahaṁseti to be derived from √hṛs and thus to mean 'he makes him bristle with excitement' but the commentaries, in glossing it with vodāpeti (he cleanses him) and with jotāpeti (he makes him shine), clearly understand it to be derived from √ghṛs, 'to grind', 'to polish' (e.g. SA i 177; cp AA ii 353), which is perhaps understandable given the fact that as a result the person concerned is made free of the āsavas.

Finally, we may note that a fifth method whereby the path* was brought to a close was by reviewing Dhamma heard. This was so in the case of Yasa above and also in that of Sāriputta who became freed of the āsavas as he stood behind the Buddha, fanning him, and reflecting upon Dhamma the Buddha had just spoken of to Dīghanakha (M i 501). In this connection it is of interest to recall those instances cited in the first chapter of devas teaching one another Dhamma, whereupon memory of Dhamma previously heard slowly returns and that deva very quickly reaches excellence (A ii 185ff) which the commentary takes as attaining nibbāna (AA iii 170); compare the similar use of this expression at M ii 69 noted earlier.

Before we conclude this discussion it will be of interest to refer briefly to one particularly interesting application of these various methods: the exhortation of sick monks who were about to commit suicide. Of the three recorded cases of monks committing suicide two involved a final teaching before the knife was taken. At S iii 120 Vakkali, who never tired of looking upon the body of the Buddha (cp DhpA iv 118f), received a visit from the Buddha, whereupon he explained that he had long since desired to set eyes on the Buddha but that his weak condition, resulting from his illness, had prevented this. In reply the Buddha points out that there is nothing worthwhile in seeing his putrid (physical) body and that, moreover, anyone who sees Dhamma sees him and vice versa, and this passage is referred to at SA ii 252 in explanation of the epithet of the sāvaka* as 'one who is able to discern who are ariyans*'. Given the circumstances under which the Buddha made this remark, in that it was clearly spoken to Vakkali to comfort him, it may be supposed that the Buddha, in speaking in this way, took it for granted that Vakkali could see Dhamma and was thus a sāvaka*. The Buddha continues by giving Vakkali a discourse on the impermanence of the khandhas and then departs and sometime later Vakkali, having sent word to the Buddha that he has no doubt as regards the khandhas nor any attachment for them, takes the knife and commits suicide (S iii 123). The Buddha subsequently announces that Vakkali is parinibbuto and thus unable to be found by Māra who is at that moment searching for him (S iii 124). Thus

we may say that this episode conforms most precisely to those we have been discussing of one who is a sekha* being taught final Dhamma in the form of a discourse on the impermanence of the khandhas as a result of which he becomes an arahant*, thereby bringing the Brahmacariya* to conclusion. This seems equally true in the case of Channa who claimed that it was because he could see cessation that he did not regard the senses as self and so on and who, having been exhorted with an exhortation, took the knife and committed suicide (M iii 263ff = S iv 55ff). Whilst there is here no record of the Buddha announcing him an arahant* he is nonetheless declared by the Buddha to be blameless (anupavajjaṁ) in the sense that in laying down his body he did not take hold of another (S iv 60). One further case of a monk who was a sāvaka* at the stage of the sekha* who had not yet reached perfection of mind committing suicide and subsequently being declared parinibbuto is that of Godhika but here no record is given of the intervening teaching (S i 121).

Thus the implication of these passages that we have been considering is that just as entrance to the Brahmacariya* was gained upon hearing an oral exposition of the Dhamma, so too was that Brahmacariya* brought to a close by hearing a further teaching on Dhamma in one form or another from the Buddha. In either case those concerned seem to have been passive recipients of these teachings. For just as it seems questionable whether those capable (bhabba) of understanding the Dhamma, or those in possession of the potential of realising the sotāpatti-fruit*, would have gained the path* had it not been for the intervention of the Buddha granting them the Dhammacakkhu*, so too are we made to wonder whether even such fortunate individuals would have been capable of bringing that path* to a close had it not been for this further teaching during which, or as a result of which, arahantship* was attained. That is to say, just as we earlier had cause to note that there seemed no practice by which right view* was to be attained, so now do we find that we are given cause to doubt whether attainment of the goal should be seen as the outcome of any practice connected with the path*, a doubt that is, moreover, strengthened by the apparently extremely short duration of that path*. For as Buddhadāsa has noted:

> These people did not go into the forest and sit, assiduously practising concentration on certain objects in the way described in the later manuals. No organised effort was involved when arahantship* was attained by the first five disciples of the Buddha on hearing the Discourse on Non-selfhood or by the one thousand hermits on hearing the Fire Sermon[1]

Rather it would seem that these two distinct stages in the process of liberation – initial sight of the goal and attainment of that goal – were

equally unthinkable without the intervention of the Buddha with an oral teaching of one sort or another. When this second teaching had been received the goal was won – there was nothing more to be done.

Kammic substrate determines variety of goal won

Or rather, perhaps, we should say that there was nothing more to be done except to undergo expiation of that kamma not already annihilated by the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* since it is clear that becoming an arahant* did not entail immediate release from this obligation. For we have already had cause to note how Aṅgulimāla, subsequent to becoming an arahant*, still had to endure, as three blows on the head, the results of his outstanding kamma. Only then could he experience the bliss of release (M ii 104) and like the theras Saṁkicca (Thag 606) and Sāriputta (Thag 1003) await his time, as a servant his wages. Some it seems did not have to wait very long and we may speculate that the fact that Bāhiya of the Bark Garment happened to be killed by a calf immediately after he had been freed of the āsavas by the Buddha (Ud 8) was no mere accident but necessitated by his outstanding kamma.

In both these cases we may say that these individuals were particularly lucky in that the kammic residue still in need of expiation was of a nature to be experienced in that same life. For there is already in the Nikāyas (e.g. M iii 214; A iii 415; cp GS iii 294 n 3) the germ of a theory that was subsequently developed in the Abhidhamma to the effect that volitions were divisible into seven so-called javana-moments. A deed performed during the first of these javana-moments was known as a diṭṭhadhamma-vedanīya-kamma, or a deed whose results were to be experienced in these seen conditions. A deed performed during the last of these javana-moments was, on the other hand, known as an upapajja-vedanīya-kamma, or a deed whose results were to be experienced upon arising in the next life, whilst a deed performed during any of the five intervening javana-moments was known as an aparāpariya-vedanīya-kamma, or a deed whose results were to be experienced in still later lives. From this it would seem to follow that for anyone to become an arahant* it would have to be the case that any kamma not annihilated by the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* would have to be of a nature to be experienced in that same life. This need not entail that it be of the first of these three varieties, however, since it could just as easily be one of the second variety performed in the immediately preceding life, or indeed one of the third variety performed in some earlier birth. The important point is that if one is to become an arahant* and thus be free of rebirth altogether it will have to be the case that all one's remaining kamma is of a nature to be

experienced before one's death. If, in spite of the Dhammacakkhu*, one remained in possession of a residue of kamma requiring one or more further rebirths for its expiation one clearly could not become an arahant*.

This seems confirmed by the frequently encountered claim that for one following the path* one of two fruits may be expected: either aññā (i.e. arahantship*) in these seen conditions or, if there be substrate remaining, the state of the anāgāmin* (tassa dvinnaṁ phalānaṁ aññataraṁ phalaṁ pāṭikaṅkhaṁ, diṭṭhe va dhamme aññā sati vā upādisese anāgāmitā – e.g. D ii 314: the expression is stock; cp M i 63; S v 129, 181, 236, 285; A v 108; It 39, 40 etc.). These alternatives are to be found expressed in a number of ways but always with the same import. For instance, at A iii 193 it is said that if one should not attain aññā in these seen conditions then one will go quite beyond the company of devas that feeds on solid food and arise in a mind-made body, whilst at A v 301 it is said that the Brahmavihāras conduce to the state of the anāgāmin* for the monk who has not penetrated the utmost (uttariṁ) release. Further elaboration can be found at M i 352, 437, etc. It is important to note that aññā and the state of the anāgāmin* are both called fruits (phalānaṁ) here. That is to say, they are given as alternative goals and that one rather than the other is obtained is said to depend not, as some might have expected, upon the diligence with which one had followed the path* but solely upon the presence of some (kammic) substrate, some remnant of a deed committed whilst still a puthujjana – and quite possibly in a previous life – and thus now completely outside one's control. That this is so is further confirmed by the fact that either fruit is said to be attainable within seven days (D iii 56; cp D ii 315; M i 62f) and the implication is that in either case the goal of the Brahmacariya* was deemed to have been attained. One became an arahant* if, and only if, one was without this (kammic) substrate giving rise to further birth; the difference between him and the anāgāmin* was not one of the degree to which each had progressed along the path* but solely one of the amount of saṁsāric time each had to run before tasting the bliss of release.

Here it may be objected that the anāgāmin* and the arahant* are frequently distinguished upon the grounds that the former is free of five saṁyojanas only and the arahant* of all ten. But such an objection does not take into consideration how such freedom is attained. Even the Nikāyas are not over-sure on this point for at A i 242 it is said that the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* brings the first three saṁyojanas to destruction (which would render him a sotāpanna*) but then adds immediately afterwards that it leaves behind a further two things, coveting (abhijjāya) and malevolence (vyāpādena). In the standard list of the five lower saṁyojanas one always finds the fourth and fifth given as

sensuous desire (kāmacchando) and malevolence (vyāpādo), respectively (e.g. A v 17), but it seems that we are nonetheless intended to understand in this afterthought a reference to these additional saṁyojanas for the sutta concludes that there would then be in that ariyasāvaka* no saṁyojana due to which he might, after death, return again to this world (which would then render him an anāgāmin*). It may be this uncertainty as regards the exact effects of the Dhammacakkhu* that led the commentaries to assert that the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* can herald the arising of the paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* or anāgāmin* (e.g. DA 237). This uncertainty also explains the Buddha's claim at A i 120 that it is not easy to decide which of the three – the saddhāvimutta*, kāyasakkhin* and diṭṭhipatta* [all varieties of sekha* (M i 478f) and often classed with the sotāpanna* (see e.g. Vsm xxi 74ff)] – is the most excellent since any one of the three could be practising for arahantship* and the other two either sakadāgāmins* or anāgāmins*. That is to say, he is claiming that any of the three could be destined to arahantship* with the other two, due to the presence of some kammic substrate requiring further birth, destined to a longer stay within saṁsāra. Put another way, it seems from these passages that the Dhammacakkhu* could destroy either the first three saṁyojanas, when there would be some remaining substrate, or the first five, when one could go on to attain arahantship*, for at A iii 379ff the Buddha explains to Ānanda that if, when dying, the person not wholly freed of the five lower saṁyojanas is taught Dhamma by the Tathāgata, he will as a consequence become so freed; if so freed already he will, on hearing Dhamma from the Tathāgata, enjoy the total destruction of all rebirth.

This is no mere theoretical claim for many instances can be found of the Buddha visiting sick and dying individuals and teaching them Dhamma whereupon they were, after death, said to have become anāgāmins*. Indeed, he had done as much in this same sutta for the monk Phagguna by means of the four verbs (A iii 379ff) just as elsewhere he did the same for the lay-follower Dīghavu with an exhortation in brief (S v 344ff), Ānanda seemingly doing the same for Sirivaḍḍha (S v 176) and Mānadinna (S v 178). Moreover, it seems from the Buddha's criticism of Sāriputta at M ii 195f that Sāriputta could have done as much for the Brahmin Dhānañjāni and that Sāriputta, establishing the dying Dhānañjāni only in the inferior (mundane) Brahmaloka, had departed leaving something further to be done – that is, establishing him in the fruit of the anāgāmin* (cp MLS ii 378 n 1). Thus, whilst the Buddha seems to have discounted the Brāhmaṇic practice of carrying out a man who has died and calling upon him by name in the belief that in so doing they are speeding him heavenwards on the grounds that a man gains rebirth in heaven solely upon the basis of his former good conduct (S iv 311ff), it is

nonetheless clear from the case of Dhānañjāni that talk to the dying could have the effect of establishing them even in the lofty Brahmaloka in spite of their previous deeds since Dhānañjāni had, by his own admission, been guilty of those offences for which a man would be dragged off to hell (M ii 186). Moreover, in his own establishing of individuals in the fruit of the anāgāmin* he too established dying individuals in the supermundane* Brahmaloka and it would seem that in spite of his reservations as regards the efficacy of the Brāhmaṇic practice of exhorting the dead we may well have here with this exhortation of the dying an early proto-type of the Tibetan practice of post-mortem exhortation as found, for instance, in the Tibetan Book of the Dead.

An interesting elaboration of these twin fruits, or goals, of the Brahmacariya* is to be found at several places where a sutta in which these two alternatives are given is coupled with a further sutta in which each alternative is expanded into a number of sub-categories:

1a he attains aññā, in advance, in these seen conditions; if he does not attain aññā, in advance, in these seen conditions, then
1b he attains aññā at the time of dying; if he attains neither aññā, in advance, in these seen conditions nor aññā at the time of dying, then he, through the complete destruction of the five lower saṁyojanas, becomes either:
2a an antarā-parinibbāyin*;
2b an upahacca-parinibbāyin*;
2c an asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*;
2d a sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*; or
2e an uddhaṁsota*, an akaniṭṭhagāmin*

(e.g. S v 236f, 285, 314; the categories *2a–2e* are found passim). The manner in which these seven categories are given here suggests that the order in which they appear is one of the increasing amount of time to which each has to wait before he can taste the bliss of freedom. We shall examine each of these categories in turn.

The precise connotation of the expression diṭṭhe va dhamme, rendered throughout as 'in these seen conditions', has not, to my knowledge, ever been established with any certainty. It is usually explained in the commentaries as 'whilst still in that same existence' (imasmiṁ yeva attabhāve ṭhatvā – AA ii 345 on A i 228 where it was said that Ānanda would parinibbāyati in this way). Whilst most do seem to have become arahants* in these seen conditions, some, as we have seen, also did so at the point of death. Thus the insertion of the term paṭihacca, emendable to paṭikacca/paṭigacca (see KS v 57 n 3 and EV i 209 on Thag 547) and meaning something like 'in advance' or 'previously', may be understood as a gloss on diṭṭhe va dhamme, thereby qualifying the manner of

attainment of aññā in these seen conditions in the first of the two suttas in such a way as to allow the inclusion of a further category, viz. he attains aññā in advance (whilst still) in these seen conditions, or he attains aññā at the time of dying. This has the interesting implication, however, that one in the process of dying was considered to be no longer in these seen conditions.

The practice of elaborating the second of these fruits, or goals, into five classes of anāgāmin* is, as already noted, to be found throughout the Nikāyas. Particularly interesting, however, is their appearance at A iv 70ff where they are, by the addition of a further two varieties of antarā-parinibbāyins*, expanded into a group of seven, all seven being contrasted with the attainment of parinibbāna that is without substrate. That there is no immediately apparent difference between these three varieties of antarā-parinibbāyin* might lead one to wonder whether the list of five had not been artificially expanded merely for the sake of its inclusion in the Book of Sevens.

Some caution in this direction is necessary, however, since not only are there in fact eight categories in all – since the seven are contrasted with attainment of parinibbāna that is without substrate – but also because of the independent appearance of three varieties of antarā-parinirvāyin* in the Śrāvakabhūmi, a Sarvāstivādin work attributed to Asaṅga. It is, of course, possible that Asaṅga could have based his work on some by then extant Pali passage rather than on some Sarvāstivādin, or otherwise, Sanskrit Āgama stemming, like the Pali, from some earlier common source, but this is unlikely given the differences, as we shall see, in the appended similes.

The Aṅguttara passage begins as follows:

> A monk . . . sees with right paññā* that there is a final place (uttariṁ padaṁ), a peace, but is not able, all in all, to realise that place . . . Through the complete destruction of the five lower saṁyojanas he becomes an antarā-parinibbāyin*. Monks, just as from an iron slab, heated and beaten all day, a bit may come off and cool down (nibbāyeyya) – even so, monks, does a monk . . . see with right paññā* that there is a final place, a peace, but is not able, all in all, to realise that place. Through the complete destruction of the five lower saṁyojanas he becomes an antarā-parinibbāyin*

The second and third varieties of antarā-parinibbāyin* differ only in the similes that are attached to them, with no attempt being made to explain why it is that they should so differ. Of the second antarā-parinibbāyin* it is said:

> Through the complete destruction of the five lower saṁyojanas he becomes an antarā-parinibbāyin*. Monks, just as from an iron slab, heated and

> beaten all day, a bit may come off, fly up and cool down – even so, monks, does a monk . . . become an antarā-parinibbāyin*

and of the third:

> Through the complete destruction of the five lower saṁyojanas he becomes an antarā-parinibbāyin*. Monks, just as from an iron slab, heated and beaten all day, a bit may come off, fly up and, before touching the ground, cool down

The commentary on this passage is not very informative: it explains the antarā-parinibbāyin* as 'one who becomes parinibbuto by way of the kilesa-parinibbāna in the interval (etth' antare) commencing immediately upon his arising but without going past the middle of the life-span (of that world)' (AA iv 39) and adds that 'without touching the ground' (anupahacca talaṁ) means 'without touching, without going past, the upper terrace (ākāsatalaṁ), without falling on the ground – it cools down whilst still in the air' (ibid). Elsewhere, however, the commentaries are more explicit and at SA iii 143 = AA ii 350 it is said of the antarā-parinibbāyin* that:

> He who parinibbāyaties without having gone past the mid-point of the life-span (of that world) is of three sorts: one attains arahantship* on the very day he arises, having arisen in the Avihas who are of a life-span of as much as one thousand kappas; if he does not attain this on the day he arises, then he does so at the end of the first hundred kappas – this is the first antarā-parinibbāyin*. Another, thus incapable, attains it at the end of the second hundred kappas – this is the second (antarā-parinibbāyin*). Another, even thus incapable, attains it at the end of the fourth hundred kappas – this is the third antarā-parinibbāyin*

Turning to the Sanskrit tradition we find that these three individuals were understood rather differently as can be seen from the following extract taken from Asaṅga's Śrāvakabhūmi:

> What is the person who attains parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state? There are three persons who attain parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state. The first person who attains parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state is made to fulfil the intermediate state no sooner has he died, at the time of accomplishing the intermediate state. He accomplishes it at exactly the same time and attains parinirvāṇa. For example, a tiny flame of hay arises and immediately cools down.
>
> The second person who attains parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state is made to accomplish the intermediate state and accomplishes it, just staying staying [*sic*] there in the intermediate state and in the intervening time

> attains parinirvāṇa, but where be the state of rebirth (upapattibhava) does not just now head toward that place [*sic*]. For example, just as when iron balls or iron plates are made burning hot by being violently struck with iron hammers, and the mass of sparks from the irons just ascends and cools down. The third person who attains parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state when he accomplishes the intermediate state does head to where is the rebirth state; and having headed there, without being reborn, attains parinirvāṇa. For example, just as when a mass of sparks from the iron ascends and then when falling, not quite reaching the earth, cools down. When one takes these three antarāparinirvāyin* persons together, the expression 'person who attains parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state' is used[2]

Whilst one may agree with Wayman's rendering of antarābhavam as 'the intermediate state' it is surely begging the question to render antarāparinirvāyin* as 'one who attains parinirvāṇa in the intermediate state'. Certainly this is in keeping with the spirit of Asaṅga's subsequent commentary but antarāparinirvāyin*, like antarā-parinibbāyin*, means only 'one who parinirvāyaties in the interval (or in between)'. We simply do not know between what such attainment was originally supposed to lie. For whilst the category of the antarā-parinibbāyin*/ antarāparinirvāyin* is common to both the Pali and Sanskrit traditions, each gives it a radically different interpretation: the Theravāda as one who parinibbāyaties in the interval, or by the middle, in the sense that he does so following rebirth in, but before reaching the middle of the life-span usually associated with those of, the Avihas; whilst Asaṅga as one who attains parinirvāṇa in the interval between death and rebirth, that is to say, before any such rebirth has taken place. In short, the dispute centres upon the question of the existence of an intermediate state.

It has long been believed in India that there is, between death and rebirth, a period of varying duration, often between seven and seven times seven days, but sometimes longer, during which the 'soul' of the deceased roams about awaiting rebirth. It is during this period that the departed needs to be sustained by sacrificial offerings given on his behalf by his still-living relatives. Should the latter fail in this duty the departed may well attempt to capture their attention by creating domestic havoc, such as urinating about the house or causing disturbances similar to those which the West attributes to the poltergeist.[3] Such a belief may be found at A v 269ff where the brahmin Jāṇussoṇi tells the Buddha that the brahmins perform the śrāddhā rites on behalf of the departed, although it is open to question whether by 'departed' (petānaṁ) Jāṇussoṇi had in mind the preta- or pitṛ-stage in the career of the deceased since both Sanskrit preta and pitṛ coalesce into Pali peta. If it is uncertain whether Jāṇussoṇi was referring to the intermediate stage of the preta or the

subsequent stage of the pitṛ in the world beyond, there can be no doubt that the concept of an intermediate state was known during the period of the Abhidhamma, for the Kathāvatthu lays down, in answer to the assertion of such a state from, according to the commentary, the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas and so on, what was to become the orthodox Theravādin denial of any such state.

The commentary claims that the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas came to such a view by their careless acceptance of the sutta-phrase antarā-parinibbāyin*, a charge they would no doubt have later levelled at Asaṅga, and one may feel a certain amount of sympathy with their reasons for refusing to accept the existence of a state intermediate between death and rebirth (Points of Controversy p. 212f):

> If there be such a state, you must identify it with either the kāmabhava, rūpabhava or arūpabhava, which you refuse to do . . . You deny that there is an intermediate state between the first and second, or the second and third of these . . . You affirm indeed there is no such thing; how then can you maintain your position?
>
> Is it a fifth matrix (yoni), a sixth destiny (gati), an eighth station for reborn consciousness (viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo), a tenth realm of beings (sattāvāso)? Is it a mode of living, a destiny, a realm of beings, a renewal of life, a matrix, a station of consciousness, an acquiring of individuality? Is there kamma leading to it? Are there beings who approach thither? Do beings get born into it, grow old, die in it, decease from it, and get reborn from it? Do the five aggregates (khandhas) exist in it? Is it a five-mode existence (pañcavokārabhave)? All this you deny. How then can you maintain your proposition?

By a series of such moves the Theravādins demonstrate to their opponents that there is no room for any intermediate state (antarābhava) within the categories which it seems both parties agree constitute all that is. Where indeed could the antarābhava be thought to exist and how, moreover, could the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas have arrived at such an absurd position? – to which they reply, of course, citing the figure of the antarā-parinibbāyin* spoken of by the Lord. Here we come to the crux of the matter for the Theravādins reply by asking 'Granted that there are antarā-parinibbāyin* individuals but is there an antarābhava?' (antarāparinibbāyī puggale atthī ti katvā atthi antarābhave ti), for on this basis they would, to be consistent, have to assert the existence of an upahacca-state (upahaccabhava) corresponding to the upahacca-parinibbāyin*, and so on, for all the first four classes of anāgāmin*, to which it seems, according to the Kathāvatthu at least, that the Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas had no reply.

In what may have been an attempt to reduce, if not entirely heal, this

difference of opinion Wayman suggests that the three classes of antarāparinirvāyin* are really means of referring to the death, gestation and birth stages of the rebirth process:

> Upon inspection of the three kinds of antarāparinirvāyin* as Asaṅga states them, we find it is actually only the second one that has an antarābhava not accepted by the opponents of such a state. This is because all the Indian Buddhist sects agreed that there is a death state followed by a rebirth state within the womb (in the case of human birth), and therefore would not deny the antarābhavas which coincide with the death and rebirth states. But they would likely ask, 'Then why use the expression "intermediate state" in these cases?'[4]

It is doubtful that this is all that they would ask: they would surely question the equation of the first of the antarāparinirvāyins* with the death state since in the Nikāyas at least there is, as we have seen, a clear distinction made between the antarā-parinibbāyin* and the person attaining aññā at the time of dying. Secondly, and as Wayman himself notes, such an interpretation would hold only in the case of human birth whereas the antarā-parinibbāyin*, if reborn anywhere, is reborn, like all anāgāmins*, in the topmost worlds of the rūpāvacara, such as the Avihas mentioned above, where the method of generation is anything but that of the human world. Moreover, such an interpretation would leave still unresolved the problem of the second of the three antarāparinirvāyins* which, as Wayman admits, would not be accepted by opponents of the antarābhava as an intermediate state. On occasion those proposing the existence of an intermediate state including, it may be noted, Wayman himself,[5] have sought independent support in the figure of the gandhabba which, when not denoting a variety of heavenly musician (e.g. D ii 263ff), seems to mean that being about to come into the womb which makes conception possible (M i 265f, ii 156f; cp MLS i 321 n 6) – thus, perhaps, Wayman's equation of the second antarāparinirvāyin* with the gestation period. From a Buddhist point of view it is clear that rebirth, strictly speaking, takes place at conception, rather than at the actual, physical birth some nine months later and that the unborn child is nonetheless an already 'reborn' individual. Given that this is so we not only lose the distinction between the gestation period and physical rebirth suggested by Wayman as, respectively, the second and third kinds of antarāparinirvāyin* – we also lose the support we thought we had in the figure of the gandhabba as independent evidence for the existence of an intermediate state. The fact that the presence of the gandhabba makes conception, and thus rebirth, possible entails that any intermediate state, if such there has been, is now concluded; it cannot guarantee

that that there has been existence in the intermediate state. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Tibetan Book of the Dead divides the intermediate state into three bar.dos, or stages, which might well coincide with the three kinds of antarāparinirvāyin*. The first antarāparinirvāyin* might then be seen as attaining parinirvāṇa during the first bar.do, the second in the second bar.do and the third in the third bar.do – which seems implied by Asaṅga's explanation. It is only at the very end of the third, or sid.pa, bar.do that we encounter the being seeking rebirth, or in other words, the gandhabba.

How then might we decide between the Theravādin and the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the antarā-parinibbāyin*? It is likely that no conclusive evidence can be found – but certain considerations suggest that the Sarvāstivādin is the more probable. First, whilst one may feel sympathetic with the difficulty of the Theravādins to reconcile the existence of an intermediate state with many of their other doctrines, there is, to my knowledge, nothing in the Nikāyas explicitly against it. Rather the reverse obtains for in the Aṅguttara Nikāya we find distinguished three classes of saṁyojana: the (a) orambhāgiyāni saṁyojanāni; (b) uppattipaṭilābhikāni saṁyojanāni; and (c) bhavapaṭilābhikāni saṁyojanāni (A ii 133f). The sakadāgāmin* is said to be free of none, the uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin* free of (a), the antarā-parinibbāyin* free of (a) and (b), whilst the arahant* free of all three. Since the anāgāmin* is, throughout the Nikāyas, portrayed as free of (a), it is not surprising that the uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin* and antarā-parinibbāyin*, as varieties of anāgāmin*, should be said to be free of these saṁyojanas in this sutta too. Nor is it surprising that the saṁyojana-free arahant* should be said to be free of all three. The difficulty lies rather in determining the precise difference between (b) the saṁyojanas that give rise to rebirth (uppatti-) and (c) the saṁyojanas that give rise to becoming (bhava-), since one might suppose, prima facie, that for the Buddhist rebirth and becoming usually amount to much the same thing. The commentary (AA iii 130f) is, as far as I can see, of no help here. Nonetheless, we may say that in general the scope of bhava is rather wider than that of uppatti since the former is applicable to all twelve stages of the paṭiccasamuppāda, the latter to only one. That is to say, one can, throughout the whole of one's lifetime, be aptly described as being in the process of becoming (bhava) but not, strictly speaking, in the process of rebirth (uppatti). Since we have good reason to suppose that the antarā-parinibbāyin*, being placed after the one who attains aññā at the time of dying, does whatever it is that he does after death, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that after death he continues to become without being reborn. It is therefore of great interest to find that the Prajñāpāramitā makes reference to:

> the saint who attains Nirvana in an intermediary state of existence, between the world of sense-desire and that of pure form. He has forsaken the fetters which bind him to a future rebirth in the world of form, but not to those which lead to his reproduction in the existence intermediary between this sphere and that of sense-desire. Whilst he is reproducing himself there, he comes face to face with the Path and thereby reaches the end of Ill[6]

Thus whilst we find in the Nikāyas no explicit reference to an intermediate state – except perhaps in the figure of the antarā-parinibbāyin* – it could well be that such a state was presupposed in this apparent assertion that one could continue to become without being reborn. Secondly, it would seem no more easy to reconcile the commentarial explanation of the antarā-parinibbāyin* as one reborn in the Avihas with this explicit canonical assertion that he is free of the saṁyojanas that give rise to rebirth than it is to reconcile the vast amount of saṁsāric time that the commentary claims the antarā-parinibbāyin* spends in those Avihas awaiting arahantship* with the brevity with which the bit of iron cools down in the canonical simile. Indeed, in spite of the difference in examples, it is on these similes that the Pali and Sanskrit traditions most agree:

Aṅguttara	*Śrāvakabhūmi*
Just as from an iron slab, heated and beaten all day,	
1 a bit may come off and cool down	1 a tiny flame of hay arises and immediately cools down
2 a bit may come off, fly up and cool down	2 when iron balls or iron plates are made burning hot by being violently struck with iron hammers and the mass of sparks from the irons just ascends and cools down
3 a bit may come off, fly up and, before touching the ground, cool down	3 when a mass of sparks from the iron ascends and then when falling, not quite reaching the earth, cools down

That is to say, in the first case the bit of iron, or the tiny flame of hay, cools down no sooner than it has arisen; in the second case the bit of iron, or the mass of sparks, cools down after flying up into the air; whilst in the third case they not only fly up into the air but also fall towards the ground, cooling down just before landing. Such vivid imagery is hardly reflected in the Pali commentarial explanation in terms of these three individuals attaining arahantship*, or cooling down, after spells of one, two and four hundred kappas, respectively.

Finally, we may cite the evidence of the next class of anāgāmin*, the upahacca-parinibbāyin*, for whereas the third antarā-parinibbāyin* is said to cool down before touching the ground (anupahacca-talaṁ) – paralleled in the Śrāvakbhūmi by 'not quite reaching the earth (pṛthivyām apatitā eva) – the upahacca-parinibbāyin* is likened to a bit from an iron slab, heated and beaten all day, that comes off, flies up and, after touching the ground (upahacca talaṁ), cools down, which AA iv 39 explains by saying that it 'does go past the upper terrace (ākāsatalaṁ), touches the earth's surface (paṭhavitalaṁ) and cools down as soon as it has fallen to the earth'. Other commentaries explain the upahacca-parinibbāyin* as one who attains arahantship* after five hundred kappas in the Avihas where the life-span is one thousand kappas (SA iii 143; AA ii 350). That is to say, whereas the antarā-parinibbāyin* is said to attain arahantship* before reaching the middle (antarā) of the life-span in that world (āyuvemajjhaṁ anatikkamitvā), that is, before five hundred kappas have elapsed, the upahacca-parinibbāyin* is said to do so only after that mid-point has passed – and indeed at one place atikkamitvā appears as a gloss on upahacca (majjhaṁ upahacca atikkamitvā – DA 1029). It is this, no doubt, that has led most translators to render upahacca-parinibbāyin* as 'one who wins release by a reduction of his allotted time' (KS v 57) or as 'one who becomes completely cool after lessening his period' (GS iv 9, 41), although one might feel that if anything the antarā-parinibbāyin* were more worthy of such an epithet, since his time is even less. Concerning the upahacca-parinibbāyin* the Kathāvatthu records that the Uttarāpathakas, though denying that one could become a sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* or anāgāmin* at birth, nonetheless maintained that at the very outset of reborn consciousness one might become an arahant* (Kvu iv 2ff). They are further portrayed as denying that in such cases the last act of consciousness at death was realisation of the arahant-path* followed immediately, as the first act of reborn consciousness upon rebirth, by the fruition of that path* – the only grounds, it may be noted, upon which the Theravāda, as opponents of the intermediate state, might have countenanced such a claim. The Theravādin attempt at a refutation of this view is not very convincing for they charge the Uttarāpathakas as follows:

> And you can name none – not even the greatest – who were arahants* from the time of birth – Sāriputta, or the Great Theras: Moggallāna, Kassapa, Kaccāyana, Koṭṭhika or Panthaka – you deny it, in fact, of all of them

It is extremely doubtful whether the Uttarāpathakas, or anyone else for that matter, would have seriously suggested that such were the case as regards those whom everyone knew had become arahants* relatively late

in life and during the Buddha's ministry. Rather they would have had in mind someone who, failing through some kammic substrate to attain aññā either in advance in these seen conditions or at the time of dying, might nonetheless parinibbāyati immediately he was reborn – and reborn, moreover, as an upahacca-parinibbāyin* in the Brahmaloka rather than in the world of men. In so doing they would not have been wavering from the commentarial tradition which, as we have seen, held that this could indeed be the fate of the antarā-parinibbāyin* who could attain arahantship* on the very day that he arises. The commentary on the Kathāvatthu claims that they had been misled into holding such a position through their having carelessly converted upahacca into uppajja (and cp PED sv upahacca which refers to 'a very early confusion with upapacca > upapajja > uppajja as indicated by the BSk. upapadya-parinirvāyin'). Such carelessness, it may be noted, was not restricted to the Uttarāpathakas since the Mahāyāna generally lists an upapadya-/upapādya-parinirvāyin* in place of the upahacca-parinibbāyin* of the Pali sources; and whilst Wayman remarks, somewhat curiously, that 'Vasubandhu appears to argue that in such a case, we could say that the upapadya-parinirvāyin* means one who attains parinirvāṇa upon being born in a Brahma world, which is of course absurd',[7] it was just such a view that was entertained by both the Prajñāpāramitā[8] and the Mahāyāna.[9] Indeed, given the fact that anupahacca talaṁ is not only glossed on occasion by bhūmiṁ appatvā in the Pali sources (e.g. AA iv 39), just as is talaṁ by paṭhavitalaṁ (e.g. AA iv 39), but also paralleled in the Śrāvakabhūmi by the expression pṛthivyām apatitā eva, one might suspect that the Uttarāpathakas were preserving a more authoritative tradition and that the proximity of anupahacca talaṁ in the simile describing the third antarā-parinibbāyin*, and of upahacca talaṁ in the present case, had instead infected the reading of what had probably once been upapajja-parinibbāyin*.

It will be remembered that here we are dealing with an elaboration of the twin fruits of the Brahmacariya* arranged, as is clear from the appended similes, in terms of an ever increasing distance from final liberation. Thus the arahant* attains such liberation either in advance in these seen conditions or, if not, then certainly by the time of dying. The antarā-parinibbāyins*, on the other hand, free of rebirth but not of becoming, continue to become in the intermediate state until they parinibbāyati. The first does this in the briefest possible time as might a spark come off a red iron slab and immediately cool down. The second takes a little longer as does the spark that flies up into the air before cooling down; whilst the third takes a bit longer still, as does the spark that flies up into the air and then falls towards the ground, cooling down just before touching the ground. The next member of this

progression is the upahacca-parinibbāyin* who takes longer still, as does the spark that flies up, falls to the ground and cools down immediately after touching the ground. He parinibbāyaties upon conclusion of the intermediate state, upapādya- upon being reborn. As Asaṅga might have said:

> He accomplishes the intermediate state, does head towards the rebirth process and, having headed there, attains parinirvāṇa upon being reborn

It is, in short, at the stage of the gandhabba that the upahacca-parinibbāyin* finds release.

That these classes of anāgāmin* are arranged in terms of an increasing amount of saṁsāric time that has to be endured before the bliss of release can be tasted is further borne out by the next two categories – those of the asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* and the sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*. These two categories seem to have caused translators even more perplexity than those so far considered, for we find the terms asaṅkhāra/sasaṅkhāra interpreted variously as 'without much toil/with toil' (Dial iii 227 where the translation contains unacknowledged interpolations from the commentary), 'without much trouble/with some trouble' (KS v 57, 177, 212; cp GS i 213), 'without (kammic) residue/with some residue' (GS iv 9, 41, 100, 253), 'unprompted by determination/prompted by determination' (Minor Readings and Illustrator 199), 'without prompting/with prompting' (Path of Purification 834), and so on. In the Sanskrit sources they usually appear as anabhisaṁskāra and sābhisaṁskāra, respectively, which Edgerton takes as meaning 'without proper mental preparation' (BHSD sv anabhisaṁskāra) and 'after proper mental preparation' (BHSD sv sābhisaṁskāra) but without suggesting how parinirvāṇa could be attainable without proper mental preparation. The Pali commentaries usually explain asaṅkhāra and sasaṅkhāra in such contexts as appayogena and sappayogena (SA iii 143f; AA ii 350) which it seems are to be understood as 'without effort' and 'with effort' given their occurrence elsewhere where it is said that the asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* reaches arahantship* with ease, not getting tired, and without effort (appayogena akilamanto sukhena patto – DA 1030), whereas the sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* does it with difficulty, getting tired, and with effort (sappayogena kilamanto dukkhena patto – DA 1030). These explanations apparently caused Woodward some confusion for at KS v 57 he notes: 'Asaṅkhāra, lit. without saṅkhāra, activities or aggregates (? without a residue of karma); but according to Comy. appayogena, without effort (cf. Dial iii 227); but it would seem to be more like an-upādi-sesa-nibbāna' (n 6). It is doubtful that it is anupādisesa-nibbāna, however, since it is the possession of some remaining substrate (upādisesa) that distinguishes all these various anāgāmins* from those who attain aññā

(cp A iv 379f where it is said that they all die in possession of this substrate – sa-upādisesā kālaṁ kurumānā). At the same time one can understand Woodward's difficulties with these terms, especially when the commentaries gloss saṅkhāra – a difficult term at the best of times with a wide range of meaning – with a term like payoga which itself admits of many shades of meaning. Nor does the preference for abhisaṁskāra in the Sanskrit sources provide much assistance since abhisaṅkhāra is itself glossed with payoga in the Pali commentaries, as at for instance AA ii 181 on A i 112 where the context is that of a wheel continuing to roll as long as the impulse (abhisaṅkhāra) that set it going lasted.

The fact that abhisaṅkhāra can have this meaning of 'impulse' should cause us to look more closely at Nyāṇamoli's understanding of asaṅkhāra/sasaṅkhāra as 'without prompting/with prompting'. Nyāṇatiloka also comes close to this when he says that 'Sankhāra means also sometimes "volitional effort", e.g. in . . . the Abhidhamma terms asaṅkhārika- and sasaṅkhārika-citta, i.e. without effort = spontaneously, and with effort = prompted'.[10] Thus we might suspect that we had in the categories of the asaṅkhāra- and sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyins* those who parinibbāyatied spontaneously, without prompting from some external source, and those who did so only as a result of such prompting. Here we may recall those instances, referred to earlier, of devas teaching one another Dhamma, or of opapātikas* (i.e. anāgāmins*) teaching one another Dhamma, with the result that in each case, though the memory of Dhamma heard is slow to arise, they nonetheless very quickly reach excellence, that is, nibbāna (visesagāmī = nibbānagāmī – AA iii 170).

Thus whilst we do not find examples of anāgāmins* who parinibbāyatied without such prompting, this need not imply that this was not the case – perhaps even the rule – with anāgāmins*. Moreover, one might further suppose that those who required such prompting tended to remain in saṁsāra somewhat longer, since they were dependent upon the presence of someone capable of stirring their memories. The similes appended to these two classes of anāgāmin* suggest just this: the asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* is likened to a bit coming off an iron slab, heated and beaten all day, that flies up and then falls on some small heap of grass, some small heap of sticks, and kindles fire, kindles smoke and, having consumed that small heap, then cools down from want of fuel (anāhārā), the sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* doing the same except that he kindles a larger heap of grass and sticks. Now grass (tiṇa) and sticks (kaṭṭha) are frequently used to refer, metaphorically, to the khandhas: one should not regard the khandhas as one's self any more than one should think of a man gathering, burning or doing what he please with all the grass, sticks,

branches and stalks in the Jeta Grove that he were gathering, burning or doing what he pleased with one's self (S iii 34). Similarly, just as a fire goes out through want of fuel (anāhāro) in the form of grass and sticks, so is the Tathāgata liberated through want of the khandhas (M i 487), whilst the khandhas are themselves elsewhere called a mass of burning embers (S iii 177; cp S i 209). Thus we are no doubt intended to understand these similes as metaphorical accounts of the extent to which each of these anāgāmins* becomes involved with new khandhas after death. The three antarā-parinibbāyins* continue to exist or to become after death for a brief period and then cool down (parinibbāyati). They cool down before touching the ground and do not therefore come into contact with any grass or twigs, that is, khandhas, which must surely be yet further reason for supposing that they parinibbāyati in the intermediate state. The upahacca-parinibbāyin*, on the other hand, does touch the ground but cools down immediately, that is, just as he comes into contact with, or is about to come into contact with, new khandhas. The asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* and the sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* set light to grass and twigs and they do become involved with new khandhas, the latter to a greater extent than the former. However, the extent to which either becomes involved with the khandhas is minute compared with that of the uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin* who is likened to a similar bit of iron falling on a large heap of grass and sticks, kindling and consuming them, and then also setting fire to the shrubland and woodland before cooling down for want of fuel. The commentaries explain him as one who arises in the Avihas, the lowest of the five Pure Abodes, and who arises in each of these Pure Abodes, remaining in each of them for the full life-span appropriate to each, before finally attaining parinibbāna in the topmost Akaniṭṭha realm (DA 1030 ≏ AA ii 350; cp SA iii 114; AA iv 7), from which can be seen the vast amount of fuel, or khandhas, with which he becomes involved prior to cooling down.

It would be easy to fall into the error of assuming that the reason for the differences between these various classes of anāgāmins* lay in the extent to which each had progressed, or still had to progress, along the path*, the antarā-parinibbāyin* being more accomplished spiritually than the upahacca-parinibbāyin*, and so on. Yet, as we have seen, no distinction on these grounds is made in the sutta in question which instead depicts them as all equally accomplished. Nor is there anywhere else in the Nikāyas, to my knowledge, any passage which distinguishes the various classes of anāgāmins* on such grounds, save in the case of the saṁyojanas giving rise to becoming and rebirth noted above – and even here we should bear in mind that freedom from the saṁyojanas, in any case, came about through hearing Dhamma, not from pursuing this or that aspect of the path*. Indeed, it is not on the grounds of accomplishment that they

are distinguished at all, for they are all said to have already attained the fruit, or goal, of the Brahmacariya*, and are rather, in the sutta in question, as a group distinguished from the arahant* who attains parinibbāna that is without substrate (anupāda). This is in turn in keeping with their being distinguished elsewhere from those attaining aññā either in advance in these seen conditions or at the time of dying. The reason for this distinction is given, quite explicitly, as there being some remaining substrate (sati upādisese) or that they are in possession of such a substrate (sa-upādisesa), some residue of that type of kamma that will require one or more future births for its expiation.[11] As Nyāṇamoli has pointed out, the expression sa-upādisesa seems originally to have been a medical term meaning a residue of poison still clinging to the wound after treatment (Minor Readings and Illustrator p. 214 n 50), which would admirably explain its use in the case of the residue of poison, or kamma, still remaining after the majority had been removed during treatment, upon the acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*. Upādi is also the compound form of upādāna which as ninth factor of the paṭiccasamuppāda gives rise to its tenth factor, becoming (D ii 31, 58), of which, as we have seen, only the arahant* is free. Thus the only grounds upon which these various classes of anāgāmins* are distinguished from the arahant* is that they, unlike the arahant*, are destined to parinibbāyati after death. When they will do so depends entirely upon the size of this kammic residue for it is this that determines the extent to which each becomes further involved with the khandhas. Since such anāgāmins* are also said to be free of rebirth in the vinipāta (e.g. A iv 379ff; cp S v 375ff, 378ff) – as are, of course, all sāvakas* – and since they always arise in the lofty regions of the rūpāvacara, usually the Pure Abodes, it follows that the kammic residue requiring expiation must be of a highly meritorious form. Louis de la Vallée Poussin has suggested that 'Les Anāgāmins sont évidemment rangés dans l'ordre décroissant du mérite, dans l'ordre croissant de la durée de vie dans le Rūpadhātu'.[12] Rather, it is the other way around: those who attain aññā in these seen conditions have less of a kammic residue to expiate than those doing so only at the time of dying but both are fortunate, compared to the anāgāmins*, in that the kamma left unaffected by the Dhammacakkhu* is of a nature to be experienced during that same lifetime. Similarly, the residue of merit of the antarāparinibbāyin*, being already exhausted before the intermediate state is completed, is but a mere fragment compared with the increasingly larger substrate of the remaining anāgāmins*.[13] They have all arrived at the door to the Deathless* but a past good deed keeps some waiting rather longer than others.

These classes of anāgāmin* are not the only sāvakas* to die sa-upādisesa for in this they are joined by the sakadāgāmin*, ekabījin*,

kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama*, all of whom are altogether freed (from rebirth) in hell, in the animal-womb, on the peta-plane and in any of the four states of loss, in any bad destiny or in the downfall (nava yime Sāriputta puggalā sa-upādisesā kālaṁ kurumānā parimuttā nirayā parimuttā tiracchānayoniyā parimuttā pittivisayā parimuttā apāyaduggativinipātā – A iv 379; cp S v 375ff, 378ff). Thus we find that the ariyasaṅgha* really admits of at least ten varieties of sāvaka*:

1 the arahant* whether he attains aññā in advance in these seen conditions or at the time of dying;
2 the antarā-parinibbāyin* of whom three varieties are sometimes distinguished;
3 the upahacca-parinibbāyin*;
4 the asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*;
5 the sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*;
6 the uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin*;
7 the sakadāgāmin*;
8 the ekabījin*;
9 the kolaṅkola*;
10 the sattakkhattuparama*.

Apart from the arahant* all die sa-upādisesa but are spared rebirth as anything other than as a man or as a deva. Though in each case the fruit, or the goal, of the Brahmacariya* is deemed won, five come to rest here and five after leaving here (pañcannaṁ idha niṭṭhā, pañcannaṁ idha vihāya niṭṭhā) (A v 119f):

	Here		*After leaving here*
1	arahant*	2	antarā-parinibbāyin*
7	sakadāgāmin*	3	upahacca-parinibbāyin*
8	ekabījin*	4	asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*
9	kolaṅkola*	5	sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*
10	sattakkhattuparama*	6	uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin*

and an examination of the fates awaiting those who come to rest here suggests that categories 7–10 are as much an elaboration of the concept of attaining aññā in these seen conditions as 2–6 were an elaboration of the concept of the state of the anāgāmin*.

Whilst the primary sense of the expression diṭṭhe va dhamme, in these seen conditions, is temporal in that it is usually used in contrast to samparāyika, belonging to the future, its connotation may also extend so as to include the whole of the kāmāvacara and in contrast with other, unseen conditions such as those pertaining in the Brahmaloka. Certainly, the scope of the term idha, here, at A v 119f so extends since all those coming to rest 'here' do so in one or another realm of the kāmāvacara, just

as all those coming to rest 'after leaving here' do so, with the possible exception of the antarā-parinibbāyin*, in one or another realm of the rūpāvacara, or Brahmaloka. Thus we find it the destiny of the sakadāgāmin* to return but once to this world and then make an end of dukkha (sakid eva imaṁ lokaṁ āgantvā dukkhass' antaṁ karoti – e.g. A iv 380). The commentaries are sharply divided upon the scope of imaṁ lokaṁ, to this world, in spite of their being supposed the work of the single hand of Buddhaghosa. DA 543f = SA iii 282 states that 'to this world' is said with reference to the kāmāvacara-world; if one attains the sakadāgāmin-fruit* amongst men, one will realise arahantship* after arising amongst the devas, or, if this is not possible, then one will certainly realise it after having returned to the world of men. If, on the other hand, one attains the sakadāgāmin-fruit* amongst the devas, one will realise arahantship* if one subsequently arises amongst men, whilst if this is not possible, then one will certainly realise it after going (?back) to the deva world. MA i 163 ≏ PuggA 197f asserts instead that the sakadāgāmin* is one who comes back but once, by way of rebirth, to this world of men and goes on to assert that four possible contenders are not included in the category of the sakadāgāmin*: (1) one who cultivates the sakadāgāmin-path* here and who parinibbāties right here; (2) one who cultivates the sakadāgāmin-path* here and who parinibbāties after having arisen amongst the devas; (3) one who cultivates that path* amongst the devas and who parinibbāties right there; and (4) one who cultivates that path* amongst the devas and who parinibbāties after arising here in the world of men. Rather, the only person included by the category of the sakadāgāmin* is the one who cultivates that path* here and who arises in the deva world, remaining there for the full life-span appropriate to that world, before arising here once again and then parinibbāti-ing. There is, it would seem, nothing in the Nikāyas that would decide this issue one way or the other. In the Janavasabha Sutta (D ii 217f) Sanaṁkumāra Brahmā addresses the Tāvatiṁsa devas telling them that there are within their ranks both sotāpannas* and sakadāgāmins* as well as countless others who are on the side of merit, puññābhāgā (whom DA 646 quite wrongly takes to be anāgāmins*). Elsewhere, as already noted earlier, reference is made to two laymen, Purāṇa and Isidatta, who are said to have arisen as sakadāgāmins* in the Tusita abode (A iii 348) but no further information as to their ultimate fate is given. These two references to the sakadāgāmin* seem to be the only ones occurring outside its stereotyped formulae in which it usually occurs alongside other members of the ariyasaṅgha*. Indeed, the sakadāgāmin* is a shadowy figure at the best of times, the problem of his obscurity being made all the worse by there being, prima facie, no difference between him and the next category of sāvaka*, that of the ekabījin*, who is said to make an end of

dukkha after generating just one human existence (ekaṁ yeva mānusakaṁ bhavaṁ nibbattetvā dukhass' antaṁ karoti – e.g. A iv 380f). AA ii 349 explains that he is a 'one-seeder' (ekabījin) since he possesses the seed of just one (further) existence, just as SA iii 238 states that he gives birth to just one more existence and then attains arahantship*. PuggA 196, on the other hand, claims that whilst the canonical description mentions only human existence, it is nonetheless quite proper to say that he also generates existence as a deva. On the basis of PuggA there would seem to be no difference between the ekabījin* and the first and third varieties of sakadāgāmin* given at DA 543f = SA iii 282. PuggA, of course, disagrees with this account of the sakadāgāmin*, arguing that the sakadāgāmin* arises in the deva world, remains there for the full life-span and then returns to the world of men where he parinibbāties. For it is this, claims PuggA 198, that distinguishes the sakadāgāmin* from the ekabījin*, since the former is reborn twice, the latter only once. Such a distinction, however, clearly makes the sakadāgāmin* seem further from liberation than the ekabījin* which conflicts with the pattern, conformed with by the other categories, of an increasing amount of outstanding saṁsāric time and this may, in part, explain the commentarial unease with these two individuals. Such unease may also be due to the fact that when Theravādin orthodoxy came to look upon the paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant* as stages of the path* rather than as alternative goals of that path* it was always with that of the sotāpanna* that the ekabījin* was identified (Kvu xii 6).

It might have made for more consistency had the ekabījin* been ranked above that of the sakadāgāmin* for then we would have had the ekabījin*, unlike the arahant*, requiring one further birth and the sakadāgāmin* possibly one but at most two. These would then be followed, in turn, by the kolaṅkola* who was required to take birth in two or three clans of good standing (although really up to six according to SA iii 238, AA ii 349 and PuggA 196) and finally by the sattakkhattuparama* who had to take birth amongst devas and men for at most seven times before making an end of dukkha (e.g. A i 235). That the ekabījin* came instead to be classed with the kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* – and thus with the sotāpanna* – may be due to a number of similes purporting to illustrate the benefits of gaining the Dhammacakkhu*. It will be recalled that a series of parallel suttas tells us that (S ii 134; cp S v 458):

> For the ariyasāvaka* possessing (right) view*, for the person possessing understanding*, this is quite the greater dukkha, this that has been destroyed, has been put to an end, whilst that which remains is infinitely small and does not amount to one hundredth, does not amount to one thousandth,

> does not amount to one hundred thousandth, when set beside the former mass of dukkha that has been destroyed, has been put to an end – that is, at most a term of seven (births): so great a good is (it to have) insight* into Dhamma, so great a good is it to acquire the Dhammacakkhu*

The infinitesimal nature of this outstanding dukkha is illustrated in a number of similes that precede the above passage. It is:

- *a* like the little dust on the tip of the Lord's finger-nail set beside the mighty earth;
- *b* like the water drawn on the tip of a blade of grass from a lotus pond of a capacity of fifty cubic yojanas;

or:

- *c* like two to three drops of water drawn from the confluence of the Ganges, Yamunā, Aciravatī, Sarabhū and Mahī rivers;
- *d* like two to three drops of water drawn from the mighty ocean;

or:

- *e* like seven small balls of clay set beside the mighty earth;
- *f* seven grains of gravel set beside the Himālaya;
- *g* seven grains of gravel set beside Mount Sineru.

It is easy to see a correlation here between the ekabījin* and similes *a–b*, the kolaṅkola* and similes *c–d*, and the sattakkhattuparama* and similes *e–g*. Whether or not these three categories were known when these suttas came to be composed is impossible to tell since except in the case of *a* at S ii 133f and *b* at S ii 134 the paragraph quoted above, extolling the virtue of acquiring the Dhammacakkhu*, is so abbreviated that it is impossible to tell whether in the later suttas the term sattakkhattuṁ paramatā, at most a term of seven (births), continued to appear throughout, or whether this might on occasion have been substituted by terms better suited to the similes. However, it is perhaps more probable that the term sattakkhattuṁ paramatā was common to all, since this was a maximum expectation, not a required number, of future births and that at some later occasion the categories of the ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* were coined as abstractions based upon the above similes. Since it was generally felt that acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* resulted in one's becoming a sotāpanna* it was natural that these three categories should be ranked with the sotāpanna*, in spite of the apparent anomaly of the ekabījin* vis-a-vis the sakadāgāmin* to which this gave rise.

Thus we may conclude that the sakadāgāmin*, ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* are to be understood, like the various classes of anāgāmin*, as arranged in terms of the increasing amount of saṁsāric time that had to be endured before they came to rest and that they are, moreover, an elaboration of the concept of attaining aññā in these seen conditions. This is summarised in Table 3.

Table 3. *Summary of the Fates of the Ten Varieties of Sāvaka**

Future births	Here	After leaving here
0	Aññā in advance Aññā at death	
	Intermediate state	Antarā-parinibbāyin*
		Upahacca-parinibbāyin*
1	Ekabījin*	Asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* Sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*
2	kolaṅkola* (2–3)	
3		
4	(commentaries) (to 6)	
5		Uddha ṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin*
6		
7	sattakkhattuparama*	

Since the ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* are all identified with the sotāpanna* and the categories of the antarā-parinibbāyin*, and so on, merely classes of anāgāmin*, it will be clear that we have here in this tenfold grouping what is nothing more than an elaboration of the fourfold sāvakasaṅgha* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant*. How the originally twin fruits of the Brahmacariya* came to be seen as first fourfold and later tenfold will probably never be known. The Nikāyas afford no clue in this direction. It is possible that the four āśramas of the brahmins may have had their influence or, alternatively, the Buddhists may have been led to adopt a fourfold scheme belonging to some contemporary sect of which no record has survived. It is clear that the Jains had a similar arrangement for in the Kalpa Sūtra we find the idea that of those following (rules

regulating) the conduct of the Sthaviras, some will reach perfection and be freed from all pains in that same life, some in the next life, some in the third birth; none will have to undergo more than seven or eight births (Kalpa Sūtra: SBE xxii 310f); but whether the Buddhists took this model from the Jains, or vice versa, or indeed whether both adopted it from some common source is impossible to tell. However, in Buddhist hands these four alternative fruits of the Brahmacariya* came in time to be looked upon by some instead as stages on the way to the goal and it could be that their expression in terms of freedom from saṁyojanas was in part to blame for this confusion. For it is one thing to say that the sotāpanna* and sakadāgāmin* are free of the first three saṁyojanas, the anāgāmin* of five and the arahant* of all ten and quite another to say that therefore the candidate for liberation has to become first a sotāpanna* and then proceed, successively, through the other three 'stages'. Such a view may be anticipated at S iii 168 where it is claimed that it is possible through wise attention to the upādānakkhandhas for the sotāpanna* to realise the sakadāgāmin-fruit*, for the sakadāgāmin* to realise the anāgāmin-fruit* and for the anāgāmin* to realise the arahant-fruit*, yet even this, to my knowledge, unique sutta may be taken as saying no more than that one variety of sāvaka* can attain a higher fruit – it does not say that he has to nor that he can attain all four in succession. Nonetheless, it became the fashion during the Abhidhamma period to look upon these alternative goals of the Brahmacariya* as successive stages upon the path* to a liberation expressed solely in terms of arahantship*, such a view being later adopted by the commentaries as can be seen from some of the passages noted above where it is said that sakadāgāmins* and so on go on to attain arahantship* and also from the commentary on Thag 5, 60 where it is said that the young novices Dabba and Sīvalī passed rapidly through each of these stages as their heads were being shaved during their ordination. The view that they are progressive stages is also found expressed in the non-Theravādin Vimuttimagga (The Path of Freedom 305ff) and in most works of modern writers on Buddhism. Typical of such a view is that of M. O'C. Walshe:

> The stage of the Arahant is the fourth stage of a progression which begins in earnest with the moment of 'Stream-entry'. These four stages, also called Path Moments, are marked by the successive breaking of ten Fetters[14]

This is clearly not the view of the Nikāyas, for we have found it a consistent pattern for the process towards liberation to begin with acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* by means of an oral teaching, whereupon one becomes acquainted at first hand with the path* to be followed, to proceed with that path* being followed, and to culminate in a further oral

teaching during which one or other fruit of that path* were said to have been won, the type of fruit won being dependent upon the nature of the kammic remnant left untouched by the arising of the Dhammacakkhu*. Whilst we are often told that there are two fruits of the Brahmacariya*, either aññā in these seen conditions or, if there be a remaining substrate, that of the state of the anāgāmin* – and either attainable within seven days – so are we elsewhere told that there are four fruits of the ariyan* eightfold path* (S v 25) or of the life of the recluse (D iii 227) – those of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* or arahant* (cp D iii 132; S v 410f; A i 44f, iii 272, etc.). The Buddha, on being pressed by Ānanda, was obliged to admit, though with some reluctance, that if women were allowed to go forth they too might realise one or other of these four fruits (A iv 276; cp Vin iii 254); similarly there are many instances of the Buddha informing Ānanda and others, following the death of some monk, nun or lay-follower, that they had attained one or other of these four fruits (e.g. D ii 91ff; M i 465ff, 490ff, etc.). This seems further confirmed by the sāvakasaṅgha* being said to comprise of 'the four who are practising (the path*) and the four who stand in its fruitions' (cattāro ca paṭipannā cattāro ca phale ṭhitā – S i 233; A iv 293) or, more fully, of: 'the sotāpanna*; the one who is practising (the path*) for the sake of realising the sotapātti-fruit*; the sakadāgāmin*; the one who is practising (the path*) for the sake of realising the sakadāgāmin-fruit*; the anāgāmin*; the one who is practising (the path*) for the sake of realising the anāgāmin-fruit*; the arahant*; and the one who is practising (the path*) for the sake of realising the arahant-fruit*' (e.g. D iii 255; cp M iii 255; A iv 204; Ud 56). In short, there are four types of person in the sāvakasaṅgha* because the path* has, depending upon the kammic status of its followers, four types of fruit to offer. These are the fruits on sale in the Lord's fruitshop and whoever desires any of these gives his kamma as the price and buys the fruit he desires (Miln 333f).

We should not be misled by the commentarial practice of speaking in terms of, say, an anāgāmin* attaining arahantship* – as, for example, in some of the cases mentioned above – into thinking that the state of the anāgāmin* is a stage on the way to arahantship*, especially where arahantship* is conceived of in terms of attaining aññā in these seen conditions. Indeed, when one considers the various fates held out for each of these four varieties of sāvaka* it is immediately apparent that they are of such a nature as to prevent the four categories being understood as stages. First, we may observe that the five varieties of anāgāmin* come to rest after leaving here, unlike the arahant* who comes to rest here; moreover, since it is part of the stock description of the anāgāmin* that he parinibbāyaties (in the Brahmaloka) and is not liable to return from that world (e.g. M i 490f), it must be clear that he is incapable, once he

has become an anāgāmin*, of ever attaining aññā in these seen conditions. As Miss Horner long ago remarked:

> But it is to my mind very difficult to reconcile the Way of no-return, as a stage on the Way to arahanship, to this same arahanship when once it had become closely united with the here and now. For if, after a person has left this earth, he is not to return to it, if he is to pass utterly away in the realm where he has been reborn after the breaking up of his body here, how can he become an arahan as that is ordinarily understood by the texts with their insistence upon diṭṭhe va dhamme? How can he, not returning, win to a perfected state in the flesh, under temporal conditions on this earth and in this life? . . . the gulf between the non-returner and the arahan is physically unbridgeable, and therefore the inclusion of the third Way is out of place, if it is thought that the attainment of arahanship here and now is the ideal of those on the Way of no-return . . . In the Piṭakas there is nothing approaching a decisive record of a man or woman who was declared to be, in this life, first a non-returner and then, also in this life, an arahan . . . I think that this difficulty has never been fully faced[15]

To this we may add that just as it is impossible for an anāgāmin* to go on to become an arahant*, so too is it equally impossible for one variety of anāgāmin* to become any other variety of anāgāmin*. For the upahacca-parinibbāyin*, asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*, sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* and uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin*, in taking birth in the Brahmaloka, have thereby already gone past the time at which they might have parinibbāyatied in the intermediate state between death and rebirth. Or, if the Theravādin account of the antarā-parinibbāyin* be insisted upon, the same argument pertains – the upahacca-parinibbāyin*, remaining in the Brahmaloka in excess of five hundred kappas, goes beyond the time at which he could have been said to have parinibbāyatied before one, two or four hundred kappas had elapsed.

Then turning to the sakadāgāmin*, ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* who, like the arahant*, come to rest here, it seems impossible that they could pass through the 'stage' of the anāgāmin* which would have, as we have just seen, the result of their being thus unable of coming to rest here. Moreover, since we are told that the ekabījin*, for instance, gives birth to just one more existence and then reaches arahantship* (ekam eva atta-bhāvaṁ janetvā arahattaṁ pāpuṇāti – SA iii 238) it seems most improbable that he could, prior to reaching arahantship*, accommodate the five further births awaiting the uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin* in the Pure Abodes. Or again the kolaṅkola* spending two or three births in good clans, like the anāgāmins* above, soon passes beyond the point at which he might, as an ekabījin*, have given birth to but one more existence – and so on.

Whichever variety of sāvaka* we examine we find that his unique fate

is of such a nature as to prevent his going on to enjoy that of any other sāvaka*, let alone all of them. In this it seems we enjoy the support of Buddhaghosa (Vsm xxiii 6):

> But those who have reached a higher path* do not attain a lower fruition because the state of each successive Person is more tranquillized than the one below. And those who have only reached a lower path do not attain a higher fruition because it is beyond their reach. But each one attains his appropriate fruition

Similarly, a little later, in refutation of the views of those of the Abhayagiri Vihāra at Anurādhapura (VsmA 895) – the supposed authors, it may be noted, of the Vimuttimagga in which is found the view that the sotāpanna* and so on are progressive stages – he goes on to say (Vsm xxiii 11; cp 55–58):

> But there are those who say that when a Stream Enterer embarks on insight, thinking 'I shall attain fruition attainment' he becomes a Once-returner, and a Once-returner a Non-returner. They should be told 'In that case a Non-returner becomes an Arahant and an Arahant a Pacceka-buddha and a Pacceka-buddha a Buddha'. For that reason, and because it is contradicted as well by the text quoted above, none of that should be accepted

The meaning of the term sotāpanna*

This must, inevitably, raise the issue of the status of the sotāpanna*. For it is clearly implied by the foregoing discussion that the fact that one is a sotāpanna* means that one has, like the sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* and arahant*, reached that goal of the path* to which one is entitled, which seems to go counter to the commentarial claim that the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* and anāgāmin* are sekhas* and thus those who have not yet reached the goal. So far I have, in the hope of avoiding unnecessary confusion, abided by this convention, as I have, for the same reason, also abided by the commentarial claim that the arising of the Dhamma-cakkhu* signalled the attainment of the paths* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin* or anāgāmin*. Now we are in a better position to see that when the Dhammacakkhu* arises one attains, depending upon the nature of one's kamma, the path* of either the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* or arahant* and that this, in turn, means that one is a sekha*. Here we may recall the case of Vacchagotta, mentioned above, who claimed to have attained as much as could be attained through the knowledge of the sekha* and asked the Buddha to teach him final Dhamma whereupon he became an arahant* (M i 494ff), but as sekhas*

they are all still in need of a further oral teaching of Dhamma in order to bring those paths* to conclusion. The interval between such attainment of the paths* and their goals we have seen to have been extremely short, ranging from a matter of minutes in the case of the Group of Five and Yasa to a maximum expectancy of but a few days. Thus to revert once more to the case of Suppabuddha the leper we may say that it was by means of a progressive talk that Suppabuddha attained the path* of the sotāpanna* but that this, in itself, did not result in his becoming the sotapanna* that he was posthumously declared to be. Rather, we may suppose that he became a sotāpanna* – and thus no longer a sekha* – during the subsequent exhortation by means of the four verbs [stock passage *e*]. This would be in accordance with what seems to have been a frequently occurring phenomenon of the Buddha first causing the Dhammacakkhu* to arise, whereupon the recipient became a lay-follower and invited the Buddha for a meal on the following day at the end of which the Buddha would exhort that lay-follower with these four verbs (e.g. D i 125f, 148f) and thus, no doubt, establish him in the fruit of the path* that he had attained. This would explain how Brahmāyu could be given the Dhammacakkhu*, feed the Buddha for seven days and, when dying shortly afterwards, be declared an anāgāmin* (M ii 145f). Similarly, we may suspect that it was by means of the death-bed exhortation with Dhamma-talk (M iii 259ff) that Anāthapiṇḍika, who was already possessed of the four sotāpattiyaṅgas* (S v 381f), reached fruition in the form of the sotāpanna*.

This, in turn, suggests that one who was in possession of these sotāpattiyaṅgas* was not necessarily a sotāpanna* since he might still be without that second teaching that would establish him in fruition. Nonetheless, we may suppose that when being so established he would not, as a consequence, cease to possess such sotāpattiyaṅgas* for otherwise it would be hard to see how at S v 360f the Buddha could say that one so possessed was a sotāpanna*; and the implication is that one who is said to be in possession of the sotāpattiyaṅgas* could be either still on the path* or already established in its fruit, that is to say, a sotāpanna*. Yet here we meet a curious anomaly, for at S v 345f we find the Buddha exhorting the dying Dīghāvu, who is said to be in possession of these sotāpattiyaṅgas*, with the consequence that he becomes an anāgāmin*, suggesting perhaps that possession of the sotāpattiyaṅgas* was a feature common to all who had acquired the Dhammacakkhu*, whether this had resulted in their attaining the path* of the sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* or arahant*. This suggests that we should look more closely at the figure of the sotāpanna*.

According to PED a sotāpanna* is 'one who has entered the stream, a convert' (PED sv sota[2]) and arrives at this interpretation through

deriving it from sota (= Vedic srotas), or stream, and āpanna, past participle of ā + √pad, to get into, meet with, come into possession of, undergo etc. It is this that has presumably guided most translators to render sotāpanna* as 'Streamwinner' (KS ii 47; GS iv 7; B Disc v 226), 'stream-enterer' (Minor Readings and Illustrator 323), 'stream-attainer' (MLS i 42) or as 'won to the Stream' (GS iii 234); only Rhys Davids deviated from this consensus by his offering of 'a converted man' (Dial i 200). This understanding of the term sotāpanna* seems to owe its origins to Childers who explained it as 'one who has entered the stream, one who has attained the first grade of sanctification, a converted man' but who nonetheless felt obliged to add that 'I think there can be little doubt that in this metaphor the state of progressive sanctification from sotāpattimagga to arahattaphala is compared to an advancing stream; the sota must therefore not be confounded with the stream or flood of lust' (DPL sv sotāpanno). Such caution was indeed perceptive for the stream, sota, in the symbolism of the Nikāyas, is almost always used as a metaphor for all that is wrong with the world. We have already had cause to note that 'By those overcome by lust for becoming and who drift with the current (sota) of becoming, gone to Māra's realm, this Dhamma is not properly awoken to' (S iv 128 = Sn 764; cp S i 15) and here we see its more literal, verbal sense, better captured by 'current', for a sota is a stream only in virtue of the fact that it streams. Thus at S iii 137f it is said that through his failure to regard the khandhas as not-self, the puthujjana is swept to his destruction as might a man in a river be swept to his destruction by its swiftly flowing current (sota) even though he might, unsuccessfully, clutch at the grass and shrubs on its banks. Given the common Indian belief, at least as old as the Vedas, that sensory perception is made possible by the senses flowing out and contacting the object to be perceived it is not surprising to find that in the Nikāyas too the senses are very frequently called sotas (e.g. Dhp 339f; Sn 1034f; Thag 761). Similarly the sota is also said to be the stream of sense-objects that are charming and that is therefore difficult to cross (It 95; cp Sn 948); thus, no doubt, the statement that sota is a name for craving (S iv 292; cp Sn 355). The sea is often portrayed in no better a light, being similarly equated with the senses (S iv 157), the akusala-mūlas (It 57) and insatiableness in general (S i 32; cp KS i 44 n 1) and indeed if we do not take care we may sink beneath the waves (S ii 158 = It 70f; cp Thag 147) and drown in the deep (S i 53).

The stream is clearly the province of the puthujjana as the following demonstrates (It 113f):

> Suppose, monks, a man is being swept along by the current of a river (nadiyā sotena) that looks dear and charming. Then a man with vision standing on

> the bank, on seeing him, might say 'My good fellow! Although you are being swept along by the current of a river that looks dear and charming, there is nonetheless further down a pool with waves and whirlpools, with creatures that possess others, with rakṣas. When you reach there, my good fellow, you will undergo death or death-like dukkha'. Then, monks, that man, hearing the call of that man, might struggle with hands and feet against the current (paṭisotaṁ). I make this simile, monks, in order to instruct you in this matter. This is the meaning here: 'the current of a river' (nadiya soto), monks, is a term for craving; 'that looks dear and charming', monks, is a term for one's own sphere of perception (i.e. the senses and their objects); 'the pool further down', monks, is a term for the five lower saṁyojanas; 'with waves', monks, is a term for being pervaded with anger; 'with whirlpools', monks, is a term for the five strands of the sense-pleasures; 'with creatures that possess others (and) with rakṣas', monks, is a term for womenfolk; 'against the current' (paṭisoto), monks, is a term for renunciation . . .

Elsewhere the person going against the current (of the kilesas – AA iii 4) is said, conversely, not to indulge in sense-pleasures nor to do evil deeds but, instead, to fulfil the Brahmacariya* (A ii 5), clearly identifying him with the sāvaka* (cp D ii 38 = M i 168 = S i 136; B Disc iv 7 n 3–4; Mhv iii 314, etc.). That is to say, we find that the person who is being swept along by the sota is invariably the puthujjana, whilst the one battling against that current is the sāvaka*. It is, however, difficult to agree with the suggestion that the sāvaka*, acting thus, is going 'against the stream up to the source (nibbāna) . . . VA 962 says that paṭisota is called nibbāna' (B Disc iv 7 n 3) since not only does it seem quite un-Buddhist to suggest that the source of craving and sensual pleasure lies in nibbāna but also because it is clear from other passages that this is not the direction of his movement. Whilst he may be going against the current, he is not going ustream but across the stream. One who has thus cut across the stream (chinnasoto) is an arahant* (S iv 292; cp S i 49 = Dhp 383) and the stream itself is the stream of Māra. Thus in the Cūḷagopālaka Sutta (M i 225–227) the Buddha claims that just as a cowherd gets all his herd to cut across the Ganges and reach the safety of the other shore, whereupon they can go safely beyond, so too does he get all his sāvakas* to cut across Māra's stream (Mārassa sotaṁ chetvā), whereupon they too can go safely beyond. It is stated, most explicitly, in this sutta that all his sāvakas*, whether sotāpannas*, sakadāgāmins*, anāgāmins* or arahants*, have already completed this crossing, have reached the safety of the other shore and are now going safely beyond.

From such passages it becomes abundantly clear that in the metaphorical language of the Nikāyas the stream or current would be the last thing the sāvaka* would desire to enter, attain or win. It was rather the

treacherous domain of the puthujjana, the realm of Māra, and indeed the very place from where the sotāpanna* had recently escaped. Nor can we say that the sotāpanna* was a 'stream-winner' in the sense that he was bravely battling against the current (paṭisota) since, as this Majjhima sutta makes extremely clear, the sotāpanna*, like all other sāvakas*, is no longer in the stream at all but safely arrived on the other shore.

Moreover, had sotāpanna* meant 'stream-winner', 'stream-attainer' and the like we might surely have expected the term sotāpanna* to have been glossed, in the commentaries, with some other word for river, such as nadī. Yet this, to my knowledge, the commentaries never do, but rather explain sota as the ariyan* eightfold path*, at the same time overlooking, or ignoring as irrelevant the fact that at S v 38f this same eightfold path* is likened to the river (nadī) Ganges. We may cite as typical of such commentarial explanations the following: ariyamaggasotaṁ āpannā (AA v 44), maggasotaṁ āpanno (DA 313) and sotasaṁkhātena maggena phalaṁ āpanno (AA ii 349). It is of great interest to find that the term sota is not only the Pali equivalent of Vedic srotas, or stream, but also of Vedic śrotas, or ear, the organ of hearing, the act of hearing or listening to, conversancy with the Veda or sacred knowledge itself (SED sv; cp also śrotriya, learner in the Veda), and derived from √śru, the very same root from which sāvaka* itself is derived. This, together with the fact that sotāpanna* is often found written śrotāpanna*, rather than srotāpanna* in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (BHSD sv), suggests that in sotāpanna* we may have a reference to Vedic śrotas rather than to srotas. This being so, we should have to understand the term sotāpanna* to mean rather 'one who has come into contact with (or undergone) the hearing'. Such an understanding would, it may be noted, be consonant with the above commentarial explanations of the term which might be rendered, respectively, as 'one who has come into contact with (or undergone) the hearing associated with the ariyan* eightfold path*', 'one who has come into contact with (or undergone) the hearing associated with the path*' and 'one who has come into contact with (or undergone) fruition by way of the path*, the so-called hearing'.

That sota in the term sotāpanna* might mean 'hearing', rather than 'stream', may find further support through the presence in the Nikāyas of the term Dhammasota* which we earlier had cause to suppose were derived from Vedic śrotas rather than srotas. For it was through attainment of the Dhammasota*, or Dhamma-ear*, that one came to hear the sound of the Deathless*, just as it was through attainment of the Dhammacakkhu* that one came to see nibbāna, and given these twin aspects of the conversion experience – its aural as well as visual dimensions – it should not be surprising that those converted were referred to on some occasions with respect to their having heard (the Deathless*) and on

others with respect to their having seen (that Deathless*). Thus it is that we find the ariyasāvaka* described as 'one who has attained (right) view* (diṭṭhisampanno*, explained at AA iii 387 as a sotāpanna*), one who has attained vision . . . who sees this true Dhamma . . . who has attained the Dhamma-ear* (or who has come into contact with the hearing of Dhamma – dhammasotaṁ samāpanno) . . . who stands, having reached the door to the Deathless*' (S ii 43).

Thus it may be supposed that in its original, and literal, meaning of one who had come into contact with the sound of the Deathless*, the term sotāpanna* would have been synonymous with such terms as sāvaka* and diṭṭhisampanna* and thus a term used to denote the converted in general. This sense seems to underlie the claim that anyone who is possessed of the four sotāpattiyaṅgas* is able to declare that he is one for whom (rebirth in) hell is destroyed, one for whom (rebirth) in any animal womb . . . on the peta-plane . . . in any of the four states of loss, in any bad destiny or in the downfall is destroyed; he is a sotāpanna*, of a nature to be free of the downfall, assured, bound for enlightenment (A iii 211). It would make no difference to the sense if here sotāpanna* were replaced by sāvaka* for there is nothing peculiar to the ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* that would make this true of them only and we have, in any case, already seen that these qualities are, on occasion, predicated of all of the members of the sāvakasaṅgha* (e.g. A iv 378ff). The originally general application of the term sotāpanna* is most explicitly preserved, however, at A v 119f where in two adjacent suttas the arahant*, the five classes of anāgāmin*, the sakadāgāmin*, ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* are firstly said to be all diṭṭhisampannas* and then all sotāpannas*, adding that of these sotāpannas* five come to rest here and five after leaving here (Tesaṁ sotāpannānaṁ imesaṁ pañcannaṁ idha niṭṭhā, imesaṁ pañcannaṁ idha vihāya niṭṭhā – A v 120). From this sutta it is clear that the term sotāpanna* cannot mean 'one who has entered the stream', even when this stream is equated with the eightfold path*, for the arahant* who all would agree had completed that path* is here also called a sotāpanna*.

That the term diṭṭhisampanna*, with which it seems that of sotāpanna* was considered synonymous, was also a general term for the converted may be seen from the fact that at A i 120 it is said that the diṭṭhipatta* could be either a sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* or practising (the path*) for the sake of arahantship*. Similarly, at A iii 373 a monk, who has already been described as a diṭṭhisampanna* and a sāvaka* of the Buddha, and whom the commentary states is a sotāpanna*, is subsequently called the 'best person of the ariyasaṅgha*' and thus clearly an arahant*, which indeed AA iii 388 confirms. Diṭṭhisampanna*, perhaps on account of its synonymity with sotāpanna*, seems to have

suffered the same fate of its meaning withering into nothing but the first of four supermundane* 'stages', and at A iv 394 we find the diṭṭhisampanna* at the place we would have expected to find the sotāpanna*.

However, given that the term sotāpanna* had originally this quite general meaning, it follows that any sāvaka* could be expected to possess the sotāpattiyaṅgas*; we should not be misled by the fact that the term sotāpanna* came in time, and for reasons unknown, to denote merely the ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama*, into thinking that one possessing the sotāpattiyaṅgas* was necessarily destined to attain one of these three goals. Rather one so possessed might, due to the nature of his kammic substrate, be on any of the four (or ten) paths*, as shown by the case of Dīghāvu, mentioned above, who, already possessed of these sotāpattiyaṅgas*, became an anāgāmin* on being given a death-bed exhortation by the Buddha (S v 345f).

The necessity of grace and the disappearance of the sāvaka*

Throughout the foregoing pages it has been my aim to show that the process to liberation, as recorded in the Nikāyas at least, always involved two distinct stages: (1) acquisition of right view* in the form of the Dhammacakkhu* which entailed both entry on to the supermundane* ariyan* eightfold path* and also a release from the necessity of having to expiate the greater part of that kamma hitherto amassed; and (2) the bringing of that path* to a close, whereupon one attained one's respective fruit in accordance with the nature of the kammic remnant to be expiated. More importantly, I have hoped to demonstrate that, in spite of the wealth of scholarship to the contrary, both of these stages were occasioned by way of an oral teaching from the Buddha: first, we have found that in theory there would seem to be no practice by means of which right view* might be acquired and that in practice this was always acquired through hearing Dhamma; secondly, though in theory the eightfold path* would seem to be the means to attaining the (various) goal(s), these too were in practice always brought about by a further oral teaching. However attractive the picture may be of the anāgāmin* striving in the Pure Abodes to rid himself of the remaining five saṁyojanas – attractive at least to those who would present Buddhism as a philosophy of self-endeavour – the evidence of the Nikāyas is rather that he is merely expiating his remaining, meritorious and thus exquisitely pleasurable, kamma and that by him, as much as by the arahant*, the goal is already won. This, inevitably, brings us to the point where we must consider the role played by grace in the Buddhism of the Nikāyas.

It will be recalled that we had occasion earlier to refer to the phenomenon of initiation in other schools of the Indian tradition. In particular, there was the case of the goddess Śrī Lakṣmī with reference to whom Gonda notes:

> . . . the same goddess is in one of her manifestations expected to appear to, and glance with a hundred eyes at, those sages who will remember her (LakṣmīT 9, 34). As long as an embodied soul is not seen by Lakṣmī moved by pity he remains limited in knowledge: ibidem 13, 33 yāvan nirīkṣyate nāyaṁ mayā (the goddess is speaking) kāruṇyavattayā/tāvat saṁkucitajnānaḥ karaṇair viśvam īksate. That this looking of Śrī-Lakṣmī is the favour which she by her own free will (13, 11) bestows upon the devout, that it has the character of an act of grace may appear from 13, 8f: 'The embodied souls which are beheld by me, Śrī, are free from sorrow*. That is called my grace (anugraha-), another name for which is a descent of creative power (śaktipāta-). Those whom I look at enjoy pacification of their karman (karmasāmya-), i.e. the extinction of the effects of karman'[16]

With this may be compared the similar manner in which the Buddha is portrayed as causing, out of compassion, insight* into Dhamma to arise to beings as an act of grace (PvA 195f; cp PvA 171ff for similar):

> Then when, towards dawn, the Lord had emerged from the meditation of great compassion (mahākaruṇāsamāpattito) and was surveying the world with his Buddha Eye, he saw the boy abandoned in that charnel ground and went at sunrise to that charnel ground. The people gathered saying, 'The Teacher has come here; he must have some purpose here'. The Lord spoke to the company that had gathered . . . (and subsequently) taught Dhamma suiting the dispositions of the company gathered there and afterwards gave that teaching on Dhamma which (the Buddhas) have themselves discovered (: dukkha, uprising, cessation, the path*). At the end of that teaching insight* into Dhamma arose to eighty-four thousand beings. And in the presence of the Lord a man of property worth eighty koṭis adopted that boy saying, 'He will be my son'. The Lord said, 'This boy is protected by such great (wealth) and grace (anuggaho) has been shown to the people'

Elsewhere it is said of a person who, though overcome with grief at the death of his father, that (PvA 38):

> His potential for realising the sotāpatti-fruit* shone in his heart like a lamp in a jar. The Teacher who was surveying the world towards dawn saw his potential for realising the sotāpatti-fruit* and thought, 'When I have recounted his past actions and relieved his grief it would be proper to give (dātuṁ) him the sotāpatti-fruit*'

Later, having dispelled his grief with a progressive talk he established him in that sotapatti-fruit* (sotāpattiphale patiṭṭhāpetvā) and returned to the vihāra whereupon the monks began to talk amongst themselves saying, 'Behold, friends, the great power of the Buddha in that a lay-follower who was overcome by the greatest grief has been guided (vinīto*) by the Lord into the sotāpatti-fruit* in just an instant' [loc. cit.]. The Buddha is to be found establishing a number of people in the sotāpatti-fruit* in this manner (e.g. PvA 168), just as there are many such instances recorded in the Nikāyas, and the implication is always that though they may be possessed of the potential, or, like Suppabuddha capable of understanding (bhabba), they will nonetheless fail to realise this potential without the gracious intervention of the Buddha himself.

In discussing the role of grace in Theravāda Buddhism, Walpola Rahula begs the question somewhat by defining grace as:

> something, a favour, that comes from God, granted by God, without which a man is incapable of achieving his salvation, however much he may try[17]

for it is surely only given such a definition that he is able to go on to assert:

> This idea is utterly alien to Buddhism. It is too obvious to need repetition that Buddhism does not recognise a creator-God who takes care ofthe world and on whom the world depends. Without such a God or Divinity a notion of grace is inconceivable and absurd[18]

To arrive at such a view, however, is surely to ignore not only all the passages that we have been considering but also the quite unequivocal and bold statement to the effect that the Buddha is the propounder, the expounder, the bringer to the goal (atthassa ninnetā), the giver of the Deathless* (amatassa dātā) found at, for instance, M i 111; and cp M iii 195; S iv 94; A v 256f, etc. Rather, it is only through the gracious intervention of the Buddha that the supermundane* path* and its goal are attained. This can be seen from the Buddha's criticism of Sāriputta that in exhorting the dying Dhānañjāni he established him only in that which is inferior, in the Brahmaloka, when there was something further to be done – that is, establish him on the supermundane* plane (M ii 195; cp MLS ii 378 n 1 and xxix).

Indeed, we may go further and say that in most cases this gracious intervention was quite unsolicited. This is clearly so in the above examples taken from the commentary on the Petavatthu, as it is in those cases recorded in the Nikāyas, for in granting individuals the Dhammacakkhu* the Buddha showed them a path* and a sanctuary hitherto unknown to them. Similarly, and as a glance at Table 5 will show, his

intervention in bringing that path* to a close was equally unsolicited. It was when the Buddha reflected that thirty monks from Pāva were still in possession of the saṁyojanas that he thought 'Suppose I were to teach them Dhamma in such a way that whilst (sitting) on that very seat their hearts would be freed from the āsavas' (S ii 187), just as it was when Soṇa Koḷivisa was dwelling aloof after having been given the Dhammacakkhu* that 'the Lord, knowing by mind the venerable Soṇa's reasoning of mind, as a strong man might stretch out his bent arm, or might bend back his outstretched arm . . . vanishing from Mount Vulture Peak appeared in the Cool Grove' and gave him the necessary teaching (A iii 374ff = Vin i 181ff; cp A iv 228ff where he did as much for Anuruddha). These teachings, like those with which he caused the Dhammacakkhu* to arise, were given when the Buddha alone intuited the need for them and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in so doing the Buddha, like Śrī Lakṣmī intervened out of compassion and as an act of his own free will graciously bestowed the Dhammacakkhu* – and with it the resultant freedom from kamma – and the goal.

Whether this skill was also shared by his sāvakas* is, in the main, unclear. There are, it is true, a few instances in which it would appear that sāvakas* such as Sāriputta gave others the Dhammacakkhu* – or could have done, as the above mentioned Majjhima passage suggests. But of sāvakas* bringing the path* to conclusion little evidence is available, for apart from the odd instance of anāgāmin* devas teaching other anāgāmin* devas only two cases have been traced: those of Bhaddiya the Dwarf (Ud 74f) and Anuruddha (A i 281f) who are both said to have been brought to arahantship* by Sāriputta – and of these the latter is suspect since we have seen earlier that it was also said that it was the Buddha who did this for Anuruddha (A iv 228ff). Some passages suggest that in theory this were possible but there is little evidence that this was so in practice as the Theravādin tradition generally confirms. The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta makes the point of mentioning that Subhadda was the last sāvaka* converted by the Buddha (so Bhagavato pacchimo sakkhi-sāvako ahosi – D ii 153) and Buddhaghosa remarks that these words were added by the theras at the First Council (cp Dial ii 169 n 2). They did this, perhaps, as a further slight against Ānanda who was severely criticised at that Council for not having begged the Buddha to live on for a kappa or more. For, three months before his death, the Buddha took Ānanda to the Cāpāla Cetiya and told him that a Tathāgata can, if he so chooses, live on for a kappa or more. Yet:

> Although so broad a hint was thus dropped by the Lord, though so broad and clear was his meaning, yet the venerable Ānanda could not penetrate it. He did not beg the Lord: 'Lord, let the Lord remain for a kappa, let the

> Sugata remain for a kappa for the well-being of the manyfolk, for the happiness of the manyfolk, for the pity, benefit, well-being and happiness of the world with its devas and men', so possessed was his heart by Māra

Three times Ānanda missed this grand opportunity with the result that the Buddha dismissed Ānanda and announced to Māra his intention to pass away in three months time (D ii 102ff = A iv 308ff = S v 258ff = Ud 62ff). The Pali commentaries are unanimous in claiming that kappa here means merely āyukappa, or a full life-span (SA iii 251 = AA iv 149 = UdA 323) but as Padmanabh S. Jaini has well shown they felt driven into this position since:

> they were not able to reconcile the text with their accepted theories of karma. They retained the passage, but gave it an interpretation to suit these theories. According to them the 'kalpa' in this passage never meant a mahākalpa, i.e. an aeon, but an āyuḥkalpa, i.e. the duration of a man's life. Now the āyuḥkalpa is what people consider as the normal life-span of a human being. It is, as the Buddha himself said (in a different context), 'a hundred years, less or more'. Since the Buddha had reached the normal limit, he did live for a kalpa or a portion of a kalpa. This indeed was a very poor explanation[19]

For as Jaini goes on to say:

> These explanations of the Aṭṭhakathās do not seem to take notice of another Vinaya passage of the Sthaviravādins. In the Cullavagga, in the section dealing with the first council held under the presidentship of Mahākassapa, Ānanda is censured for his failure to request the Buddha to live for a kappa or kappāvasesa. Surely if kappa meant only āyukappa, and if the power of the Buddha was only limited to avert premature death, there was no point in censuring Ānanda for his absentmindedness[20]

Nor, we may add, does it explain why Ānanda's heart was said to be possessed by Māra – for Māra had already waited some forty-five years for the Buddha to fulfil his vow not to pass away until all his monks, nuns, male and female lay-followers were sāvakas* (D ii 113). Now that this vow was fulfilled a few more years could hardly matter. What Māra was clearly afraid of was that the Buddha might, if begged by Ānanda, remain not for his full life-span but for a kappa or more.

Further confirmation of this may be found in that immediately after Ānanda had been censured for this omission he was further censured for having been responsible for the Buddha consenting to the going forth of women (Vin ii 289). For though as a result of Ānanda's persistence the Buddha did consent to this, he also added that (A iv 278):

> If, Ānanda, women had not been allowed to go forth from the home into the homeless life with respect to the Dhamma and Vinaya declared by the Tathāgata, then the Brahmacariya* would have been long-lasting, the true Dhamma* would have lasted for a thousand years. But now, Ānanda, since women have gone forth from the home into the homeless life with respect to the Dhamma and Vinaya declared by the Tathāgata, the Brahmacariya* will not be long-lasting, the true Dhamma* will now last only five hundred years

AA iv 137 stretches this period of one thousand years into one of five thousand years in a quite devious manner. It is highly probable that these two offences were linked in the minds of Ānanda's critics who, realising that the disappearance of the Buddha was at the same time the disappearance of their own chance of salvation, were painfully aware of Ānanda's cosmic blunder. Hence their inclusion, in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, of the cutting remark that Subhadda had been the last sāvaka* of the Buddha.

Ānanda, it seems, eventually realised his error, for in the Gopakamoggallāna Sutta he is to be found telling the brahmin Gopaka-Moggallāna that (M iii 8; cp S i 191):

> There is not even one monk, brahmin, who is possessed in every way and in every part of all those things of which the Lord, the Arahant*, the Perfectly Enlightened One, was possessed. For, brahmin, this Lord was one to make arise a path* (hitherto) unarisen, was one to bring into being a path* (hitherto) not brought into being, was one to point out a path* (hitherto) not pointed out; he was a knower of the path*, an understander of the path*, one conversant* with the path*. And now, moreover, his sāvakas* dwell as followers of that path*, following on after him

That the path* only arises when there is a Tathāgata in the world is confirmed at S v 15 where it is stated that the eight factors of the ariyan* eightfold path* do not arise except upon the appearance of a Tathāgata. Elsewhere the Buddha likens his (re-)discovery of the eightfold path* trodden by former Buddhas to a man who, whilst wandering in the woods, might see an ancient path traversed by men in former days. The Buddha, having found this path* and travelled along it, subsequently makes this path* visible to his monks, nuns, male and female lay-followers (S ii 105ff), and it is this that distinguishes the Tathāgata from his sāvakas*. At S iii 65f the Buddha points out that the distinction, the specific feature, between the Tathāgata and one who is paññāvimutta* (and thus an arahant* – cp M i 477f) lies in the fact that the Tathāgata is one to make arise a path* (hitherto) unarisen and so on, whereas his sāvakas* are (merely) followers of that path*.

This is a very interesting claim for it asserts that only the Buddha can cause the path* to arise (uppādetā) which is, no doubt, to be understood

in the sense of causing the path* to arise to a specific person at a given time, especially given the subsequent attributes of bringing that path* into being and pointing it out. In other words it means that the Buddha alone can establish persons on the supermundane* path*. This ability is not shared even by his sāvakas* who are arahants*; and if arahants* are unable to establish people on the path* it is doubtful whether they are able either to bring that path* to conclusion for them. Moreover, if even the arahant* lacks this ability, then how much more so must it be lacked by those of lesser accomplishment, such as those still treading their respective paths*.

Thus whilst we find odd passages where it seems that some sāvakas* gave others the Dhammacakkhu* it must be concluded that if in fact they did do this they were very much the exception and that in general this was not the case. Rather, they were the passive recipients of a goal that they could not pass on to others and it is indeed surprising to find preserved in the Nikāyas evidence that would support the later criticism of the śrāvaka* or arahant*, first found in the Lotus Sūtra, on the grounds that he had been satisfied with the inferior goal of a private nirvāṇa that did not embrace the spiritual well-being of others in preference to the superior goal of the Mahāyāna that included the vow to work towards the enlightenment of all beings.

The implication of these passages is that Subhadda was not merely the last sāvaka* of the Buddha but also the last sāvaka* of all. The belief that salvation was impossible after the death of the founder was also shared by the Jains:

> The Jains assume that only in periods in which Tīrthaṅkaras appear is salvation attained during a man's lifetime, therefore Jambūsvāmīn, who died in the sixty-fourth year after Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa, is said to have been the last kevalin (J 304). Hence the idea is prevalent that today there are no longer on our earth saints who have become omniscient in their lifetime, but that there are such only in other worlds. In a similar way, the Buddhists of the Little Vehicle believe that Arahats have existed only in the period intimately associated with Buddha[21]

This belief of the Jains is closer to that of the Buddhists than perhaps Glasenapp realised for just as the Jains are said to hold that salvation is now possible only for those in other worlds, so too may we suppose this to be the case with the anāgāmin* sāvakas* of the Buddha who, due to the enormity of life-span in the Pure Abodes, may still at this moment be awaiting the occasion of their parinibbāyati-ing; we may also compare the belief of some schools of the Mahāyāna to the effect that nirvāṇa is now to be attained only in the Pure Land of Amitābha.

Thus whilst the Buddha could say that Sāriputta did not take the secret of release with him when he died (S v 162) we may nonetheless observe that Sāriputta died before the Buddha and that the Buddha did do so. For had his sāvakas* been capable of establishing others on the path* we might have expected a rapid expansion in the number of sāvakas*. The evidence of the Theravādin tradition suggests the opposite was the case and that a gradual disappearance of the sāvakasaṅgha* was expected. This seems implicit in the remarks of Buddhaghosa when he states (Vsm iii 62–64):

> It is only the Perfectly Enlightened One who possesses all the aspects of the Good Friend. Since that is so, while he is available only a meditation subject taken in the Lord's presence is well taken. But after his Parinibbāna, it is proper to take it from any one of the eighty mahāsāvakas* still living. When they are no more available, one who wants to take a particular meditation subject should take it from someone in whom the āsavas are destroyed . . . So if someone in whom the āsavas are destroyed is available, that is good; if not, then one should take it from an anāgāmin* . . . from a sakadāgāmin* . . . from a sotāpatta* . . . from a puthujjana who has attained jhāna . . . from one who knows the three Piṭakas . . . two Piṭakas . . . from one who knows one Piṭaka – in descending order.

Whether those taking their meditation subject from anyone other than the Buddha would attain the final goal is, however, extremely doubtful. For (A iv 227; cp D iii 263f, 287):

> There is just one moment, one occasion, for living the Brahmacariya*. What one? That is when a Tathāgata has arisen in the world, an Arahant*, a Perfectly Enlightened One who is endowed with knowledge and (good) conduct, a Sugata, a world-knower, an unsurpassed charioteer of men to be tamed, a Teacher of devas and men, a Buddha, the Lord; and Dhamma that is calming, leading one to parinibbāyati and leading to enlightenment, is shown, is made known by the Sugata; and a person is born back in the Middle Countries and has insight, is not dull nor dumb and is able to know whether a matter has been well spoken or badly spoken.

The modern Sinhalese Buddhist, clearly aware of this fact, deems it better for the present to earn sufficient merit so that in the future he may:

> see the holy king Buddha Maitrī . . . and hear the preaching of the Four Noble Truths of suffering, its arising, its destruction, and the Way, which would be preached by the holy king Buddha and at the end of that preaching reach the four paths and the four fruits of the stream-enterer etc.[22]

It is not, as is sometimes suggested, a case of the Sinhalese Buddhist not wanting nibbāna and being intent merely on the intensely blissful

pleasures awaiting one in heaven. He has, rather, seen the sinister implications of the Buddha's apparent silence when asked by the wanderer Uttiya whether the whole world, one half, or one third would get out (of saṁsāra) through his teaching (A v 194) and, whilst wanting nibbāna, realises that this desire cannot be satisfied. To satisfy this desire it will be necessary that he generate sufficient merit that he be reborn either as man or deva when people are once more being established upon the supermundane* plane by Metteyya (Maitrī), the next Buddha. For then, and only then, might it again be said that (Miln 350):

> for as long as the Lord remained in the world, for so long wherever the Lord stayed in the three circles in the sixteen provinces, there as a rule two, three, four or five hundred or a thousand or a hundred thousand devas and men realised the peaceful and uttermost goal of nibbāna. Those who were devas had been householders, they had not gone forth. These and various other hundreds and thousands of myriads of devatās (who had been) householders living in a house, enjoying pleasures of the senses, realised the peaceful and uttermost goal of nibbāna.

Notes to Chapter 3

1 Donald K. Swearer (ed.), *Towards the Truth* (Philadelphia, 1971), p. 138.
2 A. Wayman, 'The Intermediate-State Dispute in Buddhism', in L. Cousins *et al.* (ed.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner* (Dordrecht, 1974), p. 235f. I reproduce the text as it stands which seems to suffer from a number of printing errors. I have taken the liberty, for the sake of consistency, of replacing Wayman's 'disappears' by 'cools down'.
3 For an interesting discussion see Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions* (Calcutta, 1963), pp. 36–40.
4 Wayman, p. 236.
5 Wayman, pp. 231ff.
6 E. Conze (trans.), *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom* (London, 1961), Part I, p. 54, n 22.
7 Wayman, p. 237, n 5.
8 Conze, loc. cit.
9 Taishō, vol. 29, p. 124 (quoted *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* i 508).
10 Nyāṇatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary* (Colombo, 1972), p. 163.
11 For a fuller discussion on this substrate see my 'The Nibbāna-Parinibbāna Controversy', in *Religion*, Vol. 9, 1979, pp. 215–30.
12 Louis de la Vallée Poussin (trans.), *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, iv 212, n 1.
13 goal attained. However, it should not be lost sight of that these are but elaborations – and quite possibly of a later date – of the twin fruits of the Brahmacariya* that could be won in seven days. This matter will be touched upon later in this chapter.
14 M. O'C. Walshe, *Buddhism in Brief* (n.d.), p. 17f.
15 I. B. Horner, *Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected* (London, 1936), pp. 223ff.
16 Jan Gonda, *Eye and Gaze in the Veda* (Amsterdam, 1969), p. 64.
17 Walpola Rahula, 'Wrong notions of Dhammatā (Dharmatā)' in L. Cousins *et al.* (ed.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner* (Dordrecht, 1974), p. 185.
18 Loc cit.

19 Padmanabh S. Jaini, 'Buddha's Prolongation of Life' in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 21, 1958, p. 548.
20 ibid, p. 549.
21 Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions* (Calcutta, 1963), p. 78.
22 Richard F. Gombrich, *Precept and Practice* (Oxford, 1971), p. 336f.

Chapter Four

The New Brahmin

The relationship between Buddhism and Brāhmaṇism

Buddhism did not arise in a cultural and religious vacuum and if we are to understand the Buddhism of the Nikāyas some account will have to be taken of its contemporaries. This is, however, not always the easy task it might appear, given the often scanty nature of the evidence of many of the contemporary sects that has come down to us and in this final chapter I will restrict my remarks to an attempt at highlighting some aspects of the relationship that the Buddhism of the Nikāyas exhibits with one of these, that of the Brāhmaṇic tradition.

It has often been said that of all Indian sects Buddhism is the most egalitarian in that it is critical of the caste system yet such a claim is extremely questionable, if only for the fact that during the principal Buddhist period the notion of caste would seem to have been largely unknown. Considerable confusion has often surrounded discussions of caste in western sources, so much so that it has become necessary, when dealing with this subject, to preface one's remarks with a few words aimed at supplying precision to the terminology to be employed; whilst this is obviously tedious, even trite, to some, it is nonetheless necessary if others are not to retreat into their former, and possibly erroneous, understanding of such terms.

The word for caste is jāti which, literally, means 'birth' and a collection of individuals may be said to form a caste when three conditions are satisfied:

1 commensality
2 endogamy
3 craft-exclusiveness.

The basis of the caste is the extended family, or somewhat larger tribal unit, that practises commensality. Indeed the importance of this condition may be seen from the fact that, strictly speaking, the father of a dvija caste should not eat with his son until the boy has been ritually incorpo-

rated into the caste with the investiture of the sacred thread during the upanayana ceremony, and never with his daughter, at least so long as she remains unmarried, since she becomes a member of the caste only through marriage, when she becomes a member of her husband's caste. Each extended family looks back in theory to a mythical ancestor, often a Vedic ṛṣi, as its gotra and whilst groups of families with the same gotra may eat together they cannot intermarry. Groups with the same gotra therefore form exogamous subgroups within an endogamous caste. In time, and for reasons largely unknown, such castes became craft-exclusive.

Quite independent of the social division of caste is the much earlier division of society in terms of class, or varṇa (Pali vaṇṇa), which may mean many things but probably in this context 'colour'. According to Dumezil and others it is possible to identify in Indo-European society as a whole three quite separate social functions – those of (1) the aristocrat/priest, (2) the noble/warrior, and (3) those serving these. To each of these three functions a colour was attributed – white, red and black, respectively – and this is equally true of the Indo-Āryan branch of the family that eventually migrated to the Indian sub-continent. The Ṛg Veda attests the first two of these functions and sometimes mentions the third but whilst it is probable that fulfilment of each function tended to become hereditary there is nonetheless ample evidence to show that in principle anyone might perform any of the three functions. That each of the functions was assigned a separate colour is probably due to the colour of dress worn rather than to any distinction on racial grounds for whatever the racial elements constituting the Indo-Āryan community – the term Indo-Āryan, like Indo-European, being merely a linguistic label – it is clear that all three functions were thought to belong to a racial unity styled Āryan and distinct from the indigenous peoples encountered both on arrival in and also on their later expansion into the Indian subcontinent.

Whilst these functions find mention in the Ṛg Veda it is only in the later literature of the Brāhmaṇic period when earlier tribal and semi-nomadic ways of life demanding flexibility of function start to give way to an increasingly urban form of society that these functions begin to harden into the varṇas as we now know them, whereupon they come to be referred to as the varṇas of the brahmin, kṣatriya and vaiśya, respectively, with the addition of a fourth, śūdra varṇa in which to accommodate the indigenous non-Āryan groups with whom it had become necessary to come to terms. So the theory goes, but there is evidence in the Nikāyas, as we shall see, that would make it questionable to what extent such stratification of society continued to reflect the racial division of Āryan and non-Āryan, especially in the case of the brahmin

who, despite his claims to an Āryan pedigree, seems often to have had non-Āryan origins. Be this as it may, when the caste system, as defined above, came into being it was these four varṇas that provided a convenient structure in which to accommodate the proliferation of castes, such that a given caste might, at different times, be accorded either brahmin, kṣatriya, vaiśya or śūdra status as dictated by economic or political expediency, with the result that India now knows of some eighteen thousand brahmin castes between which there is, technically, no commensality or intermarriage. Thus whilst we may, correctly, speak of a given caste as a brahmin caste, meaning that that caste is, at the time in question, afforded brahmin status, we cannot speak of the brahmin caste; and with this distinction in mind we may now turn our attention to the situation pertaining during the period covered by the Nikāyas.

On occasion we find mention of five clans (or families) of low standing (nīcakulāni): caṇḍālas, nesādas (hunters), veṇas (bamboo-workers), rathakāras (chariot-makers) and pukkusas (refuse-sweepers) – see e.g. M iii 169; A i 107 – and since the context is often that of the undesirability of rebirth into such clans, it may be that there was, already during the Nikāya period, a tendency for certain despised occupations to become hereditary and even exclusive to certain clans. But we should, at the same time, note that these despised groups are often contrasted with clans of high standing (uccakulāni) – said to be wealthy khattiyas, brahmins and householders (e.g. A ii 85f) and seemingly representing a continuation of the three functions of Vedic society – and the implication is that the despised groups were of a non-Āryan origin, as further suggested by the inclusion of the caṇḍālas, originally the progeny of brahmin and śūdra. Thus whilst it may be that we have in these despised groups the rudiments of the later caste, it would seem that during the Nikāya period the distinction between clans of high and low standing represented merely a continuation of the Vedic division of society in terms of those who were Āryan and non-Āryan. If this be so then we should not be misled by the fact that certain despised and non-Āryan occupations had become hereditary into thinking that such were necessarily the case at the Āryan level of society too. Indeed at this level it would seem that during the Buddha's day the flexibility of the Vedic period, in which anyone could in principle perform any of the three functions, persisted and that profession remained a matter of choice up until the Bhagavad Gītā. (Even the Chinese traveller Hsüan Tsang, who visited India in the seventh century A.D., makes no mention of any caste system, although this might point to nothing more than a lack of interest on his part.) Moreover, that the brahmin, in the early law books, is able to take food from any Aryan – clearly an important consideration where the practice of gathering alms is concerned – suggests that the strictures

of commensality were as yet unknown; whilst the Nikāyas record, as we shall see, that the brahmin commonly took as his wife a woman of a different vaṛṇa, which entails that the vaṛṇas were not endogamous.

Thus we may say that if any form of the caste system were known during the Nikāya period – and it is doubtful that it was – this was in all probability restricted to certain non-Āryan groups practising despised occupations and that at the Āryan level of society none of the three defining characteristics of the caste were satisfied. Even if we do have in these despised groups what may be seen as proto-castes, we nowhere find the Buddha championing their cause. Rather, he seems to regard their lot as yet a further example of dukkha, and a dukkha dependent upon a lack of merit. The existence of low clans is just another saṁsāric fact.

If the existence of the caste in the Nikāya period is somewhat dubious this is not the case with the vaṛṇas, whose existence is well attested in the tests where they are always enumerated in the following order: khattiya, brahmin, vessa, sudda (e.g. D i 91; S iv 219, v 51f). Whilst it is perhaps an all too easy move to equate the brahmin with the first function of Vedic society, such a temptation should be resisted since in the Nikāyas many brahmins are lay householders and some even farmers (e.g. S i 172). Moreover, it would seem that in the Vedic period anyone might perform the priestly function, whilst in any case the brahmin priest had been only one such office, in charge of the southern fire and responsible for avoiding sacrificial mishaps through utterance of his Atharva Veda mantras. Indeed, it may well be that such brahmins came originally from an indigenous stratum, only later arrogating themselves into a position of importance both by their claim to embody the sacred power that ensured the success of the sacrifice and also by their making that sacrifice ever more complex and mysterious. In the process they began to have their office be seen as a hereditary one of divine origin (M ii 84, 148):

> Brahmins speak thus: 'Brahmins alone are the best vaṛṇa; other vaṛṇas are inferior. Brahmins alone are the white (or fair) vaṛṇa; other vaṛṇas are black (or dark). Brahmins alone are pure; not non-Brahmins. Brahmins are own sons of Brahmā, born from his mouth, born of Brahmā, created by Brahmā, heirs to Brahmā

The Buddhists reacted against such claims on the part of priestly brahmins in a variety of ways. In the Assalāyana Sutta the Buddha responds by arguing that brahmin women, just like other women, are seen to conceive and give birth and that brahmins are, like other men, born of women (M ii 148). This would explain the otherwise curious remark that 'Brahmā' is a term for 'mother and father' (A i 132, ii 70), meaning that those who claim to be 'born of Brahmā' claim nothing more than to be born of human parents. Three things are necessary for

conception to take place – that it be the mother's season, that there be coitus of the parents and that the gandhabba be present – and since one can never know the varṇa of the approaching gandhabba one can never know whether one be a (true) khattiya, brahmin, vessa or sudda (M ii 157).

In the Ambaṭṭha Sutta some evidence is found of the possible indigenous origins of certain brahmins for the brahmin Ambaṭṭha is forced to admit that his lineage can be traced back to the black baby born of a slave-girl of the Sākyas (D i 93f). Besides stressing the 'black' – and thus indigenous – origins of Ambaṭṭha, in contrast to the brahmins' sole claim to being the white varṇa, this same sutta shows that in matters of purity of descent the brahmins were far more lax than the khattiyas. For the brahmins would accept as their own, and accord full brahmin status to, the offspring of a khattiya/brahmin marriage, whereas this the khattiyas would never do due to impurity of descent on the brahmin side (D i 97ff). Indeed the khattiyas are praised by the Buddha on the grounds that they resorted to marrying their own sisters rather than injure the purity of the line (D i 92), implying that the Buddha, far from being critical of the varṇa divisions of society, upheld them and, moreover, charged the brahmin with laxity in this regard, just as it is Brahmā Sanankumāra, no less, who is found proclaiming that it is the khattiya who is best amongst those people who value descent (gotra) at D i 99 and M i 358.

The second way in which the Buddhists reacted against such claims of the brahmins was on the grounds that the varṇas were not hereditary but dependent upon conduct – and thus to some extent a matter of choice. It is not by birth that one is despicable (vasalo) any more than it is by birth that one is a brahmin; rather this comes about by what one does (Sn 142). This same sentiment finds expression elsewhere (e.g. Sn 650ff) and also at S i 98ff where it is said that a king at war would engage any man skilled in warfare irrespective of his varṇa and in such passages we may take it that the Buddha was not so much proposing an innovation but rather appealing to the earlier tradition that had gone before in which the adoption of a given profession, or function, had been dependent upon ability rather than birth.

This brings us to the third criticism of the brahmins' claim since in this same sutta the Buddha goes on to show that a man is a source of merit if spiritually skilled, whatever his varṇa. For originally the term 'brahmin' (brāhmaṇa) had meant simply 'one possessing Brahman', Brahman being in this connection a somewhat ill-defined sacredness or mystical insight, the source of divine power that bestowed sacrificial efficacy to the mantras that he intoned. It was through their seeing and hearing this Brahman that the Vedic ṛṣis had been able to encapsulate it in the Vedic hymns that they intoned; whilst the brahmin priests of the southern fire

came into possession of Brahman through the performance of ascetic practices prior to the sacrifice itself. Possession of Brahman was the result of conduct, not of birth as the priestly brahmin contemporaries of the Buddha claimed. If the officiating brahmin is not in possession of Brahman, not in contact with the source of divine power, his sacrifice will be sterile and his mantras merely empty sounds:

> But just so, Ambaṭṭha, those ancient ṛṣis of the brahmins, the authors of the mantras, the utterers of the mantras, whose ancient form of words so chanted, uttered or composed the brahmins of today chant over again and rehearse, intoning or reciting exactly as has been intoned – to wit, Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Aṅgirasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāseṭṭha, Kassapa and Bhagu – though you can say:
>
> 'I, and my teacher, know by heart these verses', that you should on that account be ṛṣis, or have attained the state of a ṛṣi – such a condition does not exist!
>
> Now what think you, Ambaṭṭha? What have you heard when brahmins, old and well stricken in years, teachers of yours or their teachers, were talking together – did those ancient ṛṣis, whose mantras you so chant over and repeat, parade about well groomed, perfumed, trimmed as to their hair and beard, adorned with garlands and gems, clad in white garments, in full possession and enjoyment of the five pleasures of sense, as you, and your teacher, do now?
>
> Or did they live, as their food, on boiled rice of the best sorts, from which all the black specks had been sought out and removed, and flavoured with sauces and curries of various kinds, as you, and your teacher, do now? Or were they waited upon by women with fringes and furbelows round their loins, as you, and your teacher, do now?
>
> Or did they go about driving chariots drawn by mares with plaited manes and tails, using long wands and goads the while, as you, and your teacher, do now?
>
> Or did they have themselves guarded in fortified towns with moats dug out round them and crossbars let down before the gates, by men girt with long swords, as you, and your teacher, do now?

(D i 104f, after the abbreviation of Rhys Davids at Dial i 129f).

It will be noted that in his criticism of the priestly brahmin the Buddha, far from being critical of the early ideal of the brahmin as possessor of Brahman, instead uses this against his contemporary counterpart who is found lacking in several respects:

a He merely repeats the words of the former ṛṣis, without himself knowing Brahman. With this might be compared the formulation of the Dhamma in sound, as the drum of the Deathless* compared with its subsequent formulation in expositional suttas, as discussed earlier.

b He lives a life of great luxury, driving about in chariots. Compare how one day Ānanda saw 'the brahmin Jānussoṇi driving out of Sāvatthī in

his chariot, drawn by pure white mares; white were the steeds harnessed thereto and white the trappings, white the chariot. White were the fittings, white the reins, the goad, the canopy, his turban, his clothes and sandals, and by a white goad was he fanned' (S v 4).

c He lives in fortified towns, an anathema to the khattiya who, more than anyone, preserved the old nomadic ideal of the Indo-Āryans and whose deity Indra was known as Puraṁdara, or 'Fort-shatterer', who went on before them shattering the fortified cities (pura-) of the indigenous peoples whose habits the brahmins have now begun to adopt. The Buddhists – and other so-called heterodox movements – on the other hand, perpetuated the nomadic ideal of the Vedic period by going forth into the homeless life, for 'the household life is confined and dusty; going forth is in the open' (M i 179).

The most conclusive evidence that priestly brahmins such as Ambaṭṭha are not in possession of Brahman can be seen from:

d Their puthujjana-like addiction to sensual pleasures, and 'even though a brahmin may be old, eighty, ninety, a hundred years old, yet, if he still takes pleasure in sense-desires and dwells amongst them, if he burns with the burning of sense-desires, is preyed on by the imagination of them, is eager in the quest for sense-desires – then such a one is reckoned a fool' (A i 68). For by the Nikāya period such brahmins had, in addition, become greedy for money and greedy about women (D ii 245) whereas (Sn 284–306; so Woven Cadences, pp. 44–46):

Rishis of old, austere, restrained-of-self,
Quit of five pleasures, fared to goal-of-self.
Then brahmans had no cows nor gold nor corn;
Lore was rich wealth, they guarded godly store
(brahmaṁ nidhiṁ apālayuṁ – Brahman was the hidden
treasure that they guarded).
Meet alms they deemed the common door-step fare,
In faith prepared, for earnest seekers set.
And rich of realm and province honoured them
With couches, multi-coloured cloths, demesnes.
Inviolable were the brahmans then,
Invincible, by Dharma warded well . . .
They went not with another caste (varṇa) nor bought
Their wives; but wed thro' love, in concord dwelt.
Save near the time of season abstinence,
Brahmans elsewise never had intercourse.
They praised god-faring (Brahmacariya*) . . .
Then came a change; here now, there now, they looked
On kingly splendour; then on women's charms;
On well-made chariots yoked with thoroughbreds,

Gaily caparisoned; on homesteads too,
Houses partitioned, quartered, cubicled;
Droves of fat oxen; throngs of women fair:
And the gross wealth of men they coveted.
Intoning hymns they to Okkāka came:
'Thine is abundance, thine great opulence;
Make sacrifice for thou much substance hast!
Make sacrifice for thou great riches hast!'
Thereat the royal lord . . . to the brahmans
riches gave: Cows, beds,
And clothes, fair women, shapely carriages
Harnessed with steeds in gay caparison;
Homes well-partitioned, roomy, amiable,
With divers treasures filled; he gave them wealth.
Wealth won, they set their hearts on hoarding wealth:
Greed gratified, their craving waxed the more

Indeed there were, in the Buddha's day, five qualities to be found more often in dogs than in brahmins (A iii 221f):

In former times brahmins approached only a brāhmaṇī (female brahmin), never a non-brāhmaṇī; now they go to the brāhmiṇī and non-brāhmiṇī alike – today dogs go to dogs only, never to other creatures.

In former times brahmins approached a brāhmaṇī only in season, never at other times; now they go to a brāhmiṇī both in and out of season – today dogs go to dogs only in season, never at other times.

In former times brahmins neither bought nor sold a brāhmiṇī but, consorting just where affection was mutual, fostered concord; now they do any of these things – today dogs neither buy nor sell dogs but consort just where affection is mutual and foster concord.

In former times brahmins hoarded neither treasure, grain, silver nor gold; now they do these things – today dogs hoard neither treasure, grain, silver nor gold.

In former times brahmins sought food for the evening meal in the evening, for the morning meal in the morning; now after cramming their bellies to the uttermost, they take away the remainder – today dogs seek food for the evening meal in the evening, for the morning meal in the morning

Again and again we find the brahmin being censured for his excessive indulgence in sense-desires and possessions and also for his lack of concern for the purity of the Āryan blood, which it seems was a foremost concern amongst kṣatriyans. Some brahmins, however, took to the ascetic life and in so doing seem to have gone to the other extreme, mortifying themselves to an extent equalled only by the sensual excesses of their home-loving counterparts (e.g. A i 295f). Thus when, in the

First Sermon, the Buddha announced that there were two dead ends: (1) addiction to attractive pleasures of the senses that is low, of the villager, of the puthujjana, unariyan and not connnected with the goal; and (2) addiction to self-torment that is dukkha, unariyan and not connected with the goal (Vin i 10) it is quite probable that he had in mind the twin extremes, the twin depths to which Brāhmaṇism had sunk; whilst in positing a middle course that makes for vision, that makes for knowledge and that conduces to awakening, to nibbāna, he was doing no more than proclaiming his rediscovery of the ancient path* from which the brahmins had long since strayed (S iv 117f):

Foremost in virtue were the men of old,
Those brahmins who remembered ancient rules.
In them well guarded were the doors of sense.
They had achieved the mastery of wrath.
In meditation and the Dhamma they took delight,
Those brahmins who remembered ancient rules.

But these backsliders with their 'Let us recite',
Drunk with the pride of birth, walk wrongfully.
O'ercome by wrath, exceeding violent,
They come to loss 'mongst weak and strong alike.
Vain is the penance of the uncontrolled,
Empty as treasure gotten in a dream.

Such ways as fastings, couching on the ground,
Bathing at dawn, recitings of the Three (Vedas),
Wearing rough hides, and matted hair and filth,
Chantings and empty rites and penances,
Hypocrisy and cheating and the rod,
Washings, ablutions, rinsings of the mouth, –
These are the caste-marks (vaṇṇā) of the brahmin folk,
Things done and practised for some trifling gain.

A heart well tamed, made pure and undefiled,
Considerate for every living thing, –
That is the path* to attainment of Brahman

Thus the Buddha is critical of the two dead ends in which he takes the brahmins to be – excessive indulgence in the pleasures of the senses and excessive asceticism – both of which diverge from the old Vedic ideal of the ṛṣi of few wants, the true brahmin* of whom the Buddha quite clearly approves, so much so that he proclaims his arahants* to be the true brahmin* (D i 167; Ud 3, 4, 6, 29; Sn 612–656; Dhp 383–423, etc.). Whereas the brahmin had made a mere rite (S i 182f) or, at the other

extreme, an ascetic practice (Ud 6) of going down to the river to bathe, hoping thereby to wash away his evil deeds, the true means to this was the 'inner-washing' of the tenfold path* (A v 216f), of the sotāpattiyaṅgas* (S v 391) and arahantship* (M i 38f; S i 169, 182f; Ud 6, etc.).

This true brahmin* understands as it really is* the Four Truths* of dukkha (It 105f) and the escape from the world's attraction and danger (A i 260). He is, in short, the sāvaka* and most often the arahant* and we must be careful to distinguish this true brahmin* from his pleasure-seeking and ascetic counterparts. The true tevijja (Three-Veda) brahmin* is not the indigenous opportunist like Ambaṭṭha, steeped in sensual pleasure and luxury, and vacuously reciting the Vedas without understanding their true meaning – and, moreover, for a fee (D i 8, iii 64) – but the arahant* who possesses the tevijja, the three 'Vedas' or knowledges of (a) his former lives; (b) the rebirths of others through witnessing their arising in heaven and hell and so on; and (c) the certainty of his own release (A i 165 = It 100f):

> He who knows his former dwellings and who sees both heaven and the states of loss, who has reached the destruction of birth – that sage who has mastered the superknowledges – him I call a tevijja brahmin* on account of these three knowledges; him I call tevijja, not that other (brahmin) with his constant mutterings

It is precisely these three qualities that the (so-called) brahmin contemporaries of the Buddha lacked due to their having renounced those states that make one a brahmin* and adopting instead those states that make one a non-brahmin (D i 245f). To employ them to intercede on one's behalf and invoke the devas' participation in the sacrifice would be as successful as to have them stand on one bank of the Aciravatī river and invoke the further bank by calling upon it to come over (D i 244f). This they readily admit themselves when, having gone forth and attained arahantship*, they confess (M ii 123):

> Indeed we were nearly lost, indeed we were nearly lost, for while we were not (true) recluses, we claimed that we were, saying, 'We are recluses'; while we were not (true) brahmins* (abbrāhmaṇā), we claimed that we were, saying, 'We are brahmins*'; while we were not (true) arahants*, we claimed that we were, saying, 'We are arahants*'. But now we really are recluses, now we really are brahmins*, now we really are arahants*

By having, as arahants*, become true brahmins* they had come into possession of Brahman – they were brahmabhūta* (M i 341 = ii 160; cp It 57; Sn 561). Moreover, just as brahmins had, unjustifiably, claimed

to be 'own sons of Brahmā, born from his mouth, born of Brahmā, created by Brahmā, heirs to Brahmā' (M ii 84, 148), so did they, as sāvakas*, through being born of the ariyan* birth (M ii 103) now come to be an 'own son* of the Lord (on occasion called Brahmā – e.g. A i 207; cp AA ii 322f), born from his mouth, Dhamma-born, Dhamma-created, an heir to the Dhamma' (e.g. S ii 221). Just as the brahmin's claim was intended to remove him from the purely mundane sphere and accord him a divine origin, so too was the true brahmin*, as sāvaka*, no longer of the world but one with his being rooted in the Deathless*. Indeed, since it had been only the brahmin's possession of Brahman, the divine power, which he mediated in order to ensure the efficacy of the sacrifice, so now was it only the sāvaka*, who, through his participation on the supermundane* plane, could mediate this power in the practice of almsgiving into which that sacrifice had been transformed. For just as the brahmin had been worthy of alms only through his being śrotriya (versed in śruti, the Veda), so now was it only the sāvaka* who as sutavant*, or indeed as sotāpanna*, was so worthy. In a recent study[1] of the Buddhist adaptation of the sacrifice, Roy Clayton Amore has shown that the Buddhists consciously substituted the practice of making merit for the Brāhmaṇic sacrifice and that in many suttas Brāhmaṇic sacrificial terms were employed but given a new meaning. At the same time it was claimed that Buddhist wanderers were worthy of the same hospitality originally due to wandering, Veda-knowing (śrotriya) brahmins. In particular, Amore demonstrates that the stock epithet of the sāvakasaṅgha* – that it is 'worthy of sacrifice, worthy of hospitality, worthy of offerings, worthy of añjali, the unsurpassed merit-field for the world' – is in fact composed of attributes formerly applicable to the brahmin and especially to the brahmin guest (atithi). With respect to the brahmin guest, Gonda notes that according to 'AV 15, 13, 1 – the man who receives a Brahman in his house "secures those pure (holy: puṇyāḥ) lokāḥ which are on the earth".'[2] This is a particularly interesting observation for, as Gonda shows elsewhere in the same work, the term loka seems to have originally been used to denote a clearing in the jungle, the place where the celestial powers broke through into the mundane. This penetration was also thought represented by the place where the sacrifice was performed:

> . . . 'for that indeed is "heavenly world" where they immolate the victim' (eṣa vai svargo loko yatra paśuṁ saṁjñapayanti); that means that the sacrificial place is in direct communication with the 'world of the divine'. It is, according to ŚB 6 6 3 9 ('the place where Agni (the sacrificial fire) is kindled is the navel of the earth') and VS 23, 60f; ŚB 13 5 2 20f 'the navel of this world' (asya bhuvanasya nābhiḥ), the centre in which a break-through from the celestial and the mundane plane is manifest, that very plane which with

> respect to the earth and the sacrificer is the source of real life because it is the mystic point of contact with the high powers. Here the sacrificer is safeguarded against danger (ŚB 1 1 2 23: 'the navel means the centre, and the centre is safe from danger'). However the centre (madhyam), the navel, is the place in which the axis mundi, the cosmic axis, the central pillar or 'frame of creation' – which, putting the cosmic levels into communication, links heaven and earth and sustains the components of the universe – reaches the earth, constituting a means of communicating with or 'travelling to' heaven as well as a canal through which the heavenly blessings may penetrate into the abodes of men[3]

Agni, as the sacrificial fire, was, moreover, seen as the earthly counterpart of his heavenly aspect, the sun – the door to the Deathless*, or amṛtaṁ (BU V 15 1 = Īśa U 15; cp Maitrī U VI 35) – and connected with the sun by means of the deva-yāna, the channel or canal along which Agni brought the devas, the divine power, down to ensure the efficacy of the sacrifice and along which Agni also transported to the fathers the sacrificial offerings that had been consumed in his flames. Thus it is not surprising that the increasing importance assumed by the brahmin as the representation of divine power amidst the mundane led to the tendency of identifying the brahmin with Agni and all the more so where the sacrificial act consisted in feeding the worthy brahmin who, like Agni, must consume the sacrificial offering in order to send it on its way. Thus just as at RV I 73 1 Agni (who is himself styled arhaṇa, or worthy – RV I 127 6; II 3 3) is likened to a guest in the house of the sacrificer, so does Kaṭha U I 1 7 state that the brahmin guest (atithir) enters the house like fire (vaiśvānaraḥ = Agni).

Thus we may say that in the Vedic period Agni, as sacrificial fire, had been understood to be in contact with, by way of the deva-yāna, his celestial aspect as the sun, itself the door to the Deathless* and the source of divine power. The sacrificial fire was thus the point of communication between the mundane and supermundane* planes – indeed the sacrificial fire was in a sense that supermundane* plane on earth. In the Buddha's day, however, the brahmins maintained that they themselves represented this point of contact and were likened to Agni, the one worthy (arhaṇa) of the sacrifice. The Buddhists, on the other hand, claimed that the brahmins of their day had, as was obvious from their behaviour, lost contact with this source of divine energy and no longer were in possession of Brahman. Rather it was the Buddhists themselves who were now alone in contact with these powers, with the supermundane* plane; it was now the supermundane* sāvakasaṅgha* that alone represented the point of communication between the supermundane* and mundane planes and that was alone worthy (arahant*) of the sacrifice. Only food placed in the mouth of the sāvakasaṅgha*, the new sacrificial

fire or Agni, would bear the desired results including its transmission to the petas. In this connection it is of interest to note, in passing, how the Nikāyas record the curious belief that food presented to the Buddha but not eaten by him could be digested only by the Tathāgata or by one of his sāvakas*. For this reason the Buddha advises Bhāradvāja to pour that food where there is little green grass or where there is water with no creatures in it, whereupon it seethes and hisses and sends forth steam and smoke as might a ploughshare, heated all day, when plunged into water (Sn p 15; cp Ud 82 where the remains of Cunda's truffles have to be buried for the same reason and also M i 12ff where it is said that the food of one sāvaka* may be eaten by another sāvaka* or else is to be disposed of in the same manner employed by Bhāradvāja). The fact that such food becomes full of heat suggests that the association of the sāvakasaṅgha* with Agni was also present in the Buddhist mind and is also reminiscent of the belief at the Vedic sacrifice that all left-overs had to be burnt since they now possessed divine essence (cp KS i 211 n 3 for a similar explanation). This suggests that the sāvakasaṅgha* – and particularly the Buddha – were looked upon as Agni in both his aspects as fire and the sun. Proof of the former, in addition to the above, may be found in the fact that just as at the Buddha's Parinibbāna the body of the Buddha resisted efforts to set it alight until Mahākassapa arrived, whereupon it burst into flame of its own accord (D ii 163f), so too did the venerable Bakkula at his parinibbāna, not wishing his body to be a burden to any other monk, enter into the element of heat (tejodhātu), whereupon a flame sprang from his body and his skin, flesh and blood burnt like ghee and were destroyed (MA iv 196 quoted MLS iii 174 n 2). As to the association of the Buddha and the sāvakasaṅgha* with the sun we may recall the high degree of solar symbolism that continually surrounds the Buddha and his sāvakas*. The Buddha is the radiance-maker (S i 210) and is, at birth, likened to the sun in a cloudless autumnal sky (Sn 687); he is continually called Ādiccabandhu, linked with or related to the sun, Āditya (e.g. S i 186, 192; A ii 54; Sn 54; Vin ii 296, etc.). Similarly, his sāvaka* is often said to be brilliant like the sun (Ud 3; It 51); and we have already had cause to note both that the arising of the Dhammacakkhu* is likened to the autumnal sun rising into the heavens, shining, burning and flashing forth in all directions (A i 242) and that the sāvakasaṅgha*, in contrast with the puthujjana, is on the solar path* of no return.

Moreover, we may speculate, given that the ariyan* eightfold path* is the path leading to the Deathless* (amatagāmimaggo – S v 8), that that path* was itself at times seen in terms of the deva-yāna such that we arrive at the diagram in Fig. 3 which may be compared with that given earlier in illustration of the true analysis of the Buddhist world.



1 Right view*
= ariyan* birth
= crossed over and going beyond
2 Right resolve*
3 Right speech*
4 Right action*
5 Right livelihood*
6 Right effort*
7 Right mindfulness*
8 Right concentration*
9 Right knowledge*
10 Right release*
= crossed over and gone beyond

Fig. 3. The Sāvakasaṅgha* as the Mediation of the Divine Powers of the Deathless*.

Thus the sāvakasaṅgha*, like the sacrifice before it, can be seen as the navel, the centre that is safe from danger. Thus it was, no doubt, that upon sight of the Deathless* people chose to go for refuge, that is, for this protection now afforded by the Buddha. Similarly, we may compare the practice, in more modern times, prevalent amongst Sinhalese Buddhists, of placing in the Saṅgha any son having an inauspicious horoscope since it is thought the Saṅgha affords special protection in this direction. Moreover, we can also see how the sāvakasaṅgha* could claim to be in contact with the divine powers – a point surely enforced by the numerous passages recording either visits of devas to the Buddha or, conversely, visits of the Buddha and his chief sāvakas* to the worlds of the devas. But most interesting perhaps is the fact that the Deathless* was in the Vedic sources often spoken of as the cosmic waters, which makes one wonder whether this was not why Nārada had claimed that although he had seen nibbāna it was nonetheless for the present like the water at the bottom of a well which he could see but not yet touch.

From the foregoing it will be clear that by the period covered by the Nikāyas a group of individuals, from the Buddhist point of view of dubious ancestry, had arrogated themselves into a position of religious power and wealth on the basis that they alone embodied the sacred power of Brahman. The Buddhists, feeling that their unariyan behaviour disqualified them from this, openly criticised what they took to be a band of indigenous opportunists, but in this they were motivated by no egalitarian ethic on behalf of the despised clans. Indeed it was rather the other way round for the evidence of the Nikāyas suggests that it was the altogether more conservative cause of the kṣatriyans that the Buddhists favoured. The kṣatriyans were so intent on preserving the purity of Āryan blood that they took to incest whereas the brahmins would go with any varṇa or indeed a woman of the despised clans (A iii 228), accepting, unlike the kṣatriyans, any offspring. It was no doubt for this reason that they considered the brahmin low born, to the extent that Pasenadi, king of Kosala, would not allow the brahmin Pokkharasādi to enter his presence and would only speak to him from behind a curtain (D i 103; cp Dial i 128 n 2). They also saw in the brahmin of their day a degeneration of the former ideals of Vedic society which they cherished and it was these the Buddhists claimed they were preserving. The Buddhists' criticism of the brahmin was a spiritual rather than a social criticism and in claiming that the arahant* was the true brahmin*, on a par with the ṛṣis of olden times, they were advocating a reform, a return to the conservatism of the past, rather than an innovation. Indeed, as Amore shows in transforming the animal sacrifice of the brahmin and support for the wandering brahmin into support for the sāvakasaṅgha*, they did not have to convince the donor of the benefit of the practice itself. All they

were doing was adopting, and adapting, an already well-established institution in which brahmin families – for it is almost totally amongst brahmin families that the texts suggest the Buddhists sought their sustenance as indeed it was nearly always brahmins to whom the Dhammacakkhu* was given – believed themselves to be acquiring merit. The Buddhists had merely to convince such individuals that although the spiritually inept brahmin was unable to guarantee the sukṛtaṁ svargaṁ lokaṁ would be theirs after death, this doubt was not applicable in the case of his sāvakas*, the true brahmins* who could alone guarantee the sugatiṁ saggaṁ lokaṁ. No attempt is made to educate the masses religiously – they are allowed to retain their old aspirations for their old goal; only the means to that goal is changed. In short they spoke the language of the people and it is no doubt for this reason that they triumphed where their contemporary rivals to Brāhmaṇism failed. They did not reject the institution of the varṇa but rather restored to Āryan society the earlier conservatism it was in danger of losing, and as Célestin Bouglé has it 'if they worked at replacing the roof, they never gave a thought to changing the foundations'.[4]

Last days

The very disease that had ruinously infected the old roof very soon also attacked the new. The decline so frequently predicted by the Buddha took place and even sooner, perhaps, than he had anticipated, whereupon most of the criticisms that had been levelled against the brahmin now came to be equally applicable to the puthujjana monk. It was the monk wearing robes made of rags taken from rubbish heaps and cemeteries, eating only what was received into his begging bowl and living in the open air at the roots of trees, not going under a roof except during the compulsory residence of the rainy season (M ii 6–9), that was the true brahmin* leading the life of simplicity associated with the ṛṣis of old. However, he was soon to be replaced by the monk who, longing for fine robes, fine almsfood and fine accommodation, would abandon such practices in favour of dwelling in the village or city. He would even take to living with nuns and, as a consequence, lose all desire for the Brahmacariya* and return to the lay life; or he would live in company with monastery attendants and novices, when he would live and feast upon the plenty of hoarded stocks (a practice impossible for the arahant* – D iii 235) and mark out his lands and crops. Such were the Buddha's fears for the future (A iii 108ff), at which time the monks would give up the earlier practice of sleeping on straw and become delicate, soft and tender in hands and feet, lying till sunrise on soft couches and pillows of down; and these monks would fall prey to Māra (S ii 267f).

That is to say, the sāvaka* monk was soon to give way to the puthujjana monk and, moreover, to one frequently of bad behaviour, since as non-sāvaka he lacked the fourth sotāpattiyaṅga* of possession of that sīla dear to the ariyans*. Such monks were, given the Buddha's criteria above, no better than the brahmins before them. The true brahmin* was to be followed by a monk as spiritually sterile as his former brahmin counterpart, no more knowing the supermundane* than the brahmin had known Brahman. Having lost contact with the Dhamma as the sound of the Deathless* he turned increasingly to the Dhamma as formulated in the sutta and just as the brahmin had vacuously chanted the mantras of old without understanding their true meaning, so did the puthujjana monk misunderstand the collected utterances, addressed originally to sāvakas*, coming to believe, like Saviṭṭha (S ii 115ff), that anyone who could see as it really was* that the cessation of becoming was nibbāna must be an arahant*. That is, he came to believe that right view* lay at the end of the path* rather than at its beginning and in his search for the means of acquiring this right view* he resorted, in time, to the scholastic analysis of the Abhidhamma as had the brahmin, in his search for a substitute for the lost Soma, resorted to an intricate analysis of the sacrifice in such texts as the Brāhmaṇas. For the interesting question as to why the Buddhists collected the remembered utterances of the Buddha has not, to my knowledge, ever been raised, yet we may say that one already on the path* would have had little use for such utterances whilst, since such teachings were originally intended to suit the particular need of a given individual, they could have had little benefit if given a general application. Perhaps, as puthujjanas unaware of this, they set about what became a major industry supposing that though through Ānanda's cosmic blunder they had lost the Buddha they need not lose his teachings which might afford some clue as to how that goal was to be attained.

Once those who had formerly supported the brahmin had been convinced that the yellow robed monk was more merit-worthy than the brahmin it was possible for an increasingly large number of puthujjana monks to rise to power, living off the country's almsfood on the grounds that they were the true brahmin*. In so doing, the puthujjana monk became like his earlier brahmin counterpart in the sense that he came to possess some of the arrogance associated with that brahmin, as may be seen from the claim that there were twenty-two reasons why the layman, even if a sāvaka*, should rise from his seat in token of respect for, and revere, any member of the order of monks even if he be but a puthujjana novice (Miln 161ff). When there were in the world no longer any lay sāvakas* the division of the Buddhist world in terms of the sāvaka* and the puthujjana gave way to one in terms of monk and layman which has

pertained to this day as evidenced, for instance, by Ling quoted earlier. It is not generally realised, however, that since the Buddhists justified their entitlement to alms on the grounds that they alone, as supermundane*, were in contact with the Deathless* and thus alone were capable of guaranteeing that gifts given to them would bear the desired fruit, it follows that when the sāvakasaṅgha* finally disappeared from this world, so with it went this source of unsurpassed merit. For the Buddha recalls that although he had once, in a former birth as the brahmin Velāma, given vast alms, such gifts came to little since 'there was no one worthy to receive the gifts, there was none to sanctify those gifts. For though the Brahmin Velāma gave those very rich gifts, greater would have been the fruit thereof had he fed one person of right view* – and greater still had he fed a sakadāgāmin*, an anāgāmin*, an arahant*, a Paccekabuddha, a Tathāgata or the order of monks with the Buddha at its head' (A iv 394f). This 'order of monks with the Buddha at its head' is to be seen as a designation of the order of monks during the Buddha's own lifetime as opposed to that following his Parinibbāna (cp M iii 255 where this distinction is made) and consisting, as we have seen, entirely of sāvakas*. When the order of monks no longer contained any sāvakas*, when it was an order purely of puthujjana monks, there would be once more, even in the order of monks, no one capable of sanctifying gifts made. The puthujjana monk could be no more a source of merit than his brahmin predecessor since neither were in contact with the divine powers that had to be mediated if a gift were to bear the desired fruit – thus perhaps the modern Sinhalese practice of monks accepting alms on behalf of the ariyasaṅgha* reaching as far back as such great sāvakas* as Sāriputta and Mahāmoggalāna. For only then might the Sinhalese, through a gift to the Saṅgha, release their desire of generating sufficient merit that in future they might see the holy king Buddha Maitrī, hear the preaching on the Four Truths* and be established on the path*.

Thus we may say that when the sāvakasaṅgha* finally disappeared, so too did not only the supermundane* path* but also the lunar path it provided for those on the side of merit seeking pleasurable rebirths. When these two paths disappeared is not known but we may surmise that if one sāvaka* were incapable of establishing another on the path* then with the odd exception of the sattakkhattuparama* returning for a maximum of seven further births (and some amongst the devas where the life-span is, by our standards, tremendous) it cannot have been long after the Buddha's Parinibbāna; and whilst the Buddha estimated that the true Dhamma* would last no longer than five hundred years, it may rather have been a matter of a mere seventy years or so. The path*, the ancient path* through the woods that the Buddha had rediscovered – and which was really no path* at all – was quickly reclaimed by the jungle (vana =

Māra) and became so overgrown by the later scholasticism that one might never suspect it were there:

They shut the road through the woods
Seventy years ago.
Weather and rain have undone it again,
And now you would never know
There once was a road through the woods
Before they planted the trees.
It is underneath the coppice and heath
And the twin anemones.
Only the keeper sees
That, where the ring-dove broods,
And the badgers roll at ease,
There was once a road through the woods.
Yet if you enter the woods
Of a summer evening late,
When the night-air cools on the trout-ringed pools
Where the otter whistles his mate,
(They fear not men in the woods,
Because they see so few.)
You will hear the beat of a horse's feet,
And the swish of a skirt in the dew,
Steadily cantering through
The misty solitudes,
As though they perfectly knew
The old lost road through the woods . . .
But there is no road through the woods[5]

Notes to Chapter 4

1 Roy Clayton Amore, *The Concept and Practice of Doing Merit in Early Theravāda Buddhism* (Columbia University, 1970), University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1971.
2 Jan Gonda, *Loka: World and Heaven in the Veda* (Amsterdam, 1966), p. 57.
3 ibid, p. 43f.
4 Célestin Bouglé, *Essays on the Caste System*, trans. D. F. Pocock (Cambridge, 1971), p. 73.
5 Rudyard Kipling, *The Way through the Woods*.

A place | Deathless* | A state of mind

(I)
Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanūpaga — Jhāna 8
Ākiñcāyatanūpaga — Jhāna 7
Viññāṇañcāyatanūpaga — Jhāna 6
Ākāsānañcāyatanūpaga — Jhāna 5

Akaniṭṭha
Sudassi
Sudassa
Atappa
Aviha
} Pure Abodes — Jhāna 4 (Supermundane*)

Asaññasatta
Vehapphala — (Mundane)

Subhakiṇha
Appamāṇasubha
Parittasubha — Jhāna 3

(II)
Ābhassara
Appamāṇābha
Parittābha — Jhāna 2

Mahābrahmās
Brahmapurohita
Brahmaparisajja
} Brahma-kāyika — Jhāna 1

(III)
Paranimmitavasavatti
Nimmānarati
Tusita
Yāma
Tāvatiṁsa
Cātummahārājika
Earth — Sense-desire

Vinipāta — Suffering

Ādhidaivic | Ādhyātmic

(I) Arūpāvacara
(II) Rūpāvacara
(III) Kāmāvacara
[shaded box] Supermundane* plane

NB Jhānas 5–8 are technically merely modifications of jhāna 4

There is no route to the Deathless* not leading through the Pure Abodes, the door to the Deathless* – even those in jhānas 5–8 must first return to jhāna 4 as did the Buddha at the Parinibbāna

Fig. 4. A Correlation of the Ādhidaivic and Ādhyātmic Views of the Cosmic Mind or Mental World.

Table 4. *Recorded Instances of Conversion*

Reference	Name	Status	Means employed	By	Dhammacakkhu* mentioned	It is wonderful!	Takes refuges	Becomes lay-follower	Requests ordination	Fate known
Vin i 12	Vappa	G/f	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 12	Bhaddiya	G/f	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 13	Mahānāma	G/f	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 13	Assaji	G/f	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin ii 200	500 monks of Devadatta's schism	Monk	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Sāriputta & Moggallāna	*					
Vin i 40	Sāriputta	G/f	Hearing concise verse of Dhamma	Assaji	*				*	A+
Vin i 41f	Moggallāna	G/f	Hearing concise verse of Dhamma	Sāriputta	*				*	A+
M i 380	Upāli	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*		*	*		
A iv 186	General Sīha	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*		*	*		
A iv 209f, 213	Ugga	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*		*	*		Anāgāmin*
Vin i 15f	Yasa	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 19	Vimala	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 19	Subāhu	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 19	Puṇṇaji	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 19f	Gavampati plus 50 friends	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 23	30 friends from Pāva	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*				*	A+
Vin i 181	Soṇa Koḷivisa	Lay	(Progressive talk?)	Buddha	(*?)				*	A+
Vin i 16	Yasa's father	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
Vin i 18	Yasa's mother	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddhr	*	*	*	*		

Vin i 18	Yasa's wife	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
Vin i 37	King Bimbisāra	King	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
Vin i 180f	80000 village overseers	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
Vin i 225f	Belaṭṭha Kaccāna	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
Vin ii 156f	Anāthapiṇḍika	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
Vin ii 192	Buddha's would-be assassin	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
D i 110	Pokkharasādi	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
D i 148	Kūṭadanta	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
M ii 145	Brahmāyu	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		Anāgāmin*
Ud 49	Suppabuddha	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha	*	*	*	*		Sotāpanna*
D ii 40f	Khaṇḍa and Tissa	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha Vipassin	*	*	*		*	A+
D ii 43	84000 laymen	Lay	Progressive talk	Buddha Vipassin	*	*	*		*	A+
D ii 44	84000 who had gone forth	G/f	Progressive talk	Buddha Vipassin	*	*	*		*	A+
Vin i 11f	Koṇḍañña	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*				*	A+
D ii 288	Sakka plus 80000 devas	Devas	Discourse	Buddha	*					(Anāgāmin*?)
M iii 280 (= S iv 107)	1000s of devatās	Devas	Overhearing discourse given to Rāhula	Buddha	*					
S iv 47	Unnamed monk	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	*					
M i 501	Dīghanakha	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*	*	*		
D i 125	Soṇadaṇḍa	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
D i 210	Subha	Lay	Discourse	Ānanda		*	*	*		
D i 234	Lohicca	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
Di 252 (= Sn p 123)	Vāseṭṭha and Shāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
D ii 132f	Pukkusa	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
M i 205	Piṅgalakoccha	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
M i 396	Prince Abhaya	Prince	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
M ii 90	King Avantiputta	King	Discourse	Kaccāna		*	*	*		
M ii 162	Ghoṭamukha	Lay	Discourse	Udena		*	*	*		
M ii 213	Saṅgārava	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		

Reference	Name	Status	Means employed	By	Dhammacakkhu* mentioned	It is wonderful!	Takes refuges	Becomes lay-follower	Requests ordination	Fate known
M iii 7	Gaṇaka-Moggallāna	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 70	King Pasenadi	King	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 173	Kasi-Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 174	Udaya	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 175	Devahita	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 177	Mahāsāla	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 178	Mānatthaddha	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 179	Paccanīkasāta	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 180	Navakammika-Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 181	Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 182	Mātuposaka	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 182	Bhikkhaka	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 183	Saṅgārava	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S i 184	Khomadussa Brahmins	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S ii 76	Unnamed Brahmin	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S ii 77	Jāṇussoṇi	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S ii 77	Lokāyatika	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
S iv 113	King Udena	King	Discourse	Bhāradvāja		*	*	*		
A i 56	Unnamed Brahmin	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 57	Jāṇussoṇi	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 62	Unnamed Brahmin	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 67	Ārāmadaṇḍa	Lay	Discourse	Kaccāna		*	*	*		
A i 68	Kaṇḍarāyana	Lay	Discourse	Kaccāna		*	*	*		
A i 156f	Unnamed Brahmin	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 159	Jāṇussoṇi	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 160	Unnamed Brahmin	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 166	Tikaṇṇa	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 168	Jāṇussoṇi	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		
A i 173	Saṅgārava	Lay	Discourse	Buddha		*	*	*		

A i 219	Unnamed householder	Lay	Discourse	Ānanda	*	*	*		
M i 391	Puṇṇa	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*	*		
S ii 23	Timbaruka	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*	*		
S v 11f	Nandiya	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*	*		
A i 158	Unnamed Brahmin	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*	*		
M i 39f	Sundarika-Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 161	Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 163	Akkosaka	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 164	Asurindaka	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 164	Bilaṅgika	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 165	Ahiṁsaka	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 165	Jaṭā	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 166	Suddhika	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 167	Aggika	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 170	Sundarika	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S i 171	Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
Sn p 15 (cp S i 173 above)	Kasi-Bhāradvāja	Lay	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
D i 176f	Kassapa	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
D i 202f	Citta	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
D ii 152f	Subhadda (last sāvalka*)	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
M i 391f	Seniya	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
M i 493	Vacchagotta	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
M i 512f	Māgandiya	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
S ii 21f	Kassapa	G/f	Discourse	Buddha	*	*		*	A+
M ii 48	Ghaṭīkāra	Lay	Four verbs	Buddha Kassapa			*		Anāgāmin*
M ii 48	Jotipāla	Lay	Four verbs	Buddha Kassapa				*	Eventually reborn as the Buddha Gotama

Notes

a	This table is not claimed to be exhaustive but lists those cases so far traced
b	Was M ii 48 the Buddha's path*-entry?
Status:	social status prior to conversion
G/f:	one gone forth either individually or amongst some non-Buddhist sect
Dhammacakkhu* mentioned:	acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu* explicitly stated; but since it was a frequent response of those gaining the Dhammacakkhu* to say 'It is wonderful', and so on, it may be assumed that this is in itself an indication of acquisition of the Dhammacakkhu*
It is wonderful!:	stock passage (C)
Takes refuges:	goes for refuge as in stock passage (C)
Becomes lay-follower:	stock passage (D)
Requests ordination:	stock passage (F)
Fate known:	fruit* attained documented either at passage concerned or elsewhere – see Table 5 for details
A+:	the person concerned became an arahant* – see Table 5
Progressive talk:	stock passage (A)
?:	text unclear on this point

Table 5. *Recorded Instances of Second Teaching Bringing Path* to Conclusion*

Reference	Name	Status	Means employed	By	Teaching asked for	Dwelling aloof	Fate	On Table 4
Vin i 14 (= S iii 68)	Koṇḍañña	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	*
	Vappa	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	*
	Bhaddiya	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	*
	Mahānāma	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	*
	Assaji	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	*
M iii 20	60 monks	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	
M iii 280 (= S iv 107)	Rāhula	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	Quite unexpected		A	
M iii 287	60 monks	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	
S ii 189	30 monks from Pāva	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	Quite unexpected		A	*
S iv 19f	1000 monks	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	
S iv 48	Unnamed monk	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	
A iv 135	60 monks	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	
Sn p 149	60 monks	Monk	Discourse	Buddha	No		A	
Vin i 17	Yasa	Lay	Reviewing Dhamma heard in progressive talk to his father	Buddha	No		A	*
M i 501	Sāriputta	Monk	Reviewing Dhamma heard in discourse to Dīghanakha	Buddha	No		A	*
D ii 42	Khaṇḍa and Tissa	Monk	Four verbs	Buddha Vipassin	No		A	*
D ii 43f	84000 monks (previously laymen)	Monk	Four verbs	Buddha Vipassin	No		A	*
D ii 44f	84000 monks (previously gone forth)	Monk	Four verbs	Buddha Vipassin	No		A	*
D iii 27	A company of Licchavis	?	Four verbs	Buddha	No		A (so cty)	
Ud 74	Bhaddiya the Dwarf	Monk	Four verbs	Sāriputta	No		A	*

Reference	Name	Status	Means employed	By	Teaching asked for	Dwelling aloof	Fate	On Table 4
Vin i 19	Vimala	Monk	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	No		A	*
Vin i 19	Subāhu	Monk	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	No		A	*
Vin i 19	Puṇṇaji	Monk	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	No		A	*
Vin i 19f	Gavampati plus 50 friends	Monk	Exhorted with Dhamma-talk	Buddha	No		A	*
S ii 220f	Kassapa	Monk	Exhortation	Buddha	Yes		A	*
M i 496	Vacchagotta	Monk	Final dhamma teaching	Buddha	Yes		A	*
A iii 70	Unnamed monk	Monk	Exhortation	Buddha	?	*	A	
A i 281f	Anuruddha	Monk	Exhortation	Sāriputta	?	*	A	
A iii 376 (= Vin i 183)	Soṇa Koḷivisa	Monk	Exhortation	Buddha	Quite unexpected	*	A	*
A iv 235	Anuruddha	Monk	Exhortation	Buddha	Quite unexpected	*	A	
S iii 35f	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S iii 36f	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S iii 73f	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S iv 37f	Migajāla	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S iv 63f	Bāhiya	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S iv 72f (= A ii 248f)	Mālukyaputta	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S v 142ff	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S v 165f	Bāhiya	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S v 187f	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
S v 188	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
A iv 299ff	Unnamed monk	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*) *	A	
Vin ii 258 (= A iv 280)	Pajāpatī	Nun	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*)	A (so cty)	
M iii 267ff (= S iv 60ff)	Puṇṇa	Monk	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes	(*)	A	
Ud 8	Bāhiya of the Bark Garment	?	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	Yes		A	
M iii 247	Pukkusāti	?	Dhamma-in-brief	Buddha	No		Anāgāmin*	
D i 177	Kassapa	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*

D i 202f	Citta	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
D ii 153	Subhadda (last sāvaka*)	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
M i 39f	Sundarika-Bhāradvāja	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
M i 391f	Seniya	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
M i 512f	Māgandiya	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
M ii 103f	Aṅgulimāla	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	
S i 161	Bhāradvāja	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 163	Akkosaka	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 164	Asurindaka	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 164	Bilaṅgika	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 165	Ahiṁsaka	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 165	Jaṭā	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 166	Suddhika	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 167	Aggika	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 170	Sundarika	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S i 171	Bhāradvāja	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
S ii 21f	Kassapa	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
Sn p 15f	Kāsi-Bhāradvāja	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	*
Sn p 111f	Sela plus 300 Brahmins	Monk	N/s	N/s	N/s	*	A	

Notes

Status: This table includes, with one exception, only those who became arahants*; it does not cover those gaining one or other of the alternative fruits*

Teaching: 'quite unexpected' indicates the direct and totally unsolicited intervention of the Buddha's grace

Dwelling aloof: (*) indicates that the teaching was requested with the expressed intention that the individual concerned could 'abide alone, aloof, diligent, ardent and self-resolute';

* indicates that the sutta ends with the statement that the person '. . . abiding alone, aloof, diligent, ardent and self-resolute not long afterwards, by his own superknowledge, having precisely in these seen conditions realised that unsurpassed culmination of the Brahmacariya* for the sake of which young men of (good) family rightly go forth into the homeless life, abided in it. He comprehended, "Destroyed is birth, brought to a close is the Brahmacariya*, done is what was to be done, there will be hereafter no more of this state of things". So the venerable . . . became an arahant*'

?: text unclear on this point

N/s: not specified

A: the person concerned became an arahant*

Cty: commentary

Glossary

Acetanā	Lacking consciousness
*Anāgāmin**	A non-returner; five varieties are enumerated: the antarā-parinibbāyin*, upahacca-parinibbāyin*, asaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin*, sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin* and uddhaṁsota akaniṭṭhagāmin*
Anāsava	Without, or unaffected by the āsavas, a term of uncertain connotation but probably a reference to the influx of the consequences of previously generated kamma
*Aññā**	The attainment of arahantship*
*Anupādisesa**	Without kammic remnant requiring further rebirth
*Arahant**	One who attains liberation in the same life
*Ariyan**	Supermundane*
*Ariyapuggala**	An ariyasāvaka*
*Ariyasaṅgha**	The community of ariyasāvakas*
*Ariyasāvaka**	A hearer (in the presence) of the ariyans*; one who has right view* and who is on the ariyan* eightfold path*
Arūpāvacara	The four realms constituting the cosmic counterpart of the four arūpa jhānas
*Asekha**	According to the commentaries an arahant* but probably originally anyone who had won his respective goal
*As it really is**	Yathābhūtaṁ; the way things really are as opposed to the way in which Māra would have us believe they are
Bhikkhusaṅgha	The order of monks
*Brahmacariya**	The ariyan* eightfold path*; literally the 'conduct conducive to attainment of Brahman'
*Deathless**	Amataṁ (Vedic amṛtaṁ), the hidden three-quarters lying beyond the phenomenal world of impermanence, or nibbāna; Brahman
*Dhammacakkhu**	The Dhamma-eye* or Dhamma-vision*; insight* into the Four Truths* acquired through oral initiation; sight of the impermanence of the phenomenal world, the sanctuary beyond and the path* thereto
*Dhammasota**	The Dhamma-ear*, the means by which one hears the sound emanating from the Deathless*
*Diṭṭhipatta**	A sotāpanna*
*Diṭṭhisampanna**	A diṭṭhipatta*
Dukkha	Misery, suffering, unsatisfactoriness; the dissatisfaction felt upon seeing things as they really are*

*Ekabījin**	A one-seeder, one who gives rise to one more birth before tasting the bliss of liberation; identified with the sotāpanna*
*Four Truths**	Dukkha, the arising of dukkha, the cessation of dukkha and the (eightfold) path* leading to the cessation of dukkha
Gandhabba	The being seeking rebirth whose presence is one of three factors required for conception to occur
Iddhi	Psychic power or potency
*Insight**	Paññā*, the Dhammacakkhu*
Kāmāvacara	The realm of sense-desire: the hells, this world and the first six devalokas above the earth
*Kāyasakkhin**	A sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* or one treading the arahant-path*
*Kolaṅkola**	One who goes from clan to clan for two or three births before tasting the bliss of liberation; identified with the sotāpanna*
Māra	Ādhidaivically the cosmic Tempter; ādhyātmically sense-desire
*Opapātika**	An anāgāmin* but a term still awaiting investigation
*Paññā**	Insight* afforded by the Dhammacakkhu*
Parato ghosa	The sound of the Deathless* heard with the aid of the Dhammasota*
Parinibbāti	To attain liberation
Parinibbāyati	Parinibbāti
*Path**	The ariyan* eightfold path*
Puthujjana	Anyone not possessing insight* into the Four Truths*
*Right view**	The insight* afforded by the Dhammacakkhu* and entrance to the ariyan* eightfold path*
Right view	Belief in the efficacy of almsgiving
Rūpāvacara	The Brahmaloka; the ādhidaivic counterpart of the four rūpa jhānas
Sacetanā	Possessing consciousness
*Saddhāvimutta**	A sakadāgāmin*, anāgāmin* or one treading the arahant-path*
*Sakadāgāmin**	A once-returner though the term sees a variety of interpretation in the commentaries
*Sappurisa**	A Paccekabuddha or a sāvaka* of the Tathāgata
*Sattakkhattuparama**	One taking birth up to seven more times before tasting the bliss of liberation
Sa-upādisesa	With kammic remnant requiring further rebirth for its expiation
*Sāvaka**	Ariyasāvaka*
*Sāvakasaṅgha**	Ariyasaṅgha*
*Sekha**	According to the commentaries a sotāpanna*, sakadāgāmin or an anāgāmin* but probably originally anyone on the path* who has not yet won his respective goal

Son of the Buddha*	One who has undergone the ariyan* birth, the spiritual rebirth of oral initiation
*Sotāpanna**	Identified with the ekabījin*, kolaṅkola* and sattakkhattuparama* but originally perhaps a general term for the converted
*Sotāpattiyaṅgas**	Confidence in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the ariyasaṅgha* plus possession of that morality dear to the ariyans* possessed by all sāvakas* but at times seen as attributes of the sotāpanna* alone
Sukha	Happiness, ease, satisfaction; the opposite of dukkha
*Supermundane**	Ariyan*, pertaining to the Deathless*
*Suvimutta**	Fully released
Thera	Elder, a senior rank of monk
Vimāna	A dwelling of differing shape possessed by a deva
*Vimutta**	Released

Abbreviations

A	Aṅguttara Nikāya
AA	Manorathapūraṇī Aṅguttaranikāyaṭṭhakathā
Asl	Atthasālinī Dhammasaṅganī-aṭṭhakathā
B Disc	Book of the Discipline
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary
BU	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BvA	Madhuratthavilāsinī Buddhavaṁsa-aṭṭhakathā
CPD	Critical Pali Dictionary
CU	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
D	Dīgha Nikāya
DA	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā
Dhp	Dhammapada
DhpA	Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā
Dhs trans	Translation of the Dhammasaṅganī: Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics
Dial	Dialogues of the Buddha
DPL	Dictionary of the Pali Language
DPPN	Dictionary of Pali Proper Names
EV	Elders' Verses
GS	The Book of the Gradual Sayings
It	Itivuttaka
Kern	Kern's translation of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra
Khp	Khuddakapāṭha
KhpA	Paramatthajotikā Khuddakapāṭha-aṭṭhakathā
KS	The Book of the Kindred Sayings
Kvu	Kathāvatthu
M	Majjhima Nikāya (plus volume and page)
M-	Majjhima Nikāya (plus number of sutta)
MA	Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā
Mhv	Mahāvastu
Miln	Milindapañha
MLS	Middle Length Sayings
para	Paragraph
PED	Pali-English Dictionary
per	Person
pl	Plural
Points of Contr.	Points of Controversy
pot	Potential

PuggA	Pañcapakaraṇaṭṭhakathā Puggalapaññatti-aṭṭhakathā
Pv	Petavatthu
PvA	Paramatthadīpanī Petavatthu-aṭṭhakathā
RV	Ṛg Veda
S	Saṁyutta Nikāya
SA	Sāratthapakāsinī Saṁyuttanikāyaṭṭhakathā
SBE	Sacred Books of the East
SED	Sanskrit-English Dictionary
Sn	Suttanipāta (plus number of verse)
Sn p	Suttanipāta (plus number of page)
SnA	Paramatthajotikā Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā
ŚU	Śvetāśvatara Upaṇisad
Thag	Theragāthā
U	Upaniṣad
Ud	Udāna
UdA	Paramatthadīpanī Udāna-aṭṭhakathā
VA	Samantapāsādikā Vinayaṭṭhakathā
Vin	Vinaya Piṭaka
Vsm	Visuddhimagga
VsmA	Paramatthamañjūsā Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā
Vv	Vimānavatthu
VvA	Paramatthadīpanī Vimānavatthu-aṭṭhakathā

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